Jacques Derrida
Of the Humanities
and the Philosophical Discipline.
The Right to Philosophy from the Cosmopolitical Point of View
(the Example of an International Institution).
S U R F A C E S Vol. IV. 310 Folio 1 (1994), Montréal
Vendome (Editions UNESCO Verdier PUF) 1997
ABSTRACT - This essay engages in
a rethinking of the right to philosophy in its international dimension.
It grounds its reflections in a reading of Kant's "Idea of a Universal
History from a Cosmopolitical Point of View," considering the essay
in terms of its implications for institutions founded after World War II.
In examining these implications, it discusses issues of Eurocentrism, the
founding history of modernity, and the role of UNESCO in posing the question
of contemporary philosophy.
RESUME - L'auteur entreprend de repenser le droit a la philosophie dans
sa dimension internationale. La reflexion qu'il engage s'appuie sur une
lecture de "Idee (en vue) d'une histoire universelle au point de vue
cosmopolite" qui fait ressortir les implications de ce texte de Kant
pour certaines institutions fondees apres la seconde guerre mondiale. En
examinant ces implications, l'auteur aborde la problematique de l'Euro-centrisme,
l'histoire de l'emergence de la modernite, et le role de l'UNESCO dans la
reflexion sur la philosophie contemporaine.
[ en français - auf Deutsch ]
The problematic which constitutes the charter of our international
meeting compels us to take into consideration, at least by way of example,
two types of relation: 1. The interinstitutional relation among universities
or research institutes on the one hand, and among international institutions
of culture (governmental or non-governmental) on the other; 2. The particular
interdisciplinary relation between philosophy and the "humanities."
"Philosophy" names here both a discipline that belongs to the
"humanities" and that discipline which claims to think, elaborate
and criticize the axiomatic of the "humanities," particularly
the problem of the humanism or the presumed universalism of the "humanities."
It is this problematic which permits me to submit to you here part of an
unpublished talk which I gave recently on these subjects at UNESCO, and
which I have recast for our conference. (1)
Of Philosophy -- Debt and Duty
I will begin with the question "where?"
Not directly with the question "where are we?" or "where
have we come to?" but "where does the question of the right to
philosophy take place?," which can be immediately translated by "where
ought it take place?"
Where does it find today its most appropriate place?
The very form of this question concerning a question -- namely "where?,
in what place can a question take place?" -- supposes that between
the question and the place, between the question of the question and the
question of the place, there be a sort of implicit contract, a supposed
affinity, as if a question should always be first authorized by a place,
legitimated in advance by a determined space that makes it both rightful
and meaningful, thus making it possible and by the same token necessary,
both legitimate and inevitable.
According to the French idiom -- and already the usage of this idiom, the
effective authority of this idiom, brings us back to the question of the
cosmopolitical and would by itself enjoin us to ask this question -- one
would say that there are places where there are grounds for asking this
question. (2) That is to say, that
here this question is legitimately and rightfully not only possible and
authorized but also necessary, indeed prescribed. In such places, such a
question, for example that of the right to philosophy from the cosmopolitical
point of view, can and should take place. For example, UNESCO would thus,
perhaps fundamentally, be the privileged place -- I say this not out of
convention and not at all out of politeness to our hosts -- indeed, the
only place possible for truly developing the question which brings us together
today. In its very form, the authority of this question in a way bears the
stamp of this institution, receiving from it in principle both its response
and its responsibility. To say it in a word, it is as if UNESCO, and by
privilege the philosophy department within it, were, if I may say so, the
particular emanation of something like philosophy, of something like "a
right to philosophy from the cosmopolitical point of view," an emanation
that is particular for being circular, as if a source -- and the emanation
is always from a source -- were going back to the source. UNESCO is perhaps
born from the positing of a right to philosophy from the cosmopolitical
point of view, and it is properly up to UNESCO to answer for this right
by responding to this question. UNESCO bears both the response and the responsibility
for this question. Why? Why is UNESCO, in its proper destination, in the
mission which it has assigned to itself, the institution which today is
par excellence qualified to ask this question, to do it justice in its turn,
to elaborate it and to draw the practical teachings from such an elaboration?
My subtitle transparently alludes to the famous title of a great short text
by Kant, Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht
(1784), Idea (in View) of a Universal History from a Cosmopolitical Point
of View. (3) As we know, this brief
and difficult text belongs to that ensemble of Kant's writings that can
be described as announcing, that is to say, predicting, prefiguring and
prescribing a certain number of international institutions which only came
into being in this century, for the most part after the Second World War.
These institutions are already philosophemes, as is the idea of international
law or rights that they attempt to put into operation. They are philosophical
acts and archives, philosophical productions and products, not only because
the concepts which legitimate them have an assignable philosophical history
and therefore a philosophical history which is inscribed in UNESCO's charter
or constitution but also, by the same token and for that very reason, because
such institutions imply sharing a culture and a philosophical language.
And from that moment on, they are commited to make possible the access to
this language and culture, first and foremost by means of education. All
the States that adhere to the charters of these international institutions
commit themselves, in principle and philosophically, to recognize and put
into operation in an effective way something like philosophy and a certain
philosophy of rights and law, the rights of man, universal history, etc.
The signature of these charters is a philosophical act which makes a commitment
to philosophy in a philosophical way. From that moment on, whether they
say so or not, know it or not, or conduct themselves consequently or not,
these States and these peoples contract a philosophical commitment by dint
of joining these charters or participating in these institutions. Therefore,
these States contract at the very least a commitment to provide the philosophical
culture or education that is required for understanding and putting into
operation these commitments made to the international institutions, which
are, I repeat, philosophical in essence. (Let us note in passing that this
may be interpreted by some as an infinite opening, and by others as a limit
to universality itself, if one considers, for example, that a certain concept
of philosophy and even of philosophical cosmopolitism, indeed of international
rights and law, is too European -- but this is a problem that will undoubtedly
come up again in the discussion.)
What are the concrete stakes of this situation today? Why should the large
questions of philosophical teaching and research, and the imperative of
the right to philosophy, be more than ever developed in their international
dimension? Why are the responsibilities to be assumed no longer simply national,
less national today than ever, and even less tomorrow than ever, in the
21st century? What do "national," "international," "cosmopolitical,"
and "universal" signify here, for and with regard to philosophy,
philosophical research, philosophical education or training, and indeed
for a philosophical question or practice that would not be essentially linked
to research or education?
A philosopher is always someone for whom philosophy is not given, someone
who in essence must question him or herself about the essence and destination
of philosophy. It is necessary to recall this fact even if it seems trivial
or too obvious. For such a situation and such a duty are more particular
than it seems. And this can lead to fearsome practical consequences. The
existence of places such as UNESCO, that is, of international institutions
that not only imply a philosophy, indeed, imply philosophy in the discourse,
and I would even say in the language, of their charter, but have also deemed
it necessary to endow themselves with a specialized department of philosophy
(which is not at all self-evident and which recalls the whole debate, open
ever since Kant's The Conflict of Faculties: why would an essentially philosophical
institution need a department of philosophy? Contrary to Kant, Schelling
thought that, since the university is nothing but a large philosophical
institution, philosophical in all its parts, and since philosophy is supposed
to be everywhere in the university, there was thus no reason to confine
it to one department); the existence, then, of a properly philosophical
place like UNESCO, and the fact that UNESCO's mode of being is one that
is a priori philosophical, constitute, it seems to me, a sort of axiomatic,
a system of values, norms and regulating principles in virtue of which we
are here, of course, but which also prescribe every philosopher to question
him or herself concretely about such a situation, and not to take it as
an established and obvious fact without serious consequences.
Before drawing some preliminary consequences -- less abstract than these
first axioms -- allow me to recall Kant's text. If it announces and prescribes
a "universal cosmopolitical state" (state, Zustand in the sense
of the state of things, of the situation, of the real constitution, and
not of the State with a capital S), if Kant specifies at least the hope
(Hoffnung) for it, the hope that after many revolutions and transformations
this cosmopolitism "in the end" (endlich) becomes a fact, and
if Kant founds this hope (which remains a hope) on the purpose which is
"the highest in nature" (was die Natur zur höchsten Absicht
hat), this hope is everything but the expression of a confident optimism
and, above all, of an abstract universalism. By briefly underlining some
limits that give to the Kantian discourse its very form -- its form at once
the most positive, the most modern, the most richly instructive, but also
the most problematic -- and by insisting rather on the difficulties, I would
like to introduce the presentations and the discussion that will follow,
introduce them and not, obviously, anticipate them, precede them, and even
less foresee them or program them.
What are these difficulties? What do they prefigure concerning the tasks
and problems of our time? But also, what do they not prefigure? And what
in our time could, indeed, should, exceed a discourse such as Kant's? The
idea (in the Kantian sense) which brings us here together in the awareness
that the definition of a philosophical task and of a right to philosophy
should be formulated in its cosmopolitical, and therefore international
or inter-state dimension (and it is already a serious question to know whether
the cosmopolitical traces a link among the cities, the poleis of the world,
as nations, as peoples, or as States), this idea supposes, and Kant says
so himself, a philosophical approach to universal history that is inseparable
from a sort of plan of nature that aims at the total, perfect political
unification of the human species (die vollkommene bürgerliche Vereinigung
in der Menschengattung). Whoever would have doubts about such a unification
and, above all, about a plan of nature, would have no reason to subscribe
even to the fact of sharing a philosophical problematic, of a supposedly
universal or universalizable problematic of philosophy. For anybody having
doubts about this plan of nature, the whole project of writing a universal
-- and therefore philosophical -- history, and thus as well the project
of creating institutions governed by an international -- and therefore philosophical
-- law, would be nothing but a novel. "Novel" is Kant's term;
he is so aware of the risk that, several times, he deems it necessary to
confront this hypothesis or this accusation, and, for that matter, to reaffirm
that this philosophical idea, regardless of how extravagant it may appear
to be, is neither a fiction nor a novel-like story -- and that philosophy,
in the body of its institution that is in formation, is above all not literature,
and more generally not a fiction, in any case not a fiction of the imaginary.
Yet the danger of literature, of the becoming-literature of philosophy is
so pressing, and so present to Kant, that he names and rejects it several
times. Yet, in order to do so, it is necessary for him both to invoke the
guiding thread of a pattern of nature (the guiding thread, i.e., a convenient
instrument of representation [Darstellung], which is not the surest way
of being free from the novel), and also to take the history of the European
nations as the surest guiding thread for following this guiding thread,
first of all taking this history in its Greek, and then Roman, beginnings
-- in opposition to that of the so-called barbaric nations. This is why
this text, which is cosmopolitical in spirit, according to a law that could
be verified well beyond Kant, is the most strongly eurocentered text that
can be, not only in its philosophical axiomatic but also in its retrospective
reference to Greco-Roman history and in its prospective reference to the
future hegemony of Europe which, Kant says, is the continent that "will
probably legislate some day for all the others."
Since this difficult and acute question of the European, indeed continental,
model of philosophy for our problematic today will not fail, I suppose,
in truth I hope, to re-emerge in the debate that will follow, I would like
to evoke a few lines of Kant's text. They indicate that the only means of
opposing philosophical reason to the novel or to extravagant fiction is,
at least in Kant's eyes, to trust the European history of reason and first
of all the Greco-Roman history of history. In the Seventh Proposition, Kant
recalls that nature will have naturally and paradoxically used the natural
unsociability of men (and Kant is a pessimist insofar as he believes in
this natural unsociability of men and in the natural or originary state
of war among men) to push them into contracting artificial and institutional
links, and into entering a Society of Nations:
Nature has thus again used the unsociability (Ungeselligkeit,
Unvertragsamkeit) of men, and even among the large societies and state bodies
which human beings construct, as a means of arriving at a state of calm
and security through their inevitable antagonism. Wars, tense and unremitting
military preparations, and the resultant distress which every state must
eventually feel within itself, even in the midst of peace -- these are the
means by which nature drives nations to make initially imperfect attempts,
but finally, after many devastations, upheavals and even complete inner
exhaustion of their powers, to take the step which reason could have suggested
to them even without so many sad experiences -- that of abandoning a lawless
state of savagery and entering a Society of Nations of peoples in which
every state, even the smallest, could expect to derive its security and
rights not from its own power or its own legal judgment, but solely from
this great Society of Nations (of peoples: Volkerbunde) (Foedus Amphyctionum),
from a united power and the law-governed decisions of a united will. However
novel-like (more precisely, however exalted, enthusiastic, schwarmerisch)
this idea may appear, and it has been ridiculed as such when put forward
by the Abbe St. Pierre and Rousseau (perhaps because they believed that
its realisation was imminent), it is nonetheless the inevitable outcome
of the distress in which men involve one another. For this distress must
force the states to adopt exactly the same resolution, ... etc.
The logic of this teleology is that we ought to be grateful to nature --
and Kant literally says so -- for having created us so naturally, so originarily
unsociable and so scarcely philosophical in order to push us, through culture,
art and artifice (Kunst), and reason, to make the seeds of nature blossom.
That which resembles a novel-like story yet isn't one, that which in truth
is but the very historicity of history, is this ruse of nature. Nature makes
use of the detour of violence and of primitive, thus natural, unsociability
in order to aid reason and thereby put philosophy into operation through
the society of nations. Here we would find a paradoxal incitement to today's
debates. For, in this teleological ruse of nature, Greco-Roman Europe, philosophy
and Western history, and I would even dare saying continental history, are
the driving force, both capital and exemplary, as if nature, in its rational
ruse, had assigned Europe this special mission: not only that of founding
history as such, and first of all as science, not only that of founding
philosophy as such, and first of all as science, but also the mission of
founding a rational philosophical (non-novel-like) history and that of "legislating
some day" for all other continents. In the Ninth Proposition, Kant
admits for the second time that the philosophical attempt at treating universal
history according to a hidden design of nature and with a view towards the
total political unification of humanity resembles a Novel (and here he names
the novel by its name, Roman). Yet in order to contradict this novel-like
hypothesis and to think human history, beyond the novel, as a system and
not as an aggregate without plan, program nor providence, he refers to what
he calls the guiding thread (Leitfaden) of Greek history (griechische Geschichte),
"the only one," he says, "in which all other earlier or contemporary
histories are preserved or at least authenticated".
(4) In other words, Greek historicity or historiographicity
would be the sign, the index and therefore the guiding thread that allows
us to think that a history which brings together everything that concerns
the universality of humankind is at all possible. Of this Greek history
(history both in the sense of Geschichte and Historie, history in the sense
of event and of narrative, of the authenticated account, of historical science),
one can trace the influence, Kant says, upon the formation and decline of
the political body of the Roman people insofar as it first "swallowed"
the Greek polis, and then sketched the cosmopolis by influencing or colonizing
the Barbarians who in turn destroyed Rome. To this, Kant adds:
if, finally, we add the political history of other peoples episodically,
insofar as knowledge of them has gradually come down to us through these
enlightened nations, we shall discover a regular process of improvement
in the political constitutions of our continent (in unserem Weltteile) (which
will probably legislate some day for all other continents [der wahrscheinlicher
Weise allen anderen dereinst Gesetze geben wird]).
The teleological axis of this discourse has become the tradition of European
modernity. One encounters it again and again, intact and invariable throughout
variations as serious as those that distinguish Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger
and Valery. One also encounters it in its practical form, sometimes through
denial, in a number of politico-institutional discourses, whether on the
European or world scale. This eurocentric discourse forces us to ask ourselves
-- I'll say this very schematically so as not to keep the floor for too
long -- whether today our reflection concerning the unlimited extension
and the reaffirmation of a right to philosophy should not both take into
account and de-limit the assignation of philosophy to its Greco-European
origin or memory. At stake is neither contenting oneself with reaffirming
a certain history, a certain memory of origins or of the Western history
(Mediterranean or Central European, Greco-Roman-Arab or Germanic) of philosophy,
nor contenting oneself with being opposed to, or opposing denial to, this
memory and to these languages, but rather trying to displace the fundamental
schema of this problematic by going beyond the old, tiresome, worn-out and
wearisome opposition between Eurocentrism and anti-Eurocentrism. One of
the conditions for getting there -- and one won't get there all of a sudden
in one try, it will be the effect of a long and slow historical labor that
is under way -- is the active becoming-aware of the fact that philosophy
is no longer determined by a program, an originary language or tongue whose
memory it would suffice to recover so as to discover its destination, that
philosophy is no more assigned to its origin or by its origin, than it is
simply, spontaneously or abstractly cosmopolitical or universal. What we
have lived and what we are more and more aiming for are modes of appropriation
and transformation of the philosophical in non-European languages and cultures.
Such modes of appropriation and transformation amount neither to the classical
mode of appropriation that consists in making one's own what belongs to
the other (here, in interiorizing the Western memory of philosophy and in
assimilating it in one's own language) nor to the invention of new modes
of thought which, as alien to all appropriation, would no longer have any
relation to what one believes one recognizes under the name of philosophy.
What is happening today, and what I believe has been happening for a long
time, are philosophical formations that cannot be locked into this fundamentally
cultural, colonial or neo-colonial dialectic of appropriation and alienation.
There are other ways for philosophy than those of appropriation as expropriation
(to lose one's memory by assimilating the memory of the other, the one being
opposed to the other, as if an ex-appropriation was not possible, indeed
the only possible chance). Not only are there other ways for philosophy,
but philosophy, if there is any such thing, is the other way. And it has
always been the other way: philosophy has never been the unfolding responsible
for a unique, originary assignation linked to a unique language or to the
place of a sole people. Philosophy does not have one sole memory. Under
its Greek name and in its European memory, it has always been bastard, hybrid,
grafted, multilinear and polyglot. We must adjust our practice of the history
of philosophy, our practice of history and of philosophy, to this reality
which was also a chance and which more than ever remains a chance. What
I am saying here of philosophy can just as well be said, and for the same
reasons, of law and rights, and of democracy.
In philosophy as elsewhere Eurocentrism and anti-colonialism are symptoms
of a colonial and missionary culture. A concept of the cosmopolitical that
would still be determined by such opposition would not only still concretely
limit the development of the right to philosophy but also would not even
account for what happens in philosophy. In order to think in the direction
of what happens and could still happen under the name of philosophy (and
the name is both very serious and unimportant, depending on what is done
with it), we must think about what the concrete conditions for respecting
and extending the right of philosophy may be. I will juxtapose very quickly
here the headings of problems that are in truth systematically or structurally
coordinated.
1. First heading. Whoever thinks that s/he has to make the right to philosophy
from a cosmopolitical point of view be respected, accorded and extended
should take into account what is -- but also what has always been -- the
competition among several philosophical models, styles and traditions that
are linked to national or linguistic histories, even if they can never be
reduced to effects of a nation or a language. To take the most canonical
example, which is far from being the only one and which itself includes
numerous sub-varieties, the opposition between the so-called continental
tradition of philosophy and the so-called analytic or anglo-saxon philosophy
is not reducible to national limits or linguistic givens. This is not only
an immense problem and an enigma for European or Anglo-American philosophers
who have been trained in these such traditions. A certain history, notably
but not only a colonial history, constituted these two models as hegemonic
references in the entire world. The right to philosophy requires not only
an appropriation of these two competing models and of almost every model
by all, men and women (par tous et par toutes, and when I say toutes, it
is not so as to be formally prudent regarding grammatical categories --
I'll come back to this in a moment), the right of all (men and women) to
philosophy also requires the reflection, the displacement and the deconstruction
of these hegemonies, the access to places and to phi-losophical events which
are exhausted neither in these two dominant traditions nor in these languages.
These stakes are already intra-European.
2. Second heading. Respecting and extending the right of all (men and women)
to philosophy also supposes, and I'm saying it too quickly again, the appropriation
but also the surpassing of languages which, according to the schema that
I was putting into question just a bit ago, are called foundational or originary
for philosophy, i.e., the Greek, Latin, German or Arab languages. Philosophy
should be practiced, according to paths that are not simply anamnesic, in
languages which are without filiational relation with these roots. If the
most often hegemonic extension of this or that language, in an almost all-powerful
way -- and I mean the extension of English -- can serve as a vehicle for
the universal penetration of the philosophical and of philosophical communication,
philosophy demands by the same token, and for that very reason, that we
liberate ourselves from the phenomena of dogmatism and authority which language
can produce. It is not a matter of removing philosophy from language and
from what ties it forever to the idiomatic. It is not a matter of promoting
an abstractly universal philosophical thought that does not inhere in the
body of the idiom, but on the contrary of putting it into operation each
time in an original way and in a non-finite multiplicity of idioms, producing
philosophical events which are neither particularistic and intranslatable
nor transparently abstract and univocal in the element of an abstract universality.
With a sole language, it is always a philosophy, an axiomatic of philosophical
discourse and communication, which imposes itself without any possible discussion.
I would say something analogous, or in any case stemming from the same logic,
for science and technology. It goes without saying that the development
of sciences and technologies (whether theoretical physics, astrophysics
or genetics, computers or medecine, be they in the service of economy or
even of military strategy) breaks open the path, for better or worse, for
a cosmopolitical communication, and as such opens the ways, through scientific
research yet also through epistemology or the history of the sciences, for
what in philosophy will have been, and always has been, in solidarity with
the movement of science, in different modes. The hypothesis or the wish
which I would be tempted to submit to the discussion is that, while taking
into account or taking charge of this progress of the sciences in the spirit
of a new era of Enlightenment for the coming new millennium (and in this
respect I remain Kantian), a politics of the right to philosophy for all
(men and women) not be only a politics of science and of technology but
also a politics of thought which would yield neither to positivism nor to
scientism nor to epistemology, and which would discover again, on the scale
of new stakes, in its relation to science but also to religions, and also
to law and to ethics, an experience which would be at once provocation or
reciprocal respect but also irreducible autonomy. In this respect, the problems
are always tradi-tional and always new, whether they concern ecology, bio-ethics,
artificial insemination, organ transplantation, international law, etc.
They thus touch upon the concept of the proper, of property, of the relation
to self and to the other within the values of subject and object, of subjectivity,
of identity, of the person, i.e., all the fundamental concepts of the charters
that govern international relations and institutions, such as the international
law that is, in principle, supposed to regulate them.
Considering what links science to technology, to economy, to politico-economic
or politico-military interests, the autonomy of philosophy with respect
to science is as essential for the practice of a right to philosophy as
the autonomy with respect to religions is essential for whoever wants philosophy
not to be off limits for anyone (man or woman). I am alluding here to what,
in every cultural, linguistic, national and religious area, can limit the
right to philosophy for social, political or religious reasons, for belonging
to a class, age or gender -- or all of that at once. I'll take the risk
here of affirming that, beyond what would link philosophy to its Greco-European
memory, or to European languages, even beyond what would link it to an already
constituted Western model of what one calls, in Greek, democracy, it seems
to me impossible to dissociate the motif of the right to philosophy-from-the-cosmopolitical-point-of-view
from the motif of a democracy to come. Without linking the concept of democracy
to its past givens and even less to the facts classified under this name
-- all of which hold within themselves the trace of the hegemonies that
I mentioned more or less directly -- I do not believe that the right to
philosophy (which an international institution like UNESCO is duty bound
to uphold and to extend in its effectiveness) is dissociable from a movement
of effective democratization. You can easily imagine that what I am saying
here is everything but an abstract wish and conventional concession to some
democratic consensus. In today's world, the stakes have never been as serious,
and they are new stakes, calling for a new philosophical reflection upon
what democracy and, I insist, the democracy to come, may mean and be. Not
wanting to be too lengthy in this introduction, I'll wait until the discussion
to say more on this subject.
3. Third heading. Although philosophy does not amount to its institutional
or pedagogical moments, it is obvious that all the differences in tradition,
style, language and philosophical nationality are translated or incarnated
in institutional or pedagogical models, and sometimes even produced by these
structures (primary and secondary school [...], university, research institutions).
They are the various places for the debates, competitions, war or communication
of which we will speak in a few moments; but, in order to conclude on this
subject, I would like for the last time to turn to Kant, so as to situate
what today may constitute the limit or the crisis most shared by all the
societies which, be they Western or not, might wish to put into operation
a right to philosophy. Beyond political or religious motivations, beyond
the motivations -- at times apparently philosophical -- that may lead to
limiting the right to philosophy, and indeed even to prohibiting philosophy
(for a particular social class, for women, for adolescents not yet of a
certain age, etc., for specialists of this or that discipline or for members
of this or that group), and even beyond all the discriminatory motivations
in this regard, philosophy is everywhere suffering, in Europe and elsewhere,
both in its teaching and in its research, from a limit which, even though
it does not always take the explicit form of prohibition or censure, nonetheless
amounts to that, for the simple reason that the means for supporting teaching
and research in philosophy are limited. In liberal-capitalist as well as
in socialist or social-democratic societies, not to mention in authoritarian
or totalitarian regimes, this limitation is motivated -- I am not saying
justified -- by budgetary balances that give priority to research and training
for research that is, often correctly, labelled useful, profitable and urgent,
to so-called end-oriented sciences, and to techno-economic, indeed, scientifico-military
imperatives. For me, it is not a matter of indiscrimately contesting all
of these imperatives. But the more these imperatives impose themselves --
and sometimes for the best reasons in the world, and sometimes with a view
to developments without which the development of philosophy itself would
no longer have any chance in the world -- the more also the right to philosophy
becomes increasingly urgent, irreducible, as does the call to philosophy
in order precisely to think and discern, evaluate and criticize, philosophies.
For they, too, are philosophies, they that, in the name of a techno-economico-military
positivism and according to diverse modalities, tend to reduce the field
and the chances of an open and unlimited philosophy, both in its teaching
and in its research, as well as in the effectiveness of its international
exchanges.
It is for these reasons -- and I'll stop here for now -- that, for whatever
reservations I thought needed to be made with respect to the Kantian concept
of the cosmopolis (both too naturalist and too teleologically European),
I will still cite Kant in conclusion. I will cite what he calls exemplarily
an example. His short treatise, Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitical
Point of View, is also obviously a treatise on education, and it could not
be otherwise. In his Eighth Proposition, after having announced and acclaimed
the Enlightenment era and the universal freedom of religion, Kant writes
the following, which still remains worthy of meditation today, almost without
transposition. If I had to give a title to this passage, it would perhaps
be "Of Philosophy -- Debt and Duty."
...This enlightenment, and with it a certain sympathetic interest
which the enlightened man inevitably feels for anything good which he comprehends
fully, must gradually spread upwards towards the thrones and even influence
their principles of government. But while, for example, our world rulers
have no money to spare for public educational institutions or indeed for
anything which concerns the world's best interests (das Weltbeste), because
everything has already been calculated out in advance for the next war,
they will nonetheless find that it is to their own advantage at least not
to hinder their citizens' private efforts in this direction, however weak
and slow they may be. But in the end, war itself gradually becomes not only
a highly artifical undertaking, extremely uncertain in its outcome for both
parties, but also a very dubious risk to take, since its aftermath is felt
by the state in the shape of a constantly increasing national debt (a modern
invention) (Schuldenlast (einer neuen Erfindung)) whose repayment becomes
unforeseeable (unabsehlich) [repayment is Tilgung, the annulation, the erasure
of the debt, the destruction which Hegel distinguishes from the Aufhebung
which erases while conserving]. And in addition, the effects which an upheaval
in any state produces upon all the others in our continent, where all are
so closely linked by trade, are so perceptible that these other states are
forced by their own insecurity to offer themselves as arbiters, albeit without
legal authority, so that they indirectly prepare the way for a great political
body of the future, for which the past world has no example to show [such
a consequence not only relaunches the large question of debt in terms of
its geopolitical effects which are decisive today for the future of the
world; it also opens the way for a reading of Kant that is less, let us
say, traditionalist and perhaps less teleologistic than that which I sketched
above]. Although this political body exists for the present only in the
roughest of outlines, it nonetheless seems as if a feeling is beginning
to stir in all its members, each of which has an interest in maintaining
the whole (Erhaltung des Ganzen). And this encourages the hope that, after
many revolutions, with all their transforming effects, the highest design
of nature, a universal cosmopolitical state, will at last be realised as
the matrix within which all the original capacities of the human race may
develop.
With this citation I wanted to suggest that the right to philosophy may
require from now on a distinction among several registers of debt, between
a finite debt and an infinite debt, between debt and duty, between a certain
erasure and a certain reaffirmation of debt -- and sometimes a certain erasure
in the name of reaffirmation.
Jacques Derrida (Trans. Thomas Dutoit)
NOTES
1 "Des Humanites et de la discipline philosophique.
Le droit a la philosophie du point de vue cosmopolitique (l'exemple d'une
institution internationale)." Delivered at UNESCO in Paris in March
1991 -- Trans. The French noun in the title for "right," droit,
has other connotations, such as "legitimacy," "law"
as well as "rights" and is thus translated in various ways in
this essay, depending on the context. For an extensive discussion of droit,
and with especial reference to it in Kant, see Derrida's preface to his
Du droit a la philosophie, "Privilege. Titre justificatif et remarques
introductives" (Paris: Gallimard, 1990): 9-108. -- Trans. (1)
2 The translation of the French il y a des lieux
ou il y a lieu de cannot keep the signifier lieu in the latter idiomatic
il y a lieu de for it means "there is (good) reason to" or "there
are grounds for"; lieu, however, generally means "place,"
as in the first part of the phrase. -- Trans. (2)
3 This English title translates how Derrida translates
the German title. Lewis White Beck has translated Kant's text as "Idea
for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose" (in Kant's Political
Writings, ed. Hans Reiss. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1970, 41-53). Beck's
translation is used here although modified occasionally, most notably in
the title where "cosmopolitical" has replaced "cosmopolitan."
-- Trans. (3)
4 We give Beck's translation here instead of
the French translation of Kant's text by Stephane Piobetta (in Kant. La
Philosophie de l'Histoire. Paris: Aubier, 1947) which Derrida cites here
-- see facing page. Kant's German is: "d[ie]jenige, wodurch uns jede
andere ältere oder gleichzeitige aufbehalten worden, wenigstens beglaubigt
werden muß." (4)
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