

## NOTES

1. How long has it been since *à propos*? This dispatch is to remind the reader that CA is still the siglum for *Cien Años de Soledad*, or rather, for its translation: *One Hundred Years of Solitude*. I would, here, refer the reader back to the appropriate note in the opening section for all of the plays between CA, *Sa*, and *ça*.

2. *à propos* used, but never theorized, the notion of the "pastiche" when it collected cut citations. The usefulness of the pastiche and the collage as a strategy for a new critical discourse as well as a new pedagogy has been discussed in impressive detail in Greg Ulmer's *Applied Grammatology*. Though Ulmer seems to over-formalize in order to offer explanations and models, his work is useful here in its attention both to the play of language as material to be morselized and the inscription of psychoanalytic discourse into *glas*-writing (see also, along these latter lines, his excellent essay on *Glas*, Derrida, and the unconscious in *Glassary*). Also of interest concerning the effect of the pastiche are Vince Leitch's brief remarks on *Glas* in his book on "Deconstructive Criticism." Leitch recognizes that *Glas* is the place where criticism turns on itself and produces a certain textual dispersion. He then offers this literary comparison:

"*Glas* bears to critical discourse a relation like that which *Finnegans Wake* holds with the novel. Excesses of innumerable sorts court unreadability. It is difficult, then, to say we have 'read' *Glas*; the relationship is more one of 'getting to know you' than 'you're mine.'" (Leitch, 205)

This overstates the case a bit on the "difficulty" factor; but overstatement is not out of place in such a discussion. There is much more to be said on Derrida and Joyce (Derrida has already said much), but that is another book or, rather, another pastiche.

3. The notion of *Glas* and CA as "legends" is complex and deserves more attention. Gayatri Spivak, in her fine essay on *Glas*, reminds me that *Glas* insists on this name -- "not a fable: a legend." She goes on to attempt a distinction:

"A fable is to be spoken, a legend read. I can read *Glas* not merely as a story or an argument, but as a significant typographic design. This is an aspect of the play of the book. I mention it often, but not often enough. The *coup de de* (stroke of the d) is, in this sense, a repeat performance of the typographic play in Mallarmé's *Coup de des*. I remind myself that 'legend' relates to 'lecture' or reading, to *lexie*, to dialectics, to prolegomenon; that is, an explanatory *inscription*, and through the common root, *legein*, it turns logos into writing." (Spivak, 25)

Spivak goes on to relate and describe the legendary layout of *Glas*, and the implications of that layout for reading. The description is important and recommended. Still, she never quite develops a rendering of "legend" as numismatic inscription which she implies in her definition. I suspect this reading, too, is at stake here. For a full discussion of the "value" of inscriptions, of texts more often discussed than read (like *Glas*), see Sam Weber's excellent *The Legend of Freud*.

4. The relationship between "here" [*ici*], and the Immaculate Conception -- tachygraphied in *Glas* as IC -- is a very complicated one. Geoffrey Hartman does an admirable job teasing out all of the plays on IC, ICH, CHI, and *ICI* in *Glas*, in *Saving the Text*. The Immaculate Conception plays a feature role in *Glas*, since it removes the father (Genet's problem) and negates the mother's role as anything other than a vessel (Hegel's familial construction) while demanding no spillage of seed, no dissemination, no remainder. The logic of reading IC across Hegel's family and into Genet's delimits the boundaries of both familial constructions. The additional relationships, between ICH as fish, a "Gabrielle" (Genet's mother) as a type of moonfish, CHI as the chiasmic structure *parexcellence*, etc. are further delineated in "+R," Derrida's essay on Adami, in *Truth in Painting*, an essay that functions as a necessary supplement to *Glas* and will no doubt show up as Remain(s). Hartman also offers a useful reading of the relationship between Adami's work and Derrida's in his chapter entitled "Epiphany in Echoland." He adds another cryptogram to the letters at hand when he formulates a principle of "basic mirror writing" as "IC(ICH/CHI)INRI." The addition of the acronym for Christ on the Cross is explained in some detail in the pages that follow this inscription. (Hartman, 62-66) The relationship between IC and the "here" of a subject fully present in time will prove to be important when events in CA start (almost) repeating themselves.

5. The appearance here and elsewhere of the figure of the Jew as a destabilizing force for whom the clarity of *Sa* and the security of the Holy Family can never be fully present takes its lead from Hegel's theorizing of this relationship as read early on in *Glas*. This begins with the reading of the story of Noah (*Glas*, 38a), moves through a certain "Abrahamic cut," and its effect on the Jewish family (41a), engages the relationship between circumcision and castration (43a), rereads the naming of the Jew, by Hegel, as he who is insensible to art (48a), and continues through the positing of the Holy Family as model that must be alien to the Jew, as Jesus' love must be (56a and on), including an analysis of the Jew who sees "only metaphor." (73a) The reading goes on for quite some time and is important in that, among other things, it carefully details the importance and the operation of creating an Other within the Hegelian construction of *Sa*. This construction of an Other will be replayed at several crucial moments in the reading of CA. As always, the reader is sent back to *Glas*.

6. The appearance of Columbus, "after the fact," in *The Autumn of the Patriarch* has already been commented upon for its ideological significances in several books and essays. The political implications are fairly self-evident. However, his arrival from the sea, his being the first in a long line of appropriators who sail onto the shore, points to one of the important functions of the sea as boundary. At the other end of the Patriarch's twisted time line, the sea is finally taken by those whom it brought:

"...until the blunt Ambassador MacQueen answered him that conditions don't warrant any more discussion, your excellency, the regime wasn't being sustained by hope or conformity or even by terror, but by the pure inertia of an ancient and irreparable disillusion, go out into the street and look truth in the face, your excellency, we're on the final curve, either the marines land or we take the sea, there's no other way, your excellency, there was no other way, mother, so they took away the Caribbean in April, Ambassador Ewing's nautical engineers carried it off in numbered pieces to plant it far from the hurricanes in the blood-red dawns of Arizona, they took it away with everything it had inside, general sir..." (*The Autumn of the Patriarch*, 229)

Needless to say, the workings of the borders and their destabilization, both contentually and theoretically by the shifting of speaking subject positions and the refusal to use

quotation marks here will be the subject of certain "Remain(s)" to come.

7. The critical literature on the use of cyclical time in García Márquez, and especially in CA, is almost exactly as extensive as the critical literature on these texts in general. These interpretations are interestingly varied, revealing the law of excess inscribed into any concept that seeks to universalize, or even binarize time. On the most elementary level, there can be a reading of time in the novel as closed off and (only) repeating itself. For instance:

"To break our traditional conception of time García Márquez suggests the possibility of non-linear time, that is, circular, cyclical, or spiraled. One of his most salient and obvious techniques, aside from fragmentation, is repetition. The names of characters require a diagram of the family tree in order to avoid confusion, and along with the names certain characteristics are repeated[...]Perhaps the image of an axle is the most appropriate, since the motion is seemingly progressing in one direction but in fact moves back continually to where it started."(McNereney, 22-23)

Of course, this reading can only serve to limit and close off the available excesses of "events" presented within the novel. Along more sophisticated, "structuralist" lines, Julio Ortega offers a reading that turns on the binary distinction between cyclical and chronological time:

"Cyclical time, which is supported by nature, has not changed for [José Arcadio], although now it is replaced by historical or chronological time[...]. These periods, however, are not consecutive but intertwine and overlap; one cycle of the spiral turns upon the following one. The period of the end begins with that of repetition."

And shortly thereafter:

"If cyclical time reveals the places of spectacles, as a signifier testing different signifieds in distinct contexts, what happens with linear, chronological time? The story is constructed upon these two axes, upon return (rhythm, repetition) and dissolution (progress, deterioration)."(Ortega, 6)

Is return always repetition? Cyclical time, here and in other texts on CA, is too often formulated in terms of identity and repetition rather than in terms of the difference inscribed into each pulling back of the thread in a game of *fort/da*. The latter account of "here-with-difference" carries with it a respect for the heterogeneity of singular, though reminiscent events, that the cycle seems to elide. It resists the binarism that creeps into Ortega's analysis.

In another interesting development, Michael Wood reads time in the novel grammatically, in terms of the text's penchant for the verb form "was to," which always already inscribes memory into the present.(Wood, 42-43) However, Wood seems disappointed that this grammar is only "an effect":

"But this is a narrative *effect*, the way the narrator and the reader experience events which the characters have to take differently. Or rather, it is the way events add up for the characters when they see their own stories, when they have become a story for themselves, although there is a paradox here. In spite of the frequency of the verbs for remembering, attached to most of the characters at one time or another, we don't see the difference their remembering makes. They are said to remember, and that is all -- as if the narrator needed them to share his interest in memory but couldn't get them to act on it."(Wood, 42)

Remembering is not acting? In fact, it is, it seems to me, precisely the sort of "acting" that defines CA's shuttling movement through language. But this will be the subject of future readings and remain(s). For now, it is interesting to see the business of critical appropriation at work as it seeks, to differing degrees, to find a way to fix time within the movement of a reading. This desire would, necessarily, fix the movement itself, leaving it immobile and leaving time, as an "actor" in the text, out of lines, dead. The elision of difference within temporal, grammatical constructions announces the *glas* of the

singular time of a reading. For a brilliant, detailed reading of the role of memory and reminiscence in the post-structuralist account of writing, especially in Derrida, see David Farrell Krell's *Of Memory, Reminiscence and Writing*. This text not only details the reading of memory in several crucial psychoanalytic, philosophical, and literary ways; it also performs the sort of displacement of these division that my own project attempts. Its reading of memory in Derrida's recent work, specifically on Celan, de Man, and Joyce is invaluable but cannot be re-cited here. From all of this reading, only the title has managed its way into my text.

8. In *Glas*, the relationship between thinking and memory is first discussed in terms of Hegel's reading, very early in his career, in "The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate," of the Last Supper. This reading serves to mark several complex qualities of memory, including its inevitable leaving of remains and the *glas*-work of mourning. *Glas* writes:

"What then is Jesus doing when he says while breaking the bread: take this, this is my body given for you, do this in memory of me? Why already memory in the present feeling? Why does he present himself, in the present, before the hour, as cut off from his very own body and following his obsequy? What is he doing when he says in picking up the cup: drink all of you, this is my blood, the blood of the New Testament, of the new contract entered into with religious pomp, shed for you and for so many other in remission of their sins, do this in memory of me? Memory here is *Gedächtnis*; Hegel has often insisted on the kinship between memory and thought (*Denken*). Think me, Jesus says to his friends while burdening their arms, in advance, with a bloody corpse. Prepare the shrouds, the bandages, the oily substances." (*Glas*, 65-66a)

The relationship between this scene and the Greek dramas is played out later in the same column, and will be grafted onto a reading of CA's sacrificial moments further on into the reading.

9. *Glas* continually reads a debate in and around the family between Hegel and Kant. One key feature of this debate (in addition to the differences on gender construction and education and the death of the parents) is the argument over the relationship between marriage and a contractual agreement. This dispute raises crucial questions of the difference between "things" (property) and relationships (the proper union) and the accounting for what remains. In order to sketch out Hegel's response to Kant's formulation of the act as contractual, *Glas* re-cites Hegel's account of marriage and then cites Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*: "To subsume marriage under the concept of contract is thus quite impossible; this subsumption -- though infamous is the only word for it -- is established by Kant ('Metaphysical Principles of the Doctrine of Right')." (*Glas*, citing Hegel, 195a) For Hegel, rather, the union of spouses allows for no contract. *Glas* explains:

"The contract signature is under the jurisdiction of abstract right, always concerns just a thing, the possession or disposition of a thing outside the persons.[...] Now the union, the identification of spouses forms one single person, and for the engagement of persons toward each other as such, without a third and without a thing, no contract can intervene." (*Glas*, 195)

One might ask, according to this logic, whether there can be a contract of reading? Of critical writing? Can such an irreducible operation be subsumed under a contract of "things?" If it can, then it must not have retained any of the engagement's own irreducibility within its own critical movements. The desire, here, is that there be no contracts possible.

10. The "doctors" might rush in here with a lecture about dream language, and decoding, or even "interpreting." Still CA prophecies, predicts the difficulties that arise within the desire for "deep" meaning shortly after the dream. For an alternative reading of dream language; one that is based more on the accidental materialism of inter- and intra-linguistic signification, I would again suggest that the reader turn to Abraham and Torok's *The Wolf Man's Magic Word*. In Chapter 4: "In Some of Little Sergei's Dreams and Symptoms," and forward through the Cryptonymy (a sort of catalogue of catachresis and anasemia) at the book's end, a (quasi)-methodology of dream reading "by the letter" is offered. In this case, one might make suggestions about "Macondo" and "*macabro*" (macabre), "*manicomio* (lunatic asylum) and about "ice," the "here" of *ici*, and an immaculate conception.

11. I am surrounded, overwhelmed by commentaries, books, on Derrida, the Post(e), and even on *Glas*. They are listed elsewhere and I can only ask others to read them. I do not wish to write another. However, a brief remark on the importance in CA of the Derridean figure of the fortune-telling card (*carte*) that traces and opens gaps in logics of communication and history, in sending and receiving, and in remembering the past in the future seems called for. Ulmer, anagrammatically tracing *écart* through *carte* and towards the "trace," links the gaps between the past and the future, between signification and reference through the messages inscribed on cards sent via the post. The cards mark the trace that destabilizes the message system at its edges. This is the logic that dominates *The Post Card* and is operative in *Glas*. Later, this future-reading will be played out within questions of history's relationship to a written subject (within a critical reading of Stephen Minta's reading of the history of Colombia and García Márquez and CA's "events" in *García Márquez: Writer of Colombia*. But here and now the future that can (never) be seen in cards is the future deferred by (mis)interpretation. Ulmer writes of post cards and prophecies and, of course, of remains:

"Such predictions or prophecies, Derrida stresses, are made problematic by the intersection of 'ends' with 'closure.' For there is always a remainder, something extra left *posterestante* (the archive or encyclopedia of culture), for those who realize that the postal is not finally a transcendental principle equatable with the era of being. From the deconstructive point of view, the essence of the postal is not that letters *arrive* (the functionalist view, shared by Lacan) but that they sometimes *fail to arrive*. In terms of spacing rather than destiny, 'the post is nothing but a "little fold," a relay to mark that there is never anything but relays' (*Carte*, 206). In other words, the *techne* concerns enframing, the production of images by whatever means, which is to say that the *techne* itself cannot 'end' or 'arrive at its completion.' since it is what allows anything at all to become present or appear. *Techne* (is) differance (*Carte*, 206-7). The grammamologist (and the academic humanists of the future) studies enframing, not 'literature.' Literature does not end, but the classification 'literature' becomes irrelevant." (Ulmer, *Applied Grammarology*, 127-128)

Not quite. The rhetoric here is too absolute "at the end." The question of relevancy is inscribed too much into institutional dynamics to be dismissed within such a future as that promised here. The finality of the language is, no doubt, the result of trying to write "from the deconstructive point of view," as if such a place were singularly locatable. However, Ulmer does offer a working sketch of what remains within a new reading of the postal future.

12. There is (almost) no "real" psychology of reading here yet. *The Philosophy of Right*, as it writes of the incest prohibition, is read in *Glas* as turning upon itself in a sort of double gesture that, though it will later come to mark a certain reading of the fetish, here only serves to deconstruct a relationship, in Hegel, between the text and nature:

"('Hegel's') *text* is offered (up), open to two responses, to two interpretations. It

is text, textualizes itself rather, inasmuch as it lays itself open to the grip and weight of two readings, that is to say, lets itself be struck with indetermination by the impossible concept, divides itself in two.

"The section concerning the incest prohibition is at once the example and the pivot. The example and the pivot of the system that is contradictory within itself -- with a contradiction of which one cannot say whether it operates *in* or *against*.[...] An index: the incest prohibition breaks with nature and that is why it conforms more to nature. What appears as formal incoherence, denegation or 'rationalization,' critically announces at the same time, but without its knowing, the absence of a concept of nature, of reason, or of freedom, and posits, but without its knowing, the necessity of accounting for 'dark feelings.'"(*Glas*, 199a)

It is also interesting that this reading of incest in Hegel follows immediately upon Derrida's speculations, cited in *à propos*, of the possibility for a general heterogeneity in speculative dialectics. Incest seems often to be accompanied by difference.

13. CA begins, of course, with the sketch of a family tree (printed in my edition after the title page and the announcement of ownership, of copyright). This tree, and others like it will later be written into the *Remain(s)*; but here it is necessary to point out that the particular sketch that accompanies the Buendía chronicle includes "illegitimate" offspring. It marks these grafts onto the family tree with(in) sets of parentheses -- "(by Pilar Ternera)". *Glas* goes to great lengths to graft the function of parentheses to the business of the graft, the diverting "trick" of cutting and sewing between lines. It begins by rewriting the term in terms of attachment ("after the fact") and the cutting of a "thesis": "(PARANTHESIS)".(*Glas*, 124bi) *Glassary* reminds me here: "*Paranthesis* (with an *a*) marks, for Derrida, two of Genet's textures: the parenthetic and the flower (*anthos*). The term also recalls 'anthesis,' 'the action or period of opening of a flower' (Webster's). One might translate *paranthesis* as flowering-parenthetic or paranthetic-flower. For one 'Function of the paranthesis see 147b-60b.'"(*Glassary*, 158) In *Glas*, the column goes on to describe the paranthetical operation in a way that relates directly to the relationship between bastard and Family in both Hegel's texts (and, we might speculate, recalling his letter recognizing his own "natural son," in his life) and CA. (Parenthetically, I have cited this elsewhere, but it bears repeating.)

"So the operation would consist, for the moment, in merely carrying away the graft of the paranthetic organ, without knowing whether that bleeds or not, and then -- after the removal and a certain treatment that above all does not consist in curing -- to put back in place, to sew up again, the whole perhaps not growing quiet in its restored constitution, but on the contrary being slashed to pieces more than ever."(*Glas*, 125bi)

14. In *Glassary*, John Leavey explains why he leaves *seing* untranslated in *Glas*:

"*Seing*: this term, which means signature, sign manual, is left untranslated because it resonates phonetically with French *sein* (breast) and graphically with German *Sein* (being)."(*Glassary*, 135)

In *Glas*' reading of Genet's texts and their writing of motherhood, withdrawal, and the falling from the milk of the breast, the milk that spills in a "(ga)lactics" of excess, the echo that resonates between signature and breast (milk) is crucial. Milk, like one of Genet's other prominent signature-effects, plants, also proves to fulfill the function of the *pharmakon*. In an elaborate and tangled web of reading, *Glas* interprets Karl Abraham's "The Spider as a Dream Symbol" as posing "the problem of *pharmakon* in galactic terms." It quotes Abraham and continues:

"The fear of being poisoned is also probably connected with the withdrawal of the breast. Poison is nourishment that makes one ill.' Milk a poison contra poison, is also

treated as the source of jealousy. Which would come back to our question: what is the excess of zeal around the signature? Can one be jealous of something other than a *seing*? Such a question galvanizes and vulcanizes everything." (*Glas*, 70-71bi)

The relationships between breast, milk, signature, and being will be played out in CA as the family begins to expand, to break out beyond its borders, its edges. *Glas* also reminds me that, between its two columns, it rings out with the function of a "clapper," that strikes between the resonance of *seing* and the edge:

"The place the clapper will necessarily have taken up, let us name it *colpos*. In Greek, *colpos* is the mother's {*de la mere*}, but also the nurse's, breast {*sein*}, as well as the fold {*pli*} of a garment, the trough of the sea {*repli de la mer*} between two waves, the valley pushing down into the breast of the earth." (*Glas*, 70-71bi)

The sound of the sea in the mother (*la mer en la mere*) is, of course, the sound of still another signature (*seing*): *el mar*. This link, between the mother, the author, the sea, the breast is also at work in the resonance of Gabriel and Gabrielle and will be played out in CA in part in terms of the mother as an Archangel who can (no longer) see. Finally, the flower that writes itself most immediately into any (ga)lactics would have to be the carnation.

15. A brief note is necessary here to reassure the reader that there will be a time for a reading of "madness" and the challenge of excess that it poses to "civilization," discourses and epistemologies. Later, with the "collapse" of the patriarch and the translation of his "mad" discourse by the church in CA, the debate that takes place between Derrida and Foucault on this issue will be heard in these notes. For now, the notion that empirico-formalism cannot think the death of the parents in the child's education is a critique levelled at Kant by Hegel and read as one of the text-limits that *Sa* seems to establish for itself and that will later be overrun (see *Glas*, 132a). In this sense, any critique is already linked to the debate on the ability of "madness" to speak, because it is haunted by a certain Hegelian version of the *Cogito*, one that will be played against Genet's argot translation in *Glas*, and, later, against an interrogation of the limits of the more famous Cartesian formulation.

16. Rebeca's dream of her (lost?) parents, in addition to writing (binding erect) a number of separate motifs in *Glas* together into CA, also speaks to the issue of deferral (of recognition) in the language of dreams (see Derrida's essay, in *Writing and Difference* on Freud's "Note on a Mystic Writing Pad" for more on the differential structuring of the unconscious as a language), the necessary death of the parents in the bringing to consciousness of the child (see *Glas*' reading of Hegel here), and the "between" of dreams, as they find a space on the edges of several "spaces" including the fictional and the autobiographical. The relationship between parent and child and the business on reading dream language also sketches out, within it, a strategy for reading *Glas* as autobiography and as a sifting through the remains of a self-analysis. This is an approach chosen by Spivak, in her reading of the book, and in her summary of it is possible to find her approaching "what interests and constrains us here," and re-citing a title that will place itself over all of this:

"I have proposed a way of reading *Glas* that can be summarized as follows:

'If we are always surrendered to an economy of our contrary, to deny the father is yet another way to affirm him. *Glas* takes the counter-risk of celebrating the ancestry.

The ideology of deconstruction can turn into an instrument of the will to power as diagnostic knowledge of the text's transgressions; or into a seductive invitation, a longing for the abyss, a scorn of firm ground, the euphoria of falling (which desires a ground). *Glas* takes the counter-risk of autobiography and self-analysis -- however multiple -- and of the question "what remains?" when formalism has enclosed or deconstruction undone a

text; and "what remains" after *Aufhebung*, after the idealization that undoes idealization? *Glas* supplements the propositional convention of philosophical analysis and the expository convention of literary criticism with the rebus or legend." (Spivak, 30)

This is a useful "summary" even if certain parts of it ("deconstruction *undoes*(?) a text," only "celebrating" ancestry?, the binary logic of risk/counter-risk limiting the options for reading) are troublesome. Spivak bases this reading, in part, on the "historical" fact of Derrida's own father's death prior to the writing of *Glas*, and Derrida does in fact sign this moment into *Glas*. But the question of the status of events, especially in a text such as *Glas*, is, it seems to me, too complex to rely, in reading, on any "event" for too long. Recognition is liable to be lost, the remains are apt to hang around, sounding their own dull *glas*. "Cloc-cloc-cloc."

17. For a crucial analysis of the role (and the metaphor) of usury in the use of metaphors, see Derrida's "White Mythology," in *Margins of Philosophy*. This analysis, of course, will serve to link metaphor to the economics of use-value and to the gaps of deferral and the wearing-away of memory in such a way so as to make it invaluable for a reading of this series of linguistic predicaments in CA. An entirely other reading of the effects of the plague and Aureliano's attempts to maintain the referentiality of signification could be constructed by grafting this essay and its "sequel" "The Retrait of Metaphor," rather than *Glas*, onto the novel's narrative. This, however, is not the time for such an exercise in memory.

18. José Arcadio Buendía's reading of the technology of the daguerrotype resounds with another signature, one that shares Adami's exhibition walls with Derrida's *Glas*: Walter Benjamin. Benjamin, also a feature player in Derrida's "+R" (on Adami and *Glas*) and in "*Des Tour des Babel* (on Benjamin and translation), has offered a reading of the technology of photography and cinema as "works of art" in an age when art can be reproduced by machines that speaks directly to the concerns of *Glas* and the time of CA. Specifically, he echoes José Arcadio when he marks the transition in the ideology of aesthetics prompted by photography:

"In photography, exhibition value begins to displace cult value all along the line. [the difference here is the difference between art as ceremonial object which matters precisely *because of* its existence (cult-value) and art to be exhibited, its value deriving from its "fitness for exhibition" -- John] But cult value does not give way without resistance [remains?]. It retires into an ultimate retrenchment: the human countenance. It is no accident that the portrait [of the Buendías, later of God?] was the focal point of early photography. The cult of remembrance of loved one, absent or dead, offers a last refuge for the cult of the picture. For the last time the aura emanates from the early photographs in the fleeting expression of a human face." (Benjamin, 226)

*Glas* tolls for the "remembrance" of ("absent or dead") aesthetics and allows survival only (Úrsula is right) as a "laughingstock." *Glas* also re-cites the problem of the original in much the same way as CA does when it writes Erendira (and others) into its pages. Benjamin, earlier, warns that this problem will arise in such an age:

"From a photographic negative, for example, one can make any number of prints; to ask for the 'authentic' print makes no sense."

Precisely. But Benjamin goes on to draw from this a lesson that merely reverses established hierarchies and puts into place a new absolute in such a way that both CA and *Glas*, reading the same problem of cut-ability and (non)-origin, radically resist:

"But the instant the criterion of authenticity ceases to be applicable to artistic production, the total function art is reversed. Instead of being based on ritual, it begins to be based on another practice -- politics."



A lesson already learned by CA and *Glas*: reversal without displacement leaves us where we started. What could be more ritualistic these days than politics?

19. Such lists can be easily acquired. See, for instance, Clive Griffin's "The Humor of *One Hundred Years of Solitude*," in McGuirk's *Gabriel García Márquez: New Readings*, 92. See also (and Griffin sends us there), David Gallagher's *Modern Latin American Literature*, 147 and 162. After recognizing these characters (Griffin sees their inclusion as a sort of "wink" to readers of Latin American literature) not much critically has been written about the problems their appearances pose in terms of the status of a "text" as being defined by a set of locatable boundaries. As the characters arrive in our reading these issues will also arrive. The *Remain(s)* speak briefly to the dangers of thinking about these appearances in terms of "intertextuality" since this term implies just the sort of relationship, between at least partially stable, identifiable objects, whose possibility is precisely what is at stake here.

20. "Jealousy is at stake," *Glas* reminds me several times as it reads Genet's discourse of theft (from the mother) and Hegel's debate with Kant about the possibility of a jealous God. (See, for instance, *Glas*, 211-213a) But here and now, the jealousy we need to read, the jealousy "between" (daughters), is written in term of the pianola in CA, and in terms of the organ in *Glas*, wherein it is re-written also as *jalousies*, or "Venetian shutters" (as a part of the machinery of the organ):

"And taking account of the 'récit [swell organ, solo, narrative], of the 'Venetian shutters [*jalousies*] of the swell box,' and of the 'plien-jue' and the 'grand plien-jue,' of bi-clavication and classical, baroque or romantic organs, couldn't one reconstitute an organigraphic model. a new *De organographia*" (*Glas*, 224-25bi)

The movement of jealousy, like the movement of the organ's *jalousies*, is bi-directional, it "comes and goes." This is also the case, as we shall see later, with Amaranta's emotions and her relationship with Rebeca and Crespi. Too often, critics of the novel have seen fit to describe these emotional oscillations in uni-directional terms, according to all-consuming myths of passion that cannot account for what remains. Michael Wood, for example, reads the situation with a rhetoric that seems so determined to "balance the books" that it ignores the excesses, the castrations and fetishes (Amaranta's burnt and bandaged hand (recalling Stillitano's), for instance), the undecidable oscillation of *fort* and *da* that marks the "love" of Amaranta, Crespi, Rebeca, and (later) José Arcadio:

"The girls Rebeca and Amaranta, as we have seen, are both yearningly in love with Pietro Crespi, the blonde and beautiful pianola expert.[...] However, this romantic misery has an end, or looks as if it might. Rebeca's love is reciprocated, she and Pietro are engaged. It is true that Amaranta is left out, and swears that Rebeca's marriage will take place only over her dead body. [There is never a "but" to follow this "it is true." Rather, Wood goes on to tell the story of Rebeca's future until she eventually "becomes an ancient forgotten lady in an unvisited house."] In context though, this is not an unhappy love song. Rebeca, as Úrsula understands in her final audit of her family's emotions, was possessed of an 'impatient heart,' which had the valor of its impatience and regretted nothing." [But what about Amaranta? Here the myths are allowed to dominate.] "This is to say that the Buendías are afraid of the heart, however brave they may be against other enemies -- although their fear is complicated, a form of vanquished or displaced heroism. The story of Amaranta is exemplary in this sense. [...he re-cites the plot...] We are looking, in Amaranta, at what we may call a vocation for solitude, and at love as a means of inviting and enhancing this vocation, setting its exorbitant price. The vocation is founded on guilt perhaps, rather as Macondo is founded on José Arcadio Buendía's having killed a man. There is an important insight in the picture of love and the terror of love fighting it out, making Amaranta some kind of Latin American cousin of the Princess of Cleves, or any of

the world's great, frightened renouncers. The cowardice *and* the love are significant, only great love makes the cowardice moving, and not merely abject. Amaranta's vocation is to miss love, and painfully to cherish the knowledge of all she is missing, to maintain intact her raw intentional regret." (Wood, 80-81)

*Glas* often reminds me that the most attractive feature of any dialectical structure is that it (appears) to explain away the remains. Here, in Wood, it provides purpose, simplifies direction, and forces the text to accommodate itself to "great" myths. But the text will not play that (object) game. Macondo is not, in fact, "founded on José Arcadio Buendía's having killed a man," but more on an excess of spirit and the chance of an interrupted journey. How does one determine the "happiness" of a love song sung by one with "an impatient heart"? What can these metaphors mean (to say)? What has happened to the (simple) excess of jealousy and its (complex) movements? And why "some kind of Latin American cousin"? What determines this particular familial tie? Surely there is no similarity in the form or the context of the respective "renunciations." What is this account trying to do, to account for, with its talk of "prices" and "audits" and the balancing of love and cowardice? In the next cut we will see such language again as Wood offers his reading of "chapter 5" as an example of one of CA's narrative "devices," wherein "the system of alternation is everywhere." Distinctions will need to be drawn then and there.

For a more detailed reading of "jealousy" as it functions within the figure of *jalousie* throughout Derrida's work, see also Peggy Kamuf's introduction to *A Derrida Reader: Between the Blinds*, wherein she undertakes a reading of the formations of jealousy in respect to both gender and religious questions in Derrida, and, in particular in *Glas*' debate between Hegel's Christian God and Kant's Jewish God, a debate about jealousy (of God, (between God and himself), of sexual difference (the jealousy of the between that marks CA), and the perpetual jealousy inscribed in and by metaphysics) that remains to be read into *What Remains*. See, in particular, Kamuf, pp. xx-xxlii.

21. The re-marking here in CA of eating, blood, and a sacrifice (in) memory recalls *Glas*' reading of the (remaindered) scene of the Last Supper (see Note 8, above). Here, too, it is written around "love," "the sensible hearth of the family." (*Glas*, 64a) It also reinscribes a necessary signature: "Jesus' good-bye to his friends, at the Last Supper, is a 'love-feast' (*Feier eines Mahls der Liebe*). The most visible, the closest form of this is the position of the preferred disciple, John, on the breast {*sein*} of Jesus." (*Glas*, 65a) As "a preferred disciple," John would like to remind readers of CA about the cut, the (fate) of morselizing that is critical reading. Later in *Glas*, written around a niche in the other column that morselizes John's words, cuts and stitches together sections of John's book, *Glas* describes this reminder: "Harvester of winded breaths. The other, 'sent by God,' 'his name was John,' had come to say 'In the beginning was the Word.' The latter presents himself in order to sound the *glas* of breath, to cu

[And then the niche is carved, beginning with "after developing the radiographic negative of the testamentary chrisms and bandages (why anointing and banding in the two testaments?) after attacking, analyzing, toning their relics in a kind of developing bath, why not search there for the remains of John (*Jean*)?" and going on to morselize the words that remain.]

t, to reap, to glean all expirations. To bind them afterwards, in the midst of a song, in a bouquet, in a sheaf. Sheaf is always said of what let itself be cut." (*Glas*, 198-99b, bi)

Why not search here for the remains of John? For more on *Glas*' reading of John, see Hartman's chapter "How to Reap a Page," 67-95. Hartman too reads the "book" for and about remains, but sees such innumerable morselizings as a possible apocalyptic threat (or perhaps it is just his rhetoric trying to impress):

"There is a real danger of literature getting lost, running amok or running scared after Joyce's *Wake* and Derrida's *Glas*. Everything is infected by equivocation and the

repetition of part-objects of language, Where the word was the pun shall be. The reality reference of literature is subdued to intertextual allusions, omnivorous flowers of speech, metaphors, devices.

"There is a rain or ruin of unsummable meanings that seem to scatter us. A 'hoard of destructions,' to pun with Stevens; and how can we tell whether this fragmentation and expropriation of texts, this meta-comic dissemination of the energies of language through an equivalent of seme-smashing can be controlled? What if it is as nihilistic as Joyce's "abnihilation of the etym" suggests?[...]Is *Glas* the last text that knows the deathduty it must pay? In the realm of commentary -- commentary being that deathduty -- *Glas* is its own wake."(Hartman, 79-80)

There is much to admire and agree with here, especially the notions of seme-smashing and commentary as deathduty, but the apocalyptic concern over nihilism seems to be a product not of "concern" but of rhetorical drive. Is all this at stake here? If it were; how could we know? Would a "truly" apocalyptic text announce itself? Efface itself? How? These are difficult questions that remain (both here and in *Saving the Text*).

22. What is the price of a call not accepted, or one never received? This question, informing as it does the entire logic of (postal) communications whether telegraphic, telephonic, or here telepathic, will resonate in both CA and *Glas* in a multitude of disguises. It is raised directly in "Envois," the telegraphic section of Derrida's *The Post Card*, in a "chance" footnote:

"I must note it right here, on the morning of 22 August, 1979, 10 A.M., while typing this page for the present publication, the telephone rings. The U.S.. The American operator asks me if I accept a "collect call" from Martin (she says Martine or martini) Heidegger. I heard, as one often does in these situations which are very familiar to me, often having to call "collect" myself, voices that I thought I recognized on the other end of the intercontinental line, listening to me and watching my reaction. What will he do with the ghost or Geist of Martin? I cannot summarize here all the chemistry of the calculation that very quickly made me refuse ("It's a joke, I do not accept") after having had the name of Martini Heidegger repeating several times, hoping that the author of the farce would finally name himself. Who pays, in sum, the addressee or the sender? who is to pay? This is a very difficult question, but this morning I thought I should not pay, at least not otherwise than by adding this word of thanks."(*The Post Card*, 21)

The note goes on for some time to discuss the implications of this anecdote within the economy of sending and receiving that is philosophy and literature, reading and writing, (psycho)analysis and speculation. The interrogation of such telegraphic questions extends itself into the realm of "debt" and "gift" as well, in CA. For a useful and even necessary set of remarks on this question and this exchange in particular, see Sam Weber's impressive essay "The Debts of Deconstruction and Other, Related Assumptions." Weber reads the debts (to Freud and Heidegger in *Post Card* and within Freud and within Heidegger to each other) in a way that also asks continually after the remains, the "perhaps."(Weber, in Smith, Kerrigan, 33-65. See particularly page 43 for more of Derrida's Freud and Nietzsche's "dangerous perhaps.") Also, for a brilliant book-length performance of the question of who pays (in Heidegger), the question of the implication of accepting or not accepting a (phone) call, and all of the implications of all of the tele-logic that writes us always today, see Avital Ronnell's *The Telephone Book*, a text to which "my own" study owes (too) many extraordinary debts that it cannot begin to pay back here.

23. A brief introductory remark about Lacan, purloined letters, and the (transcendental) signification of the Phallus: Much of what will be written "from here on in" concerning a certain reading of the postal logic of Freudian speculation takes for granted a familiarity

with not only Derrida's Freud of *The Post Card* and *Writing and Difference*, but also with the debate between Derrida and Lacan in and around Poe's "The Purloined Letter." A postal *récit*. Derrida's reading of Lacan's seminar is published in the English translation of *The Post Card* with the title "*Le Facteur de la Vérité*." Elsewhere the title has been translated as "The Purveyor of Truth," however Alan Bass resists this temptation, explaining "The title of this essay must remain untranslated in order to capture the double meaning of *facteur*: both postman and factor. Thus, the postman/factor of truth, the question of the delivery of truth in psychoanalysis." (*The Post Card*, 413) This is not the time to re-cite the debate or the texts that have been produced by and around it. It is in this text that the "single proper trajectory for the letter" that Lacan's psychoanalysis would wish to establish is faced with the possibility of not arriving at its destination. Here, in a reading of and *between* psychoanalysis and literature that is neither a psychoanalytic reading of a literary text nor a literary reading of a psychoanalytic one, Derrida writes between a literal reading of Poe and a *glasizing* of it within a divided reading of the Seminar that concludes, even as it indicates the effects of "indirection" in the story: "The divisibility of the letter -- this is why we have insisted on this key or theoretical safety lock of the Seminar -- is what chances and sets off course, without guarantee of return, the remaining [*restance*] of anything whatsoever: a letter does *not always* arrive at its destination, and from the moment that this possibility belongs to its structure one can say that it never truly arrives, that when it does arrive its capacity not to arrive torments it with an internal drifting." (*The Post Card*, 489)

This torment, of internal drifting, of what remains, is what concerns us in *Glas*, in CA, and in *What Remains*.

24. Can an onomatopoeia be translated? Without loss (of time, of the "cloc"?) This is the question, *Glas* reminds me at length, that begins any deconstruction of Saussure's *Course*. Even as the *Course* "establishes linguistics in its patronage," it faces two objections to these theories: "onomatopoeias and exclamations." (Saussure, 69) *Glas* is surprised to find itself mentioned:

"And then, as if by chance, upsurges the example of *glas*, which Saussure treats as a word ('Words like French *fouet* "whip" or *glas* "knell"...'). (*Glas*, 91ai) But these words pose a problem for Saussure, although he assures us that they "come no closer to refuting our thesis" (of the arbitrariness of signification). (Saussure, 69) His attempt to face these objections, *Glas* demonstrates, reveals his inability to calculate remains. He must create a category of "authentic onomatopoeias," argue that these words do not fit the category ("Words like French *fouet* 'whip' or *glas* knell may strike certain ears with suggestive sonority, but to see that they have not always had this character we need only go back to their Latin forms (*fouet* is derived from *fagus*, 'beech tree,' *glas* = *classicum*). The quality of their present sounds, or rather the quality that is attributed to them, is a fortuitous result of phonetic evolution."), and construct the following "kettle argument" re-cited in *Glas*:

"In other words, these examples are chosen too poorly or too well: no one can consider *fouet* and *glas* as authentic onomatopoeias. Besides, no one has done so; and besides there is no authentic onomatopoeia. But instead of concluding that there is then no authentically arbitrary element either, instead of taking an interest in the *contaminated* effects of onomatopoeia or of arbitrariness, in the drawing-along of the language (with the *fouet* or *glas*), he runs ahead of the 'danger' in order to save the thesis of the signs arbitrariness." (*Glas*, 93ai)

Again the logic of either-or has refused to allow for consideration of excess, remains, contamination. Like Lacan, or Hegel, Saussure seems to have too much at stake. But the *cloc-cloc-cloc* sounds the (untranslated) *glas* of remains for these systems and their (untranslated) proper names, even as translation's call cannot be ignored.

25. Gayatri Spivak reads *Glas*' debate about passivity and activity within the biological and cultural formations of gender differences to include the flowing of menstrual blood as well, and as leading directly to the differences between Hegel and Kant on the (contractual) status of marriage, which relates these passages more immediately to the opening of this cut in CA:

"By pointing at the effacement of woman in the Holy Family, Derrida brings us to the question of marriage. He glances at Hegel's phallogentric feminism in passing: woman is closer to the origin because Reason as an activity has not yet emerged in her; in 'a description of anatomic appearance,' [129a] Derrida points out Hegel's point that the clitoris is passive, menstrual blood flows out, the blood of male tumescence engorges; and so on. It is not surprising then, that, within the situation of marriage 'the *Aufhebung* of sexual difference is, manifests, expresses, *stricto sensu*, *Aufhebung* itself and in general [128a].'"

Spivak goes on to argue for a reading of Derrida's analysis of the Family within the Hegelian structure as the undecidable element that produces dissemination, another form of Derridean writing, the hymen, supplementarity, invagination, etc., precisely because of its effacement of the cultural being of woman. While this reading has certain advantages within a specific context, and while *Glas* clearly demonstrates that Hegel's feminism, while it does not fall victim to the obvious phallogentric rhetoric of Kant's anthropology (wherein, for instance, "[t]o illustrate that the woman can on no account appropriate the masculine attribute, for example or substitution, science, culture, the book, Kant denounces a kind of transvestitism: 'As for scholarly women, they use their *books* somewhat like a *watch* so it can be noticed they have one, although it is usually stopped or badly adjusted to sun.'" (*Glas*, 130a, citing Kant's *Anthropology, From a Pragmatic Point of View*), it nonetheless becomes a phallogentric feminism as it sentences women to the work of the home and the tomb and separates them permanently from the cultural development of the family or the State, the "people-spirit, and from the *Aufhebung*" (of art, religion, or knowledge); the same reading also freezes *Glas*' reading of the figure of woman in Hegel in a way that remains at least partially blind to the oscillation of effects (remain(s)) produced when women (by Hegel) are given the *glas*-work to do, and are thereby able to inscribe their own subject positions into memory, education, and the legacies of death. These issues will be raised over and over in CA as war comes to Macondo, and then as the outside invades and the Family begins its disintegration into a number of variations of "marriage." Still, Spivak's reading of the entire presentation of Hegel's Family-writing is impressive and certainly important for any reading of *Glas*.

26. Michael Wood chooses this "chapter" to discuss in detail in his book on CA, because he believes it is "astonishing" in its use of several specific narrative strategies including the "repeated changes of musical keys." (Wood, 71) His summary of the chapter is revealing in the way that it literally "characterizes" the narrator as someone surprised by the events he relates:

"In other words, this chapter concerns the invasion of politics into Macondo and private life, yet it reads as if this invasion were not its topic but a strange surprise, something the narrator has recently stumbled on. The movement is the opposite of remembering the future, and both perspectives are important in the novel. The narrator eagerly remembers and oddly forgets." (Wood, 71)

Such talk about memory and forgetting seems to me quite appropriate here, although the consequences, both epistemologically and "textually" (and the difference is, of course, the problem), of these re-writings of the "between" of the unconscious and time in (hi)story are, I suspect, extremely complex. Wood, however, proceeds on to "summarize" the chapter's plot complications, and attaching to them, grafting on to them, interesting

judgments. Reading Remedios: "The girl, who seemed to be living in her own happy story, is a grim event in someone else's, a complication, a narrative deferment. The shock is all the greater because, as I said earlier, the language of *was to* seemed to promise Remedios a much longer life: another destiny unravelled. It seems heartless of the narrator to call her an obstacle, but that is one of the tougher effects of the imperturbable tone, and here as elsewhere we do tend to supply the emotions he will not name or evoke." (Wood, 72)

We do? The critic here seem to be dangerously close to making precisely the same mis-readings as the characters often make concerning the language of prophecies, promises, and the closure of personal histories. What Wood reads as "heartless," as a question of tone (without linking this back to his earlier "musical key" metaphor), seems to me to be an inevitable result of a narrative that writes (hi)story only as truncated cuts and remains. Thus, the question of the "supplying" of emotions, of readers filling up the novels partial stories and partial attitudes seems to me finally an Hegelian question, precisely because it is, eventually a question of "relief," of easing discomfort. Are not our own "destinies" as readers constantly "unravelled"? Wood goes on to read the arrival of war in a similar way, suggesting, in a vocabulary that resonates with an affective theory of (passive) reading, that it can never be a question of arbitrariness, only of not (yet) understanding, a temporary deferral of meaning as presence: "The implication, I take it, is not that war is as arbitrary as Remedios' death, but that that is how it will feel until you understand it: just another harsh, unmotivated incursion, an affliction like a plague. That is how all stories feel when we are only character in them." (Wood, 72-73)

As opposed to? Wood does not say, and this is the problem. The implication here is that there is an "understanding" eventually available that will distinguish war from the arbitrariness of Remedios' death -- a place for "readers," unlike the "we" of the characters trapped in the stories' events, to view and "understand" the significance of (hi)story. The status of "arbitrariness" in terms of deaths, *glas*, war, mourning, executions, etc. seems to me to delineate precisely the boundaries around which CA is written as a question. As I read further, I will return to the question of the arbitrary aspects of reading and writing between *Glas* and the (hi)story of the Family and Macondo, but I will not, finally, claim to "understand" the difference.

27. In "A Trace of Style," a fine essay on Derrida's "style," Tom Conley writes of reading *Glas* in terms of the (double) chiasmus. Here, too, as in Wood on CA, Derrida's work is described as "musical" and writing is described, in a paraphrase of Derrida's account of *écriture* in texts as diverse as *Of Grammatology* and "No Apocalypse, Not Now," as living "only to mourn its absence, its death at the moment it is born" -- the *glas* of Remedios' death and births. (Conley, in Krupnick, 77) Before reading the chiasmatic reading strategy of Conley's seventh footnote, I am reminded in his essay of a line from Derrida's own essay on style, *Spurs*, wherein he writes "If the simulacrum is ever going to occur, its writing must be in the interval between styles." (*Spurs*, 139) The import of this "between" will, no doubt, be the theme of later remain(s). It is, as Conley reminds me, a "between" that itself produces a style of remainders. "The note summarizes the preoccupation both Heidegger and Nietzsche shared about writing; it also refers to the fact that we all must multiply the *frames* of style from different periods and expand the referential limits we usually impose on them." (Conley, 79)

And, more precisely, later:

"One must write *in* the margin to reflect the historical perspective of discourse; but, also, within the remainders -- the discards, the leftovers in a game of cards or chance (another sense of *l'écart*) -- that determine one's own given (symbolical, political, and historical) conditions as a writer. The signature of the self is erased when it begins to write, so that notions sacred to the order of style find themselves eradicated in the act of

writing that reconstitutes them. The individual self enters into a fray of common discourse; it loses the uniqueness of its *écart*, its proper name and personal history, when it represents words in the place of itself. [Here Conley seems, unfortunately, to minimize *Glas*' problematization of uniqueness via that reading/writing of a *seing*. -- John] Notions of anticipation, experience, empirical truth, finality of performance, perception, and even the integrity of events are all thrown into question when writing cuts between its own needs and tensions, its urgency and seriality."(Conley, 80)

This "cut between" helps form the geometry of the double chiasmus that plots *Glas* reading for Conley. It is certainly one among many useful strategies: "Derrida's long academic-philosophical study of Hegel adheres to a supremely poetic one in Genet [the distinction here is, of course, too absolute. -- John], but in particularly graphic way, in which the erotic shape of a double chiasmus or Moebius-strip-twice-over results from the two borders bending back and reading through -- doubly invaginating -- each other."(Conley, 78) The attached footnote grafts a drawing of this strategy onto his reading. For more on the implications of the chiasmatic structure for the reading and writing (of births and death) see also Derrida's essay "Dissemination," in the book of the same name, especially part II, numbers 9, 10, and XI (pages 347-359). This text brings together long discussions of several of our concerns, including the chiasmus, the column, and the graft. It is here that Derrida reminds me that "to try to resist the removal of a textual member from its context is to want to remain protected against writing poison. It is to want at all costs to maintain the boundary line between the inside and the outside of a context."(*Dissemination*, 316)

This should be recalled as an important lesson for reading *Glas*, CA, the Buendías, and the family prick-logic in particular.

28. Spivak, 30. "If *Glas* is a tattooing, it turns the brute body into a writing surface. It is a sewing-work that stitches citations onto a text and leads to reading that sublates (and is sublated by) the text."

And shortly thereafter:

"If *glas* is fart, belch, and death rattle, it is the body's most intimate speech. But it is also that which constricts the orifice, and the writing in short spurts that characterizes most of *Glas* might be a peristaltic legend that produces the fecal column...."(Spivak, 30)

29. The references here are, of course, to the use of the figures of "*pharmakon*," "*pharmakeus*," and "*pharmakos*" as developed in important detail in Derrida's "Plato's Pharmacy," in *Dissemination*. "The character of the *pharmakos* has been compared to a scapegoat."(*Dissemination*, 130) The political fate, in CA, of the sham pharmacist, who would sew the seeds of violent revolution-as-*pharmakon*, is that of the *pharmakos*; thus CA reads all three terms in the series into a single (narrative) thread. Just as this essay reminds me that "the rite of the *pharmakos*" is "evil and death, repetition and exclusion"; so, too does it make the important case, for our reading, that in Plato (and, implicitly, in many of those "to follow") "Memory and truth cannot be separated. The movement of *aletheia* is a deployment of *mneme* through and through."(*Dissemination*, 105) Once again, this essay also ends facing the question of (what) remain(s):

"--But maybe its just a residue, a dream, a bit of a dream left over, an echo of the night...that other theater, those knocks from without..."(*Dissemination*, 171)

30. This scene of recognition has been described earlier on page 123, above. In *Saving the Text*, Geoffrey Hartman reads *Glas* as a book about, in part, scenes of recognition (including the famous one between Genet and his mother that "occurs" in Jean Paul

Sartre's book on Genet and is read rather critically in *Glas*, as the offering of a key, with the effect of an arrest: "To try once more to arrest it, as in 1952, when, at the exit from prison, the ontophenomenologist of the liberation [and here *Glas* cites Sartre on the scene] insisted on handing back to you, right into your hand, to a safe place, the 'keys' to the man-and-the-complete-work, their ultimate psychoanalytico-existential signification." (*Glas*, 28-9b) *Glas*' debate with Sartre's reading of the figures of "flower" and "thief" in Genet continues and will be discussed elsewhere). But Hartman, too, comes close to revalorizing such scenes as identificatory as he reads the history of Western literature in light of the psychoanalytic problematics of such scenes, and names two examples that seem to me particularly relevant to *Glas* and CA as Family scenarios:

"Our vision of the psyche's vulnerability broadens and intensifies; it extends into the bowels of language, from images to names and to the pathos that insistently attends the giving or calling out of a name. However different the Gothic gloom of Melville's *Pierre* and Faulkner's *Absalom, Absalom!* both novels turn on the seductive centrality of a scene or recognition -- of naming and acknowledgement. The concepts of vocation, initiation, and identity run parallel yet subordinate to that central hinge that Aristotle in the *Poetics* already discerned as essential to Greek tragedy." (Hartman, 107)

While Hartman's language of centrality and subordination is troublesome, with its resonances of "literary criticism," his recognition of the play of names and the problem of identity as questions raised in the two novels seems to me most appropriate for CA as well, and, in the same vein, I would add two other texts that re-cite such scenes in Family terms and ask similar questions (and inform my reading of CA), Kafka's "Metamorphosis," and Cervantes' *Don Quixote*. Both of these texts, like the others mentioned above also prove to ask "family" questions:

"The desire for a 'here and now,' fixed image or defining word, mystic portrait or identity-imposing story, is not dissociable, according to psychiatry, from a family romance: the recognition scene is always a displaced or sublimated family scene. It is no different with the Christian scandal of the "Presence of the Word" (*logos spermatikos*) in the Immaculate Conception, or more precisely, in the Annunciation." (Hartman, 107)

Who writes better scenes of recognition than Gabriel? Hartman goes on to read Genet's scene (of the family) as, I suspect, too absolutely-opposite the Christian scene, too much of a "reversal." But his remarks here seem to read CA into *Glas* in a particularly direct way. CA re-cites several moments of annunciation or of nomination, although not always in terms of a gift, the possibility of "taking" a name must also be considered; and goes on to de-stabilize the borders of the Family politically, economically, and linguistically, as it translates (the repetition of) names. As in the *Quixote*, where the "taking" of a proper name not only implies an identity, but a (hi)storical and political destiny that may not be one, so, too, in CA, these temporal attachments to names seem problematic (as, I hope, the fate of the next generation of Buendías to be read will demonstrate) (see, in *Don Quixote*, Vol. 1, Book 1, page 31 for the beginning of this process, the rest of Vol. 1 for its implications, and, of course, Vol. 1, Book 3, for its encounter with (what) remains). Colonel Aureliano Buendía's relationship with each member of his Family (most especially, with his mother) will be completely re-written after his grafting of the proper name, as if, in fact, he (or his "identity") has been transformed; and the new family differences, like those in Kafka's tale, mark, in an oscillating movement, the re-shaping or identifying of *all* involved. Finally, although the "influence" of "Faulkner" has been much reported and read into CA, I suspect the suggestion of a re-reading of *Pierre* into this event could prove to be most useful within a certain, carefully delimited context of grafting.

31. The impact of the narrative's re-citation of events that seem to "refer" to a specific Colombian history can be quickly recognized in much of the criticism to date. Perhaps the



fullest account of these intersections can be found in Stephen Minta's *García Márquez: Writer of Colombia*. Although Minta writes his history (and his literary criticism) as if there were no problem of the subject or/of reference; his book, nevertheless, serves a useful function when read within a specific, limited context. Post-colonial Colombian history, of course, is easily read as a history of violence. The word is even made proper, capitalized, in order to refer to a particularly bloody period of political turmoil between 1946 and 1966, a twenty year massacre known by schoolchildren and historians alike simply as "*La Violencia*". But CA's narrative has not moved so far -- although it is a common practice, and one followed by Minta, to describe *In Evil Hour* and *No One Writes to the Colonel* as "stories of *La Violencia*."

At this point in CA, if we are to decide that we are, in fact in the "Macondo" that is "an old banana plantation situated between the villages of Guacamayal and Sevilla, near García Márquez's birthplace of Aracataca"(Minta, 144), we seem also to be "situated" in 1899, at the outbreak of what is known historically as "The War of a Thousand Days" -- a long period of civil violence between Liberals and Conservatives that, at times, was a full-fledged civil war, and that continued until late in 1902.(Minta, 10) Of course, this war was preceeded by almost twenty-five years of sporadic violence and civil strife and Colonel Buendía's first battles may date as far back as 1875. In any case, the war that is fought over the next five cuts in CA is read by Minta as the War of a Thousand Days, and Colonel Buendía is read as modeled after its most notable "hero": General Rafael Uribe Uribe, who also had a "glorious" reputation despite losing every one of his campaigns. Minta reads García Márquez' presentation as a revisionist project attempting to de-mythologize the war hero so often described in Colombia with soaring Athenian rhetoric.(Minta, 15) As CA's narrative moves along, and other "events" in Colombian history, such as the banana plantation massacre of 1928, or traces of *La Violencia* itself, seem to be re-marked, I will offer the appropriate speculations as to "correspondences." Minta's text goes into impressive detail in describing the battles of the War of a Thousand Days and the history of General Uribe, and it should be referred to if the reader has any specific questions. However, attention should also be paid to the questions raised by the incorporation, to varying degrees, of such "information" within the context of a critical reading. The problems of textuality, of history, how and when it is "written" and by whom, especially in such explicitly and mundanely political circumstances cannot be dismissed. Minta, at times, writes in terms of "literature," in the face of desired change, having to "give way before the claims of other modes of thought and other forms of action."(Minta, 179) This implies a faith in what are essential(ly) philosophical distinctions that may themselves be contributing to the production of the conditions Minta would like to change. In any case, it would seem that a lesson of *Glas* is that the space that marks the between of precisely these distinctions is the space in which the possibility of change is most effectively interrogated. This is, of course, not to deny the ("existence" of a) past or the necessity of its representation, nor is it to dismiss entirely the project of historical contextualization, even in a text that would seem to actively resist the fixing of specific referential moments within a field of obviously (at best) quasi-referential language and situations; however, it is to suggest that such enterprises need to be written with(in) the same "plural styles" and with the same attention to their own assumptions about signification that seem to mark the (inevitably) textual marks they are reading. For more on this problem, see the citation from *Of Grammatology* that appears in the following note (below).

There is also a "history" of war that unfolds in *Glas*, as it reads any number of different wars including the *intifada* of the Palestinians that engages Genet (36-7b), wars between Jew and Greek, and those within the Jewish family (39-41a), the war for the signature (71b), the war from which Jesus withdrew (91-3a), Hegel's wars between species and Hegel's "war" as a natural death (109-116a), Kant's war between the sexes (125-27a), Hegel's "real and total violence" (135-38a), and even a war that marks the difference between plant and animal behavior (or religions) (245-49a). As with so much of

*Glas*, however, each of these wars must be read separately.

32. The supplemental logic implied in this formulation has its fullest explication, of course, in Derrida's *Of Grammatology*, specifically, pages 141-164, and in the essay "Différance." In the *Grammatology*'s formulation of the supplemental logic (of the trace structure) the relationship between object and supplement is re-written as one of mutually defining interdependency within any binary (or even dialectical) hierarchy. It could be said that what is inscribed here is "oscillation." The most explicit proclamations concerning these structures can be found on page 65 of the *Grammatology*, however, a more detailed reading of the supplement (of a supplement) that is always already inscribed into writing, into the network of traces to be read, occurs within the book's reading of Rousseau (in Part II) for whom writing was already a well-known supplement. Here, between pages 152 and 162, Derrida distinguishes his own formulation of supplementarity (later, *différance*, the hymen, dissemination, etc., each time with a difference) from previous uses of the term by psychoanalysis (*Of Grammatology*, 159-160), and goes on to define, as "dangerous supplements," (citing Rousseau), the notions of external context or data, including history, biography, "existence," etc., whose effect upon reading, while inevitable must nonetheless be examined with some care. (158-59) Within a rhetoric whose exuberance still resonates with the extremes of post-1968 Paris, Derrida writes his notorious argument "*There is nothing outside of the text.*" (158) Even here, within a reading of Rousseau, this already means (to say) that what is assumed to be "outside" the text is already textual in that it is represented within differential structures or networks of traces (of meaning). This by now, is an old analysis, and one that has been consistently developed and refined as Derrida's texts have re-written their own re-formulations of writing; however, as the opening of a philosophical critique of the effect of certain linguistic, epistemological, and ontotheological assumptions within the texts of many, diverse institutions and disciplines, including those of politics and pedagogy, these early formulations are still vital. For a servicable introduction to these and other crucial early formulations of Derridean strategies of reading, see Gayatri Spivak's preface to the *Grammatology*. Also, for a detailed analysis of the grammatical implications of supplementarity as a (re-positioning before the) Law, see Derrida's "The Supplement of Copula," in *Margins of Philosophy*. It should be noted, as I read the opening of war in CA, that the constant struggle within supplementary pairs can be translated as "the violence of the letter," as in the beginning of the *Grammatology*'s second Part. The suggestion here that violence is always already inscribed into any interpretive activity (a suggestion that is further developed and supported in Derrida's reading of Levinas in *Writing and Difference*) and that such violence can, at crucial moments, be both inevitable and (almost) totally destructive -- leaving only a "trace" -- will mark much of the reading of CA that is to follow. For an important investigation into the consequences of this, "the violent truth of 'reading,'" see also, "Living On: Border Lines," pages 152-176.

33. This passage skims over an important pair of paragraphs in *Glas*' reading of the family, and of woman in the family, on page 97a. Gayatri Spivak reads *Glas* as "pointing at the effacement of woman in the Holy family" (Spivak, 34), and it is here that such pointing occurs most explicitly. She also suggests that although the Hegel column would claim to read the Family as it is formulated within the Hegelian text, an actual reading of the Family never quite develops, "it is as if the argument of the family constantly comes to an end and is reopened, as if it repeats itself *ad infinitum*. Yet each time, if the context is examined, a slightly displaced spiral rather than a repetitive circularity is discovered." (Spivak, 33) In this case, *Glas* mimes and is mimed by CA and *What Remains*.

The passage that commands our reading in *Glas*, on what is missing from the family within Hegel's text, seems to begin by describing CA, and ends up interrogating it as a chronicle of the Family. This "development" is precisely the issue, as Derrida's reading seems to do more, or something other, than just "pointing" at effacement. By asking the questions that follow such implied effacement, Derrida seems to problematize the notion of "restoration," of returning what is missing, as well. Although I will no doubt turn again to a citing of these paragraphs, "in the text" of my reading; I will re-cite them here, now, in the margin, for the purposes of "demonstration":

"The family never ceases to occupy the stage, and yet there is the impression that there is never any question of that. The philosophical object named 'family' seems ceaselessly to slip away. The ontotheological premises, the infinite kernel of the family structure, of nomination, of filiation to be sure, are visible. But the whole fundamental syllogistic is controlled by the father/son relationship about which we can ask ourselves whether it opens or closes the possibility of the family. This domination belongs, it seems, to the essence of the Holy Family.[...]"

"Who in effect is missing from the Holy Family? Who can be *absent* within it, and what does *absent* mean in this case? Is the father absent? Is the mother? Since Joseph is absent and Mary a virgin, the son is the son of the Father: the father and the mother are missing, one from the finite 'point of view,' the other from the infinite 'point of view.' But this dissociation between the two points of view is precisely what speculative dialectics criticizes. The relation of the Holy Family to the earthly family plays in this strange part(y) or partition between two, three, and four that works (over) the first texts and 'develops itself' in the whole later system. In still speaking of development, we do nothing but name without resolving a difficulty now recognized."(*Glas*, 97a)

Already, in the early (Hegelian) texts, the scene of the family can be read as a space "between," and the question of the family raises the inevitable question of development, of "growth" or branching out over time, susceptibility to the graft.

34. For a typical reading of the "trails" of incest in the novel, see Michael Wood's *One Hundred Years of Solitude*, pages 83-86. Even Wood begins by resisting the temptation to "allegorize" literary incest and remarks that "critics have already had a field day." He names two: Jacques Jos  t and Michael Palencia-Roth. His own reading of "incest" in the novel is a fairly standard example of this tendency however. It uses the balance sheet of moral value as it reads cases of "metaphorical incest" and "real incest averted" in the novel, finally tallying up the results and concluding that "There is no punishment of incest: incest in the novel is innocence dogged by guilt, not guilt getting its comeuppance. What does get its terrible comeuppance is happiness."(Wood, 86) Interestingly, although Wood cites the relationship of Jos   Arcadio and Pilar Ternera discussed earlier, as well as Jos   Arcadio's later relationship with Rebeca and two later cases of "aunts and nephews," and cousins marrying, which remain to be read, he does not read Arcadio's attraction for his mother, Pilar, or the bed-trick she plays, within his discussion. This should surely qualify, at least, as "incest averted."

Still the question remains as to what can be "done" critically with the repetition, within the text, of the circumstances of sexual love within the family borders. I have already read, in part, *Glas*' reading of Hegel on the incest prohibition, and later I will read Hegel's rejection of the Oedipal situation as a defining myth of the family. Other work, from Levi-Strauss to Deleuze and Guattari, might also be discussed if this were a detailed theorization of incest as a "theme" or "issue." However, what seems to me to be important here and now is that the defining of "incest" is a problem within a family whose borders refuse to stabilize, and that the depositing of "value" or even "structure" to the translating activity of copulation, even along the edges of a family scene, is inevitably resisted by irreducably singular and complex logics of attraction and repulsion, of, we might say,

speculative dialectics. The family "curse" acts as both a stimulant and a protectant even as its effects seem to manifest themselves differently each time. This heterogeneity of seemingly structural prohibitions will become more important as these instances multiply.

35. A great deal is at stake here, as *Glas* demonstrates as it reads Genet refusing to recognize the (royal) signification of his own proper name within the political dynamic of a prison interview. (*Glas*, 40b) *Glas* makes the argument, at some length, that the signatory figures of flowers and horses that disseminate throughout Genet's texts refuse to signify along standard readable lines, and calls for a reading that avoids falling into some well known critical traps, including those that seem to capture Sartre (the flower as universal figure, "thief" as identifying a self via the gift of a proper name (from the mother)) and Lacan (the phallus as "key," or as transcendental signified) within "arresting" critical strategies that will be read in greater detail as the flower-writing proceeds. *Glas* also describes the movement of the (de)part(ed) flower through the text as causing a deferral of recognition and, thereby, resisting and even alienating readers whose desires conform to historically powerful assumptions about the rhetorical functions of such figures -- *Glas*, that is, recognizes its steady loss of readers:

"Departed are those who thought the flower signified, symbolized, metaphorized, metonymized, that one was devising repertoires of signifiers and anthic figures, classifying flowers of rhetoric, combining them, ordering them, binding them up in a sheaf or a bouquet around the phallic arch (*arcus, arca, n p n n* , which trap you fall into doesn't matter).

"Departed then are, save certain exceptions, duly so considered, the archeologists, philosophers, hermeneuts, semioticians, semanticians, psychoanalysts, rhetoricians, poeticians, even perhaps all those readers who still believe, in literature or anything else." (*Glas*, 40-41b)

*Glas* reads Genet (and presents itself, also) as a challenge to "those in a hurry" (to read) to be "patient for a moment"; although it recognizes (for Genet and for itself) the possibility, even inevitability of "departures." Of course, as results go, de-parting is perhaps the most appropriate *glas*-response possible, as the text seeks, always and everywhere it seems, to de-part. On this point, at this point in the reading of CA as a novel, a critique begins to develop that would also attempt to account for the somewhat unorthodox citation style that *What Remains* has been repeating all along. *Glas*, as we have seen, de-parts, separates, a set of "proper" readers named with(in) the assumptions of (usually pedagogical) institutions from its own movements, its own "textuality." Earlier, (but still to be read, in only a few moments), it had already posit(ion)ed the flower (as rhetorical figure) both inside and outside of that ("series of bodies or objects") of which it is already a part. (*Glas*, 14-15b) Also, it will come to call for the de-parting of its (own) readers and its (own) readings. *What Remains* would echo these gestures of de-partation by moving, by relocating, one might say, its citations outside of its sentences' "proper" boundaries; beyond the closure of their periods or the strict binding (erect) of their quotation marks -- to leave the citation (as a location) to remain. While this is clearly not the extraordinary challenge to institutional laws and their assumptions (about the "proper") posed by *Glas*, with its absence of citations; it is, it seems to me, a small cut that would seek to mark a space between "inside" and "outside" (as if to re-negotiate the space of CA between the inside and the outside of a Family (and a) "novel"). In its "execution," this strategy would seek to retain the (proper) name *inside* the parentheses, while, "at the same time," leaving it to remain *outside* the sentence (posted on the edge of the law), and leaving the reader to ask what (systems of) concepts or beliefs remain at stake here.

This critique of a "proper place" will be further developed (at some length) at the novel's (later) moment of its own "translation," where the citation strategy will be read again, this time as its de-parting seeks to reinscribe a resistance to (the "dream" of) pure

interiorization of translation by placing, in its place, the improper exterior of parentheses that inevitably remain.

36. The philosophical relationship between rebound and result is crucial, for Derrida, to understanding the relationship between the origins of "origin" in Hegel and Heidegger. For more on this relationship, see, first, Heidegger's *Identity and Difference*, pp. 52-53, in which Heidegger develops, from Hegel, an account of the "origin" as a result, a movement of "rebounding" from origin to result that eventually becomes an oscillation of "reflexive counter-motions." Derrida re-tells this "original" (hi)story, as *Glassary* reminds me on page 140, in his essay on "sources" in Valéry ("Qual Quelle", in a section called "Rebound," pp. 278-283 in *Margins of Philosophy*) and in a note to a parenthetical remark "(the 'ground' is the 'result' for Hegel)" in his essay on Hegel and prefaces ("Outwork," p. 31, note 30, in *Dissemination*). Around the parenthetical remark is the result of this formulation for, among other things, the question of the possibility of the "preface" (its status as either origin or result) in a philosophical work (for Hegel and, here, Marx): "It is around this valuation of the result (the 'ground' is the 'result' for Hegel) that the entire debate revolves." The note also reminds me that the formulation in Hegel can be found at the beginning of the "Theory of Being" in the Greater Logic. The redrawing of the distinction between origin and result is the beginning of philosophy's critique of the possibility of reflection. This will be a crucial movement as the possibility of (hi)storical and subjective reflection becomes more and more of a problem in CA, and we will eventually turn to Rodolphe Gasche's excellent account of the history of the critique of reflection in Continental thought, including Derrida's chiasmic restructuring of earlier, more decidable constructions, in *The Tain of the Mirror*, a text which finds its title recited (in a fashion) in the pages of "Outwork" that follow the citation and that, later, will prepare us for CA's problems and Gasche's readings of these questions:

"The breakthrough toward radical otherness (with respect to the philosophical concept -- of the concept) always takes *within philosophy*, the *form* of an a posteriority or an empiricism. But this is an effect of the specular nature of philosophical reflection, philosophy being incapable of inscribing (comprehending) what is outside it otherwise than through the appropriating assimilation of a negative image of it, and dissemination is written on the back -- the *tain* -- of that mirror. Not on its inverted specter. Nor in the triadic symbolic order of its sublimation." (*Dissemination*, 33)

Neither the doubling of spectral reversal nor the "relief" of dialectics (neither Heidegger nor Hegel) can contain the disseminating logics of reflection as they exceed (as the rebounding of results) their own origins in empiricisms. Reflection will be another pure dream turned nightmare within CA's (hi)story of the Family.

37. The first words of *The Thief's Journal* are:

"Convict's garb is striped pink and white. Though it was at my heart's bidding that I chose the universe wherein I delight, I at least have the power of finding therein many meanings I wish to find: *there is a close relationship between flowers and convicts*. The fragility and delicacy of the former are of the same nature as the brutal insensitivity of the latter.\* Should I have to portray a convict -- or a criminal -- I shall so bedeck him with flowers that, as he disappears beneath them, he will himself become a flower, a gigantic and new one." (*The Thief's Journal*, 9)

*Glas* cites the first part of these remarks, up to the asterisk, and then interrupts, to read the note at the bottom of the page:

"The asterisk holds the veil raised.

The footnote reference is not going to make you fall into the trap of an antonymy or an antinomy, so as to paralyze you there.

On the contrary, the note states that what provokes a movement that is infinite, quivering, rustling (these last two words are very studied, they are also among the movements, the emotions of flowers).

Here is the note: '\*My excitement is the oscillation from one to the other.'

Whose excitement? The author's? the narrator's? Who signs in the margin and bottom of the page? Since excitement is oscillation ('My excitement is the oscillation...'), the I is carried away, divided, moved aside in(to) the trait that relates it to anything whatsoever. Undecidable it too in its signature." (*Glas*, 127b)

For further discussions of the veil, the danger of falling into reading traps and being paralyzed, oscillation as an undecidable movement, disappearing beneath flowers, and the carrying away, the moving aside of the "proper" I, see the remainder of this cut in *What Remains* and particularly note 35 above and, below, the cut's "final scene," as read on pp. 184-187. *Glas'* brief reading of the first page of Genet's "Journal" can easily lead, here, as it does in *Glas*, to almost all of the question that remain.

38. The link between writing and burning, between the trace and ashes as remains, is developed in several places in Derrida's work, including *Of Spirit* and the "Envois" section of *The Post Card*. Derrida's book on Heidegger and the development of "spirit" begins, "I shall speak of ghost, of flame, and of ashes." (*Of Spirit*, 1) The argument that follows reads Heidegger as first warning against the conceptualization of spirit (*Geist*), and then citing it within the binding of quotation marks; until, finally, by the time of the *Rectorship Address*, Spirit "presents itself...in its spirit and its letter. Spirit's affirmation, inflamed." Derrida continues,

"Yes *inflamed*: I say this not only to evoke the pathos of the *Rectorship Address* when it celebrates spirit, not only because of what a reference to flame can illuminate of the terrifying moment which is deploying its specters around this theater, but because twenty years later, exactly twenty years, Heidegger will say of *Geist*, without which it is impossible to think evil, that i the first place it is neither *pneuma* nor *spiritus*, thus allowing us to conclude that *Geist* is no more heard in the Greece of philosophers than in the Greece of the Gospels, to say nothing of Roman deafness: *Geist is flame*. And this could, apparently, be said, and thus thought, only in German." (*Of Spirit*, 31-32)

The reading that is undertaken here, of the politics of a figure and of a philosopher, demonstrates that as the figure develops, is capitalized, essentialized, singularized, into an ultimate gift to a people, the philosopher simultaneously follows along a specific and horrific philosophical path. Heidegger's silence (on the question of the holocaust) is met and disturbingly re-echoed by a reading of Heidegger's words, which reveal a path towards the transcendentalization of a figure (*Geist*) that, as an operation, facilitates the blindness that is to come. The warning here, for the makers of systems and the founders of figures, concerning the consequences of allowing a figure to become *the Figure* (*par excellence*) is crucial, and is repeated in much of García Márquez' literature on the dangers of absolute power, and in particular in *The Autumn of the Patriarch*.

It reminds me that the language must, every so often, be allowed to burn, to destroy itself in the flames, leaving only ashes as traces of its previous significations, so that it can be re-written and so that the transcendentalism that comes over time is not allowed to mark a blindness to the assumptions that gave it birth. This would also, I read in CA (in the fate of Aureliano's writings), mark a burning of the past, a burning that, here, will be deferred by the deferral of remains. This burning, and the impossibility of it ever (totally) succeeding is both counted upon and resisted within the logic of *Glas'* reading and in the postcards between addresses in "Envois," including the following part of one dated January, 1979:

"Last night I felt that the worst vengeance was on its course, and that it was avenging someone else, neither you nor me. Your desire has set in place and on its way,

everything that you feared, and which has wound up finding you. In you, apart from you. I would like to be *sure* that it is you, uniquely you alone and directly who have finally accepted (without deliberating for a second) the idea of this great fire, call it 'burning': that literally will remain nothing of what we have sent each other, this entire eternity, that one day or another we will become younger than ever and that after the burning of the letters by chance I will encounter you. I will wait for a birth, I bet."(*The Post Card*, 173)

This particular postcard also begins with an apparent citation, in quotation marks, without reference, that, in part, re-cites the (hi)story of Colonel Aureliano Buendía:

"Go to the war."(*The Post Card*, 172)

39. I am thinking here of Moby Dick -- both the text and the whale, the whale as the text of rumor and gossip and of a particularly philosophical (hi)story. In the chapter whose title repeats the title of the "book" and the proper name of the whale, the chapter that writes of the "news" of the whale as messages sent in from outside, as rumor or as "report" (amidst a section that would re-draw the philosophical distinction between "agency" and "principle" that has such a powerful history), the rhetoric of CA's war becomes the rhetoric of an-other war:

"No wonder, then, that the ever gathering volume from the mere transit over the widest watery spaces, the outblown rumors of the White Whale did in the end incorporate with themselves all manner of morbid hints, and half-formed suggestions of supernatural agencies..."

And, less than two pages later, the "rumors" characterize the Whale in the same terms as they elsewhere would characterize the Colonel:

"One of the wild suggestions referred to, as at last coming to be linked with the White Whale in the minds of the superstitiously inclined, was the unearthly conceit that Moby Dick was ubiquitous; that he had actually been encountered in opposite latitudes at one and the same instant in time."(*Moby Dick*, 241-243)

As the chapter progresses there are a number of striking similarities between the reports of the two "subjects"; and the questions as to their status as agents, their "responsibility" for their "personae" and their "results," are formulated in similarly undecidable terms. Indeed, the interrogation of the status of object as "subject" -- the enquiry into Being that Melville's novel undertakes with its textual journeying through rhetorics of idealisms, empiricisms, materialisms, and psychologisms; within the language(s) of grammatologies, dramatologies and onto-theologies -- marks out a path that could be easily "discovered" within CA's narrative as well. But that is another project that must be left to remain. I have attempted to quell the resonances of "other" texts, the sounds of "other" signatures that insist on ringing as I read CA and *Glas*, (Kafka and Faulkner, most often), if only to avoid an entirely different set of problems that would need to be discussed if these texts were allowed to ring as loudly as they might. I have, of course, been more and less successful (failing miserably in this instance, where the sound of the tolling would not fade away); and I am sure this will continue to be the case.

40. Michael Wood reminds me that García Márquez, in an interview with his friend Plinio Apuleyo Mendoza, appears to solve the problem that CA suggests is "perhaps the only mystery that was never cleared up in Macondo," when he says,

"Listen to this. When a character in the book shoots himself, his blood trickles in a thin stream all round the town until it finds the dead man's mother. The whole book is like that, on a knife's edge between the sublime and the vulgar. Like the bolero."(Wood, 76)

"But," Wood reassures his readers concerning this "solution," "he is only the author."(Wood, 76) I will leave the question as to whether he who signs can solve (a

mystery or anything else in the text) unsolved. It will remain a question for now, as it so often does in *Glas*. This is not, it should be noted, a question of intent or pure "authority," but rather a question of the status of a signature *after* the fact of reading or interpretation. If this is, in fact, a solution, how much of a solution is it? How much depends on when this solution is read, and where? How does one read the novel's "perhaps" and its ridiculous claim of singularity? What sort of supplemental logic is in action when the text remains silent and an interview speaks? These and a great many similar questions remain.

Wood cites the passage as evidence for his claim that the novel is organized around certain musical structures and motifs. The difficulties with this reading of "only the author's interview as evidence for the "key" to the narrative are not of interest to me here and now. I would rather call attention (not as evidence, but as still (only) another suggested reading to graft onto my own) to the description of the novel as written "on a knife's edge between....," re-marking, as it does, a reading of CA's cuts and edges, its castrations, truncations, grafts, and incisions; and especially, its pos(i)t(ion) "between." The bolero, incidentally, also marks a between, as Mendoza goes on to describe it as a form that "may seem excessively sentimental, but...also tongue-in-cheek." Wood reads CA in the space of this between, reminding me that "the wildest songs are the ones you have to sing straight." Even Wood's attempt to find a musical style that recalls "magic-realism" cannot help but be written with at least the resonance of a vocabulary of the double-bind. Unfortunately, Wood's reading goes on to fall into one of *Glas*' earlier "traps": "There was an arid strain in Modernism -- remember the prim Stephen Dedalus, and the tight, frightened inhabitants of Eliot's poems -- and it has taken writers some time to reclaim the heart, to recognize that the realms of open feeling should not be left entirely to the songwriters." (Wood, 77)

The dangers, cited earlier and warned of so much in Derrida's work, of essentialist, capitalized history, and of reading monolithically, should, with the memory of Stephen and, one supposes, his "books," including *Ulysses*, as "prim," be apparent. Who has lost, who has reclaimed, "the heart"?

41. For an interesting introduction to the rhetorical function of the figure of flowers in Freud, Hegel, and (briefly) Derrida, see Claudette Sartiliot's informative essay "Herbarium, Verbarium: The Discourse of Flowers," in the Winter, 1988 *Diacritics*. Sartiliot traces the flower-rhetoric in Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right*, in Freud's *The Interpretation of Dreams*, and, to a much lesser extent, in *Glas*, where she reads the exposition of the *genêt*. Sartiliot does read *Glas* and Deleuze and Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus* (with its many "rhizomes") as "reviving" a "lost tradition" of philosophers writing botanical treatises (see Rousseau, Goethe, and Ruskin for examples). This seems to overstate the case a bit, especially considering that she goes on to suggest that both these works actually "emphasize the correspondence between the mode of production in the vegetable world and in the work of art." (Sartiliot, 80) I do not have the time to unpack the assumptions (both worthwhile and troublesome) in such a reading, but by now it should be somewhat clear, at least in the case of *Glas* (and I am confident about the other work, too), that any sort of "correspondence" between plant-rhetoric and anything is something the text seeks constantly to avoid. I suspect that *Glas* might have this reading of "the life of the work of art" de-parted (as it no doubt, at some point, would my own, as well).

42. See note 40 above for the quote from García Márquez' interview with his friend Plinio Mendoza and speculations on the import of this particular figure (of speech). Also, for a full reading of all of the "betweens" of *Glas*, see section 5. of John Leavey's essay "This



(then) will not have been a book," entitled "Between the two, the clapper" (in *Glassary*, pp. 101-106). In these five pages, Leavey reads the betweens of both columns and the space between them as the invitation of the *entre* and the problematizing of the remain(s):

"Between two lives (should I say between Hegel and Genet, already split in their *seings*) is death (Genet) and concept (Hegel). The relation of artist/author and art work, like the signature, is a family relation, the question of filiation, relieved but with remain(s) and so not relieved.

"The other column: shuttling between the two, between what one keeps and what one gives up, since both are lost, is shuttling between nothing: 'the crack between the two is nothing' (207b). *Colpos*, nothing, between the two, like a miser, I shuttle and lose."

And later: "Finally, 'between the two,' 'the woman's two legs,' the spectacle of the fetish in its monumental supply, 'the fleece of hair,' *la toison* (210a).

"Between the two -- *glas*.

"Between the two -- enant(h)iosis. Pregnancy. Fetish." (*Glassary*, 106)

Leavey's reading respects this logic of the between as it continues to write in the margins of Derrida's corpus, his written body, and his *Glas*.

43. For a detailed account of the relationship between incest, translation, and genealogy (the ties of filial filaments), see Anibal González' valuable essay "Translation and Genealogy: One Hundred Years of Solitude," in McGuirk's *Gabriel García Márquez: New Readings*, pp. 65-79. This essay has informed much of my reading of the link between these problems and I am greatly indebted to it. González reads three theoretical texts on translation: Benjamin's "The Task of the Translator," Derrida's *Des Tours de Babel*, and Borges' "The Homeric Versions." Needless to say, the first two of these will also be read into *What Remains* as the "time" of a translation draws nearer, and Borges may also appear as one who signs ("Pierre Menard: Author of the *Quixote*") in the *Remain(s)*. González offers the reading of an "emblem" of the link between these problems of discourse and filiation at one point in his essay:

"But perhaps the emblem of this link between genealogy, writing, and translation in the text is, as I have said before, José Arcadio's tattooed male member; here the rather hackneyed Freudian symbolism of the writing implement as phallus becomes literalized, and the words 'in several languages intertwined in blue and red' on José Arcadio's penis evoke the confusion of languages at Babel and the Shemites' phallic Tower." (McGuirk, 74)

Although the notion of penis (or even phallus) as emblem is troublesome given our reading of a generalized fetishism that can never be quite "literalized," since it does not simply signify (either in terms of anatomy or concept), the reading of the written prick as Babelian tower is nonetheless useful for other reasons that will become more apparent when the issue of translation is raised more directly. González goes on to link translation to incest in a most useful way in the passage I have almost cited in the text:

"Translation and incest both share a transgressive nature, both are improper acts that imply the breaching of barriers between members of the same family or between two languages." Or even more importantly perhaps, as Derrida would remind me in "Living On: BorderLines," within the same language, from reading to reading, from text to text. González never quite reads the problem of intralingual translation and its theoretical development in Derrida and García Márquez. The essay does carry a reference to the Family tree (of José Arcadio Buendía's) as a genealogical one; and, much to my interest and delight, there is a passing speculation that seems at first to suggest my own reading of *Glas* into CA:

"The plot of García Márquez' novel not only deals explicitly with the Buendías' task of translating Melquíades' manuscripts, it also reinscribes that task, translates it, in a broader sense, into the language of kinship (with all that implies in terms of the incest taboo

and the importance of proper names) which configures the other half of the action in the novel in a specular movement that is like a parody of Hegelian dialectics and which leads not to synthesis, but to the novel's collapse into its linguistic origins." (McGuirk, 72)

González never develops this notion of the novel as "a parody of Hegelian dialectics" -- a *Glas* -- and his rhetoric of collapse and origins marks a reading that is, of course, very different from my own; however, the resonance of names and styles must have "more than mere chance about it." I hope it is already clear, here, now, that any notion of the novel "collapsing into its linguistic origins" could not be sustained by my own particular reading of *Glas* and CA, since the formulation of terms (and "concepts") such as "collapse" and "origin" is precisely what "interests and constrains us here" in both of these texts. I will return to this essay at some greater length when I approach the translation of Melquíades' (hi)stories by another Aureliano, a Babelian one, a Babilonia -- and when the *Remain(s)* go on *Tours* with Benjamin.

44. Gayatri Spivak also reads the figure of the hymen into *Glas* in her essay "Displacement and the Discourse of Woman" in Mark Krupnick's *Displacement: Derrida and After*, pp. 169-195. She begins by detailing the conceptualization of the hymen in *Dissemination* in a way that I suspect serves as a useful explanation:

"The hymen is the figure for undecidability and the 'general law of the textual effect,' (*Dis.*, p.235) for at least two reasons. First, 'metaphorically' it is the ritual celebration of the breaking of the vaginal membrane, and 'literally' that membrane remains intact even as it opens up into two lips; second, the walls of the passage that houses the hymen are both inside and outside the body. It describes 'the more subtle and patient displacement which, with reference to a Platonic or Hegelian idealism, we here call Mallarmean by convention' (*Dis.*, p. 235; I have arranged the word-order to fit my sentence). The indefinitely displaced undecidability of the effect of the text (as hymen) is not the transcendent or totalizable ideal of the patronymic chain." (Krupnick, 174)

Spivak applauds Derrida's re-sexualization of philosophical discourse, and his re-writing of "truth" no longer as "unveiling" (*aletheia*), but she reads this text still as "the expression of a man's desire, if only because it is the only discourse handy." The hymen proves to be "doubly displaced since "it is the phallus that learns the trick of faking orgasm" in the mimed scene of "The Double Session" and *Mimique*. She then goes on, insightfully, to read *Glas* as having as one of its many projects, "to learn the name of the mother," suggesting that its reading of Genet stages the "efforts of a critic who seeks to discover the name of the mother" as a strategy to undo the phallogocentric scenario of the Oedipal positing of phallus as transcendental signified.(176) The unfolding of this scenario is best read, she argues, in *Glas*' reading of the history of dialectics in terms of fetishism, a (hi)story that includes passages that remain to be read in these pages:

"I can do no more than mark a few moments in that "history." Hegel remarks on the fetishism of the African savage, who must eat the fetishized ancestor ceremoniously. (*Glas* is also an act of mourning for fathers.) Hegel accuses Kant of a certain fetishism, since Kant sees the Divine Father merely as a jealous God, and must thus formulate a Categorical Imperative. (Derrida supplements the accusation by pointing out that, in French at least, the Categorical Imperative has the same initials as the fetishistic notion -- saving the mother jealously from the father's phallus -- of the Immaculate Conception: IC)." (177)

Her reading of the filial problematics raised by the IC leave many issues remaining, including the relationship between the IC and the remains of the Family syllogism in the *Phenomenology*, but the reading that she then goes on to offer of the relationship between the hymen and the fetish in *Glas* is most important for our own cuts here and now:

"Rather than negating the thing itself -- that would merely be another way of positing it -- deconstruction gives it the undecidability of the fetish. The

thing itself becomes its own substitute. Like the faked orgasm, the thing itself is its own fake. Yet the fetish, to qualify as fetish, must carry within itself a trace of the thing itself that it replaces. Deconstruction cannot be pure undecidability. 'It constitutes an *economy* of the undecidable.... It is not dialectical but plays with the dialectic.(*Glas*, 210a)'" And a short time later: "If the project of *La double seance* finally puts the phallus in the hymen, *Glas* is obliged the son with the patronymic in the arms of the phallic mother."(178-79)

The "obliged" begins to signal a danger for my own reading at this point. Spivak, who between these two citations has offered a reading of the last two pages of the Genet side of *Glas* in terms of the fetish and the impossibility of a full displacement, the impossibility of writing the name of the mother in the space of the large graphic L (*elle*) of page 261b, seems to risk a certain biological essentialism as she reads the sexualization of discourse (metaphor, metonymy, signature, etc.) in terms of a gendered destiny that leaves Derrida without a choice, always already trapped, to some degree in a vocabulary that would displace woman's pleasure and woman's discourse. As a male philosopher, she seems to suggest, in a reading of the Genet column where "the 'feminization' of philosophizing for the male deconstructor might find its most adequate legend in male homosexuality defined as criminality, and that it cannot speak for woman." I do not think that the one reading necessarily leads to the other, nor that the choices are in fact binarisms to begin with. *Glas* would seem to me to write itself within a generalized literalization of "heterosexuality" in such a way that though the shape of the book might indeed be a fetish, it is not "an object that the subject regards with superstitious awe," but the undecidable movement of an oscillation (of the trace of the object). Spivak's risk of gender essentialism is obviously a strategic one here, aiming at a political discourse on theory and woman, but it seems to already have assumed a literalizing strategy of reading that ties itself into the very inescapable traps it would find *Glas* finally succumbing to. It risks reading too literally *Glas'* readings between sexuality and discourse, and consequently, it risks approaching the destiny of the literal reader that once asked professor Freud how a man could possibly be a "hysteric." There is always more and less at stake here.

45. Michael Wood reads this incident in CA first as the result of a singular, human act of reading, of agency, and then as a sort of phenomenologizing of "destiny" as a concept. Both readings seem to me to illustrate some important dangers in much of what has been written about passages such as this one in CA. Wood begins with a reading that would explain an "event" in terms of individual responsibility (a strategy for dealing with the excesses of magic-realism that is all too popular):

"Pilar Ternera, Aureliano José's mother has foreseen his death in the cards -- has foreseen, that is, not his pleasant destiny but what was in fact going to occur. But then it seems to have occurred, bewilderingly, *because* she foresaw it -- this is what 'directed by a wrong interpretation of the cards' means. She has cruelly misread his fortune, and the misreading has cruelly come true."(Wood, 46)

I am not as assured as Wood seems to be about what, precisely, the phrase he cites "means," but it can certainly mean, at least, more than that Pilar Ternera has caused her son's death. The passage never does ascribe an author to its "interpretation," and given the status of so much interpretation in CA, I would be wary of assigning one. Although Wood does go on to recognize that: "the lethal misreading does serve to underline the role of interpretation in these matters. It is scarcely a metaphor to say that interpretations can kill, in and out of literature"(46); his reading, already unclear as to what it means to be "scarcely a metaphor," is further muddled by an attempted distinguishing between destiny and life (as fate):

"Aureliano José's destiny is what was supposed to happen to him, an exact enactment of the *was to* formula. What did happen was...what happened, mere life. A destiny, we may say, is a project or interpretation; life either takes it or leaves it. Fate is

what actually happens, read in retrospect as if it had to happen."(47)

The notion of "life" "leaving" an interpretation, of a metaphysical distinction between the presence of a Being-in-time and its subjectivity, is characteristic of assumptions about the relationship between destiny and fortune-telling, between writing and reading that accompany much critical work on CA. The distinction implies a separation of subject and object that, it seems to me, is under investigation in the novel. The two strategies here, of personal responsibility and metaphysical fate are separate ways to explain, in the face of undecidable scenes of writing and reading (of cards, for instance), events that otherwise are likely to leave unaccountable remains. Of course, they do anyway, and these remains mark the trace, the spoor to be followed as *Glas* reads CA.

46. See *Autumn of the Patriarch* and the discovery of the doubled remains (in the tomb):

"...and then we pushed open a side door that connected with an office hidden in the wall, and there we saw him, in his denim uniform without insignia, boots, the gold spur on his left heel, older than all old men and all old animals on land or sea, and he was stretched out on the floor, face down, his right arm bent under his head as a pillow, as he had slept night after night every night of his ever so long life of a solitary despot."(9-10)

This proves to be the remains of a double. The signature style of the undecorated uniform as textile-fetish (as "spur") allows the Patriarch to cast a double in place of his own (original) death (in the narrative) and that allows for the dissemination (of the Patriarch and the novel) and, as we can then see, the effacement of his image:

"Only when we turned him over to look at his face did we realize that it was impossible to recognize him, even though his face had not been pecked away by vultures, because none of us had ever seen him, and even though his profile was on both sides of all the coins, on postage stamps, on condom labels, on trusses and scapulars, and even though his engraved picture with the flag across his chest and the dragon of the fatherland was displayed at all times in all places, we knew that they were copies of copies of portraits that had already been considered unfaithful during the time of the comet..."(10)

Thanks to the problematic logic of disseminated mimesis (so intricately analyzed over and over in "The Double Session") the double need not even be a double (the futile dream of Nabokov's *Despair*). The double can be an other, marked by any difference but also by a repetition of the *seing*, the style of the fetish.

47. The line concerning the economic law of the home in CA reads: "Many times he would prolong the talks beyond the expected limit and let them drift into comments of a domestic nature."(CA, 165) This line, written in terms of drifting beyond expected limits and in terms of the economy of *oikos*, ties the postal relationship (which, by virtue even of its technology comes to be marked by the undecidability of the between (and its remains)) to the entire *eidos* of *oikos* and to economic laws of use and exchange value. For more on the re-reading of these classical Marxist concepts that Derrida's work might afford see Michael Ryan's *Marxism and Deconstruction*. There are, it seems to me, several difficulties in Ryan's attempt to find the places of intersection and conflict between Derrida's project and Marx's; the first being that he reads both sets of texts *as* projects, as teleologically inscribed and sustained philosophical critiques which develop within a specific and patterned set of assumptions and desires. This approach risks treating what, in each case, are heterogeneous texts as if they were part of a monolithic system of analysis (whether discursive, political, economic, etc.). It also risks erasing much that remains unsystematized in each set of texts, including, incidentally, *Glas*, about which there are only few references. *Glas* is marked in Ryan's book as a sort of "turning point" in Derrida's reading of Hegel. Ryan tells a (hi)story of his own (in the best dialectical fashion), arguing that, before *Glas*, Derrida uses Hegel's methodology sympathetically to

critique Husserlian phenomenology and the limitations of structuralism ("Against the theology of immediate presence, Derrida proposes the mediation of the relation to the other as non-presence"), but after the extended reading of Hegel in *Glas* (which Ryan does not read into his book):

"Derrida drops the words 'mediation' and 'negation' from his vocabulary. 'Mediacy' or 'expansive mediacy' appear instead. And in one of the rare moments when he uses the word 'negation' in the later work to name the alterity that inhabits the repetition necessary for self-identity, it is within quotes. More and more, the dialectic comes to be inseparable from the desire to repress the dissemination of reference, to reduce alterity, and to cut off the indefinite movement of finitude." (Ryan, 66)

This is a convenient history, but it also seems to me to demonstrate precisely the dangers of schematizing such work in such a way, the dangers that Ryan would ostensibly be warning others about. I suspect Ryan's historical reading misses much of what is at work in Derrida's readings of Hegel on both sides of the turning point (both sides of *Glas*). In the works on Hegel prior to *Glas*, specifically in "The Pit and the Pyramid," "From a Restricted to a General Economy," and, especially, "Outwork," the essay on Hegel and the preface, there is already a double-writing of the Hegelian dialectic, already the notion of its "inseparability" from the desire to repress dissemination and from the desire, more often, I suspect, to totalize; *and* already the notion that re-reading Hegel is necessary, even unavoidable as philosophy begins to think beyond its "own" proper place and "ends." (See pp. 48-49, and note 48 in "Outwork" for a clear example of this double-writing). Even in the early critique of Husserl, I might go on to argue if not for a certain economic problem (of time), there are more than a few explicit moments wherein such a double-writing of the Hegelian text is inscribed. Likewise, "after *Glas*," (though what precisely this means I am not sure, and this seems to be an important problem -- the history of reading and how it is delineated, by what logic, according to what line -- whose "natural development" Ryan seems to take for granted) when Hegel makes an appearance (in the work on memory and De Man, for example,) it is still neither in terms of simple affirmation or negation, not a question of "dropping words from a vocabulary" (as if one constituted the other). Derrida reminds his readers the important lesson they might learn from De Man:

"Such a strategy thus leads one to recognize and analyze in Hegel's *Aesthetics* the strange corpus of a text whose unity and homogeneity are not guaranteed by the reassuring singleness of a meaning: a 'double and possibly duplicitous text' which *intends* 'the preservation and the monumentalization of classical art' yet which *happens to describe* 'all the elements which make such a preservation impossible from the start.'" And the double-reading goes on to problematize the master-slave dialectic and the function and structure of allegory in the *Aesthetics*. (*Memoires*, 68-69)

Ryan's reading seems unable to account for these remains, for these readings which do not fit into his "history." It also attempts a re-writing of both Marx and Derrida to make their work more congenial to each other. Ryan re-reads the formulation of exchange value in what he argues would be a "Derridean" manner, but what seems more like a Saussurean reading of it according to its own differences (that is, only the beginning of any "deconstruction"):

"Exchange value is a concrete social relation, but it has no sensible existence outside of the play of differences between commodities or the difference of forces between capital and labor. One cannot study the 'truth' of exchange value as the thing itself revealed in its presence without recourse to a differential system that breaks up presence into an economy of forces and deploys the 'thing itself' along a chain of referential serial relations." (Ryan, 16)

"Referential relations?" Surely, this (status) remains, often in Derrida's texts, to be analyzed. Although Ryan does criticize deconstruction for the possibility that it might make the concept of history unreadable, he also attempts to re-write a deconstruction that might operate "in the name of the political interest of countering the structures of power whose

interests are served implicitly by the angelic disinterestedness of liberal detachment." (Ryan, 41) But clearly, "after *Glas*," these cannot be the only alternatives, clearly all "detachment" is neither disinterested nor liberal and clearly deconstruction cannot simply act "in the name of" anything, given the effect of its critique of the name. The issues here are much more complex than this rhetoric would seem to allow, and the work that would be necessary to read rigorously the heterogeneity of the Derridean signature into questions such as these (and therefore re-write, in an extended and similarly rigorous way, these questions) remains (to be approached).

48. The reference here is to Freud's *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, in which, Derrida argues, the game of *fort/da* that Freud observes young Ernst playing is re-written in at least four different textual movements and moments: The child's game played at the edge of a bed, at the edge of a skirt that Derrida calls "once more and necessarily, the *hymen*." (*The Post Card*, 316) The game of withdrawal and return played out between the formulations of the Pleasure Principle and the Death Instinct as inscribed within the Law of the Reality Principle. (see, for instance 369-376 in *The Post Card*) The text's constant movement "out" towards "speculation" and then its return back to the scientific rhetoric of analysis, its risks and returns, (as a cause, for instance, of the necessity of transference, p. 339). The text's movement towards and away from the presence of itself as autobiography, towards (and away from) the presence (and absence) of the analyst as subject (position), the recalling of "himself." (pp. 322-337, for instance, in *The Post Card*). The *fort/da* of *Beyond...*, it seems, is a family scene, a writing of filial returns (and deaths), a CA-text in many ways. But as it moves between autobiography and analysis, one forever contaminating the other (and the return), *Beyond...* also asks, for Derrida, an institutional question that is as important to ask of criticism as it is of psychoanalysis:

"If one wished to simplify the question, it could become, for example: how can an autobiographical writing, in the abyss of an un-terminated self-analysis, give to a world wide institution *its* birth? The birth of whom? of what? and how does the interruption or the limit of the self-analysis, cooperating with the *mise 'en abyme'* rather than obstructing it, reproduce its mark in the institutional movement, the possibility of this remark from then on never ceasing to make little ones, multiplying the progeniture with its cleavages, divisions, alliances, marriages, and regroupings?" (*The Post Card*, 305)

The movement of *Beyond...* between questions of autobiography, filiation, analysis, speculation, pleasure, death, etc., is the undecidable movement of the *fort/da* game, the movement that "whatever its exemplary content, is always in the process of describing in advance, as a deferred overlapping, the scene of its own description." Derrida goes on: "The writing of the *fort/da* is always a *fort/da*, and the PP and *its* death drive are to be sought in the exhausting of this abyss.[...] An overlap without equivalence: *fort.da*." (*The Post Card*, 321, see this same page earlier for a link between the *fort/da* and the laces and nets (the *file*s as threads, sons, laces, and the *filet* as net) in *Glas*, complete with the "proper" citation, the name (re-sounding) in a note (Note 20)). *Glas*, of course, also enacts the between of autobiography and analysis, most explicitly in Derrida's own signature-effects and in its re-writing of the scene of a young boy in an Algerian synagogue as he watches the unveiling of the Torah (240-241bi) within an autobiographical scene of the father (whom *Glas* would mourn) that ends with the question (and suggestion of a between): "What am I doing here? Let's put it that I am working on the origin of literature by miming it. Between the two." (*Glas*, 241bi)

49. The notion of the gift that can be read in Heidegger's "*es gibt*" is the subject of a great

deal of writing by Derrida in a number of places, including *Memoires*, "Two Words for Joyce," "The Retrait of Metaphor," *Spurs*, *Of Spirit* and the two essays on *Geschlecht*, on the sexuality of or in relation to *Dasein* (the second of which might also be read, later, in relation to the writing of Colonel Buendía, the writing "in his own hand"). In *Glas*, Heidegger's writing between the "is" of Being and the gift is read within a complicated and rapid chain of interpretations that pass from the terms of holocaustic fire to Hegel's religion of the sun, to the pure *cadeau* as the gift of self, to the gift as cake (*gateau*) and chain, as writing of the masters (defined in the *Littre*), as useless embellishment, and as the marking of a ring of time, an anniversary, an annulus (as the guarding of the present). (*Glas*, 242-245a) Within all this appears once again the ice and mirrors that mark memory and dreams in CA (242a).

Gayatri Spivak explicates this passage in her essay on *Glas* in a way that is both useful and appropriate, even as it (necessarily) moves too quickly. I offer her offering (as a gift), including her citation, and return to the family:

"How can the self and the for-itself appear? How can the sun of the burn-all broach its course and its decline?" It is the question of the *gaine*: 'To be what is, purity of play, of difference, of consuming, the burn-all must pass into its contrary' [240, trans. mod., (The text also asks "How would the solar outlay produce a remain(s) -- something that stays or overdraws itself?" I will return here. -- John)] Derrida finds the answer in a reading of Heidegger. The unconstrained gift that is not an exchange, the holocaustic sacrifice of the burnt offering, is the instituted trace that will broach the movement of history within this fulfilled sun-scene. 'In *Zeit und Sein*, the gift of *es gibt* [literally "it gives" -- the German expression corresponding to the English "There is"] is given to thought before *Sein* [being] in *es gibt Sein*[...]' (242a) What is the gift? 'This, perhaps: the process of a gift (before exchange), a process which is not a process but a holocaust, a holocaust of the holocaust, *engages* [pun on gaging, gambling, throwing the dice] the history of being but does not belong to it [...] The dialectic of religion, the history of philosophy (etc.), produces itself as the reflection-effect of a *coup-de-don* as/in holocaust.'"

(Spivak continues the citation. I have replaced, in this spot, her translation with Leavey's since he allow *coup de don* to remain untranslated (she renders it "stroke of the gift"), and the term will come to re-mark her next paragraph as such. I have also interrupted here to remark that in her excision of certain lines (the "[...]") she has erased the appearance of the ice and the mirror, "cooled by the glass, the ice, of the mirror," and thus erased a between (between CA and *Glas*). I return now to her reading since it proceeds to tell a story that I think is important as a reading of the gift (as a "between" between Hegel and Genet), and since she ends the paragraph (and this note) in a family home.)

"The stroke of the gift is the 'coup de don,' a pun on 'coup dedans' (stroke within, the trace of history resident in plenitude), and a 'coup de des' (the Mallarmean throw of the dice, which in turn is a 'coup de de.' the stroke or blow of a D, the autobiographical yet sacrificial reader-writer's gesture, the beginning of a signature which shapes the seemingly; y originary text). I can suggest another legend here: in Hegel's *Phenomenology* the religion of the sun changes and gives place to the religion of flowers; *Glas* rewrites that story as the burn-all text of Zarathustra (Nietzsche of anti-Nietzsche\_ giving place to the religion of flowers (Genet) through a stroke of the autobiographical D, the *coup de don*. Absurd? But in a text that ranges from the fart to the categorical imperative, absurdity is at home [*en famille*]." (Spivak, 37)

For Heidegger's use of the "*es gibt (Sein)*" and the arguments that surround it see, for instance, *Being and Time*, pp. 26-27, 102, 255-56, 270-71, 364; and, *Glassary* reminds me, *On Time and Being*, pp. 1-24. (*Glassary*, 164) Also for a related reading of the same sentence, in a volume that could almost be considered a companion to *Glas* (as it shares innumerable "betweens"), see Blanchot's *The Writing of the Disaster*, especially pp. 64 (on autobiography) and 108-111 (on "*es gibt*"). For a full reading of the *es gibt* in

Heidegger as it relates directly to Derrida's work in *Glas* and *Of Spirit*, see Herman Rappaport's *Heidegger and Derrida*, pp. 171-174. Rappaport reads Derrida's reading of Hegel's gift (of the annulus) as a commentary on the relationship between Heideggerian and Hegelian thought as well, another useful between to remember, since it carries any analysis of the "event" into Heideggerian terms of the withdrawal of time and raises again the issue of the event of/as holocaust and Heidegger's response to that particular call.

50. In the hopes of demonstrating a movement that is crucial to my reading of CA, *Glas*, and Derrida's work elsewhere on Freud, a story will, in fact, be told here, of a single analytic "concept" (but this is precisely the problem): masochism. I choose masochism because it marks a thread of theorization through several Freudian texts that is pulled and released a number of times, each time with a difference, and because, in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, it marks an excess that poses a problem of accounting, it threatens to remain. The story starts there, but, as in CA, the narrative will not be linear.

"Clinical observations led us at that time to the view that masochism, the component instinct which is complementary to sadism, must be regarded as sadism that has been turned round upon the subject's own ego. But there is no difference in principle between an instinct turning from an object to the ego and its turning from the ego to an object -- which is the new point now under discussion. Masochism, the turning round of the subject's own ego, would in that case be a return to an earlier phase of the instinct's history, a regression. The account that was formerly given of masochism requires emendation as being too sweeping in one respect; there *might* be such a thing as a primary masochism -- a possibility which I had contested at that time." (*Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, 48-49)

What has happened? Why does Freud seem to change his mind (almost)? Is this in fact an "emendation" at all or is Masochism, like the Death Instinct, still held fast within the bind of the Pleasure Principle? What would a primary masochism mean or be?

Our story, of course, does not "begin." It will be said to begin, however, "at that time," in 1905, with the publication of "Three Essays on Sexuality." Near the end of the first essay, "The Sexual Aberrations," under the telling heading "Sadism and Masochism," we find the text arguing that, whereas in the case of sadism "the roots are easy to detect in the normal," masochism, "seems to be further removed from the normal sexual aim than its counterpart." ("Three Essays on Sexuality," 158-59) However, what is always maintained within this essay is the correspondence, the relationship via reversal of the two "perversions." "It can often be shown," Freud writes "that masochism is nothing more than sadism turned round upon the subject's own self, which thus, to begin with, takes the place of the sexual object." (158) And later... "A sadist is always at the same time a masochist, although the active or the passive aspect of the perversion may be the more strongly developed in him and may present his predominant sexual activity." (159) Masochism and Sadism. For Freud at this point, they are two halves of a whole "sado-masochistic" perversion which are separated by the descriptions "active" and "passive." Sadism, because its roots may be found in the normal aggressiveness of courtship, is said to be primary, it serves as the source for the "baffling" phenomenon of masochism, which cannot be said to have primary qualities. However, in the *Standard Edition* there is already a harbinger of the doubt and revisions to come. At the "bottom" of the very page on which this distinction is offered there appears a footnote "added 1924," almost two decades later, in which Freud announces that his "opinion of masochism has been to a large extent altered by later reflection.... I have been led to distinguish a primary or *erotogenic* masochism, out of which two later forms, *feminine* and *moral* masochism, have developed." (158) Already there are emendations. The text announces its own insufficiencies and a reformulation is hinted at, one which we will examine closely. At this point, however, it is important to recognize that Freud establishes masochism as a secondary urge, the complement, indeed a variation of, a primary sadism. Also, it should be noted that masochism represents a "turning in upon" oneself of the sadist's ego. This reflective binarism will soon begin to be



questioned; though, I suggest, it will never actually be recinded within the Freudian account.

Our story continues with a "rethinking."

This "rethinking" takes place over the space of three important texts: "A Child is Being Beaten" (1919), *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920), and finally "The Economic Problem of Masochism" (1924). Time restricts the possibility for a close, detailed reading of each of these texts -- though such work is surely necessary -- and a general overview, a too deliberate narrative of "here" and "there," of speculation and withdrawal, will have to do. The tracing of the term can be seen to begin with a certain state of confusion evident within "A Child is Being Beaten" where the text, again admitting its own insufficiencies, reveals that it can claim little or nothing about beating-phantasies in young men because the "reliable data is not yet available in these cases." Here there is an uncertainty about the nature of adult masochism, those cases "which are so hard to clear up;" but Freud insists on placing both male and female beating-phantasies within the rubric of the Oedipal triangle, arguing that the male phantasy "corresponds with the Oedipus complex just as the female one does; only the parallel relation we expect to find between the two must be given up in favor of a common character of another kind. "In both cases the beating-phantasy has its origin in an incestuous attachment to the father." ("A Child is Being Beaten," 198-99) The law of the Father, the binding force later to be reconstructed in the guise of the Pleasure Principle and its inscribed Death Instinct, entraps the heterogeneous nature of male and female masochistic phantasies and harnesses them in the analytic task of curing "sexual aberrations." But the lack of any account of adult masochism in this paper reveals a confusion that will not find even the appearance of a solution until the publication of Freud's masterpiece of speculation, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*.

Our story now takes a dramatic turn, a turn initiated one might say by the Death Instinct (as well as by the positing of such a principle). Absolute negation, of course, cannot be given in psychic life (unlike the merely "destructive instincts," which manifest themselves commonly in behavior). Even in the unconscious, Freud as philosopher tells us, Thanatos is "essentially silent." And yet we must speak of it, for it turns out to be a determinate principle. Everything seems to depend on it and its curiously sublimated relationship with the Pleasure Principle. Still, the author reminds us, we "can only speak of it in speculative or mythical terms." But, the reader will ask, how does the establishment of a death instinct, as a primary counterpart to the Principles (Pleasure and Reality), then allow for the positing of a primary masochism? The answer turns out to be one of textual strategies. Sensing the mystical nature of a concept such as a Death Instinct, its purely speculative quality; Freud rushes to his own defense with a strategic example -- an illustration of the power of dramatic speculation (of a certain sort of masochism itself, I would say):

"But this way of looking at things [the death instinct as displacement] is very far from being easy to grasp and creates a positively mystical impression. It looks suspiciously as though we were trying to find a way out of a highly embarrassing situation at any price. We may recall, however, that there is nothing new in an assumption of this kind. We put one forward at an earlier occasion, before there was any question of an embarrassing situation." (*Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, 48)

This offering of an earlier example of the positing of a primary instinct where previously there had been only a certain sublimation of one behavior pattern under the rubric of another turns out to be the suggestion of a primary masochism as cited in the crucial passage that serves to open this note. And so, the author seems to say, if I can reconstruct a primary masochism of an erotogenic nature, I can surely reconstruct a death drive as a counterpart to the Pleasure Principle, though still functioning according to the binding law of the Father, the law of the Reality Principle. The primacy of erotogenic masochism, then, though it appears to be a speculative conclusion, functions, within its very introduction, as a premise for the establishment of another, even greater (that is, more

powerful) Law. Once again, even primary masochism turns out to "belong" to another power, and still to be, according to a certain parallelism, the partner of the essentially normalizing force of sadism. The binarism, though it has been "maneuvered," is always maintained.

Of course, the most serious challenge to the tyranny of the Law of sadism, the Law of the father in the Freudian account of masochism comes in 1924, with the publication of the most comprehensive article on the subject by our author, "The Economic Problem of Masochism." It is here that Freud finally lays out the tripartite (almost Hegelian) structure of his new account of masochism. It is here that Freud begins to speculate on the importance of "pleasurable tensions" within the masochistic experience (he never uses the word "drama"). And, it is also here that Freud offers his account of the roles of the ego and super-ego and the economy of morality within masochism.

"The existence of a masochistic trend in the instinctual life of human beings may justly be described as mysterious from the economic point of view." ("The Economic Problem of Masochism," 159) This is how Freud opens what will clearly be a piece of speculation. "For if mental processes are governed by the pleasure principle in such a way that their first aim is the avoidance of unpleasure and the obtaining of pleasure, masochism is incomprehensible." (159)

And so, it becomes necessary to construct a logic wherein masochism might be seen as primary but still be accountable under the Law of the Father, the Law of the pleasure principle as the dominant drive in psychic life. To do this Freud must first construct a masochism which takes three forms, one form being primary and the other two being secondary (a familiar enough schema): first form: "as a condition imposed on sexual excitation;" second form: "as an expression of the feminine nature;" third form: "as a norm of behavior." "We may, accordingly, distinguish and erotogenic, a feminine, and a moral masochism. The first, the erotogenic, masochism -- pleasure in pain -- lies at the bottom of the other two forms as well." (161) This construction allows Freud to suggest that the third form, moral masochism -- "in some respects the most important" -- "has only recently been recognized by psychoanalysis as a sense of guilt which is mostly unconscious." The second form reveals the phallocentrism inherent in the system, as Freud depicts the masochists as "feminine" since they place themselves in the submissive role and allow others to control them. Here Freud makes what will later become an important distinction between the manifest content of the masochistic performance (he *does* use that word) and its interpretation:

"In both cases -- for the performances are, after all, only a carrying out of the phantasies in play -- the manifest content is of being gagged, bound, painfully beaten, whipped, in some way maltreated, forced into unconditional obedience, dirtied and debased...The obvious interpretation, and one easily arrived at, is that the masochist wants to be treated like a small and helpless child, but, particularly like a naughty child." (162)

Freud posits an "obvious interpretation" which, I suspect, having read later analyses of the same phenomenon, is not quite as clear as he would like it to be. However, for now I must continue with a reading of his presentation. In a vital parenthetical comment the Freudian text briefly reveals the knowledge of difference that Gilles Deleuze will later use to deconstruct the Freudian formula. Freud, almost in passing, remarks "(Masochistic tortures, incidentally, rarely make such a serious impression as the cruelties of sadism whether imagined or performed.)" (162) However, the text never seems to acknowledge the space between these two performances or the problematic space between "reality" and "phantasy"; and, in fact, later in the essay a possible explanation of feminine masochism is rejected because "it throws no light on the regular and close connections of masochism with its counterpart in instinctual life, sadism." (170) Again, what is important here is that these connections are *assumed*. Original, erotogenic masochism, that of the primary order, is quickly revealed to be a "taming of the death instinct by the libido." (164) Masochism in its primary form, then, is a trace, a remainder "from the phase wherein the

coalescence...between the death instinct and Eros took place."(164) As a primary form, it gives rise to "moral" masochism which extends the masochist's behavior out into the external, non-sexual world in the form of self-subjugating dramas. The three forms of the perversion all result from, of course, an unconscious, Oedipal guilt which takes the explicit form of a fear of castration and the desire for the death of the Father. Masochism, too, it turns out, with all its dramatics and paradoxes, nonetheless obeys the Law. It remains under the tyranny of the Pleasure Principle, and its primary status eventually turns out to be a (masochistic) ruse which serves the purpose of solving certain difficult economic problems having to do with exchanges between the ego and the super-ego. In this case, the Freudian account is quite predictable. The masochist suffers from a super-ego run wild, if you will, convincing him he needs to be punished for everything, as it sets about destroying his ego. The masochist finds himself "under the domination of an especially sensitive conscience, although they are not conscious of any of this ultramorality.." (169) In this way the Oedipus complex is revived, since the phantasy to be beaten by the father ("quite common," Freud tells us) "stands very close to the other wish, to have a passive (feminine) sexual relation to him and is only a regressive distortion of it." Freud goes on: "If we insert this explanation into the content of moral masochism, its hidden meaning becomes clear to us. Conscience and morality have arisen and have become desexualized through the overcoming of the Oedipus complex; but through moral masochism morality becomes sexualized once more, the Oedipus complex is revived, and the way is opened for a regression from morality to the Oedipus complex. This is to the advantage neither of morality nor of the person concerned." (169)

The unconscious aspect of masochism (moral masochism) is placed as the servant to the super-ego's desire to resexualize the Oedipus complex and the masochistic impulse turns out to be regressive. The analysis is complete and Freud has what he seems to feel (for now) is a satisfactory account of a mysterious problem -- masochism. In Freud's account then, masochism remains, more or less, the illicit partner of a normalizing sadism. Whereas sadism suggests a dominance of the ego and the death of the super-ego, an unbridled anarchy which is primarily teleological, and sexual; masochism reveals a victorious super-ego demanding punishment of the ego (which has become, in the unconscious, masochistic in itself) and projecting its regressive tendencies out into the non-sexual arena. Masochism, allied with the death instinct finally corresponds to the part of that instinct "which has escaped being turned outwards as an instinct of destruction" and therefore turns in upon itself; although it does seem to bring with it certain, passive, libidinal satisfaction. In this way, finally, masochism becomes the same type of primary instinct that sadism must be, although both remained bound to the demands of the Pleasure Principle and the Death Instincts.

The speculation ends here, as the note (randomly) stops marking the game of *fort/da* that the theorization plays "between texts" and between "levels" of instinct. It could go on to read Freud's responses to critiques of his formulations, and a few later emanations. But the movement (of speculation as theory *a la young Ernst*) is what the text would here call attention to. Theorizing and then consuming theory within the Scientific schema of a sort of Hegelianism of the Father, the texts continually risk breaking free of the system only to pull back once again into the safety of its structures, all the while remaining unable to cope with the remains. The story follows a narrative quasi-movement that is repeated in Derrida's reading of *Beyond...* and in *What Remains'* reading of CA, of this cut in CA, as it moves between "betweens." For a full explication (another story) of how Freud's work on masochism is exceeded by its own remains, see Gilles Deleuze's crucial study of the problem, *Masochism*.

51. *Glas* offers a series of theorizations concerning the prosthesis and its logic of supplementarity. It is, of course, also a featured figure in Genet's *Our Lady of the*

*Flowers*, with its fascination with artificial body-parts. The prosthesis links the fetish-object and the graft within the remains of an operation. An illustrative example is the artificial leg worn by Culafroy's cell mate, which prompts in Culafroy a disgust that he only overcomes through "a sublime effort." (*Our Lady of the Flowers*, 208) *Glas* reads this passage in the novel to mark the effect of the prosthesis on the subject:

"The peg. It is exhibited, like any prosthesis, any epithesis, any erection, any simulacrum, any apotrope, any parade, any parry, any masquerade, with daintiness." [And here *Glas* cites *Our Lady...*, after which it speculates on the power of the prosthesis to remain (awake, as it does in the novel)]

"The account -- frighteningly exact -- lets the (sur)plus value appear, not of what should be compensated, the member missing, but of the prosthesis that bands erect all alone. The stance, the stanza, of the peg, as of a stony colossus, no longer knows repose; dispenses with the subject, survives the wearer, and shelters him from any failure; stays awake when he sleeps." (*Glas*, 138-39b)

The prosthesis ("prose-thesis," perhaps) here not only marks the presence of an absence, the absent limb (or organ, in other "cases"), but remains after the absence has been marked to swell up, to engorge or band erect (at the sight of) the missing limb, and thereby, as *Glas* would remind me, links it, via castration, to the remain(s) and the event of reading (CA):

"The one that remains grows stronger,' [*Glas* cites Genet and continues], the more that (ça) remains, the better that (ça) bands erect. Remain(s) equals band(s) erects. In every occurrence, play at replacing remain by band erect, the remain(s) by the band(s) erect. You will begin to think what an event is, a case, let us rather say an occurrent. The logic of antherection must not be simplified. It (Ca) does not erect *against* or *in spite of* castration, *despite* the wound or the infirmity, by castrating castration. It (Ca) bands erect, castration. Infirmity is what, as they still say today in the old language, *produces* erection: a prosthesis that no castration event will have preceded. The structure of prosthesis belongs to intumescence. Nothing stands upright otherwise." (*Glas*, 138b)

In *What Remains*, any prose thesis can only ever be a prosthesis, like the one Professor Freud had to wear as he grew older, the one he often had to travel to be "fitted" for, the one that made speaking (and even writing) difficult. For a reading (under the proper names of Derrida and Freud) of Freud's "own" formulations on the prosthesis, the possibility of man becoming a "prosthetic God" via tele-technology (in *Civilization and its Discontents*), and of Strachey's translator's note that would define the "prosthetic device" in Freud's text, see Ronell's *The Telephone Book*, pp.84-94. Here she too resists the prosthesis as replacement, directing her attention to the "almost" that prevents divinity through technological supplementarity and that renders "true replacement" impossible. A different section of the same book offers a useful reading of Derrida's essay on chance, which will appear shortly in this cut in(to) *What Remains* (see *Remain(s)*, below and pp. 150-154 in Ronell).

52. For the most recent series of interrogations on this "subject" and the questions that always accompany it, see *Who Comes After the Subject?*, edited by Eduardo Cadava, et. al.. In addition to several re-readings of the question(s) of the subject by writers including Levinas, Nancy, Lacoue-Labarthe, Koffman, Irigaray, Lyotard, Blanchot, and Deleuze, there is an interview with Derrida which retheorizes the grounds of thinking the subject in a way that is useful here and now. The work that would have to be done at this point in *What Remains* to interrogate the problem of the (status of the) subject, the (ontological) question of who hears, would begin with these words:

"It is thus not a matter of opposing another discourse on the same 'things' to the enormous multiplicity of traditional discourses on man, animal, plant, or stone, but of ceaselessly analyzing the whole conceptual machinery, and its interestedness, which has

allowed us to speak of the 'subject' up to now. And the analysis always produces something more and other than an analysis. It transforms; it translates a transformation already in progress. Translation is transformative. This explains the nervous distrust of those who want to keep all these themes, all these 'words' ('man,' 'subject,' etc.), sheltered from all questioning, and who manipulate an ethico-political suspicion with regard to deconstruction." ("Eating Well," 109)

The (hi)story of the subject is always already a (hi)story of politics and ethics (through the (hi)story of ontology). The patient and detailed re-formulation of alternative theorizations of "subject" (without the definite article) must wait for another time and place; although *What Remain(s)*, like *Glas* cannot forget the resonances of the question(s). They go on, nonetheless, with the bits and pieces of the subjects that (perhaps) remain.

53. Here, now, the question of truth, the truth value of stories or sentences, of language "itself," is raised as both a Hegelian and Derridean question. Irene Harvey, in her useful study *Derrida and the Economy of Différance* contrasts Hegel's theory of language as the pure idiom, as the law (of a purely idiomatic order even of truth) with Derrida's reading of the "law" of difference, which, through its reading of the effect and affect of the proper name marks a remains, an impure idiom that "exists after language." Within her analysis, Harvey points to another appearance of the here and now in Hegel, (from the *Logic*), a "here" and "now" tied to the thinking of truth (as the operation of language):

"And the unutterable -- feeling or sensation -- far from being the highest truth, is the most unimportant and untrue. If I say 'the individual,' this individual, 'here', 'now' all are universal terms. Everything is an individual, a 'this,' and if it be sensible, is here and now." (*Logic*, 31, cited in Harvey, 139)

Although Harvey stops citing Hegel at this point, the passage goes on to re-mark (as universal, and therefore of the order of truth) even what can be said of the I, the question of the speaking subject. Harvey's analysis, however, goes on to read this positing of truth value in language against Derrida's reading of language as the order of naming (and, therefore, the business of giving birth to an excess, and impurity of idiom): "And for Derrida, we have the death of the pure idiom by the movement of language whose function is to 'name' and therefore make proper." (and later) "The excess in the system is precisely where the idiomatic appears and reappears, even if only for an instant." (Harvey, 139-40) It is this instant of excess that makes reading/writing (as criticism) the business of producing remains. The relationship of this business to "truth" seems to be located somewhere in an (ordered) space between (orders):

"Now this double theory (or double column taking note of the general equivalence of subjects or contraries) describes the text, describes itself as it describes some pictures, some "*works of art*," as the suspense of the *verily* [writing truth into the space of flight, theft, and the veil -- John]: remain(s) beyond the true and false, neither entirely true nor entirely false. That (*Ca*) is stretched between two subjects absolutely independent in their distress but nonetheless interlaced, interwoven, entwined like two lianas orphaned from their tree." (*Glas*, 44b)

54. There is a play on "regards" at work within these developments that should be detailed briefly. The word "regard" frames Genet's "What Remained of a Rembrandt...", opening it on one side (with the gaze at the painting) and closing it on the other with the gaze of the (equivalent) Other, towards the member, banded erect. (See "What Remained...", 90-91) As *Glas* read this text that, so to speak, gives it (and its form) its birth, it describes the columns (in Genet's text), it describes "itself" (as text) and it will come to describe (the relationship between) the twins:

"X, an almost perfect chiasm(us), more than perfect, of two texts, each one set

facing {*enregard*} the other: a gallery and a graphy that guard one another and disappear from view. But the pictures are written, and what (one) writes (oneself) is seen regardless by the painter."(*Glas*, 43-43b)

The text goes on to analyze the columns and the relationship between (them) in terms of truth value in the passage cited at the end of note 53, above. Truth, within the double logic of the chiasmus, the twisted destiny and identity of twins, is a question of the position from whence it is regarded, as the possibilities are set facing (*en regard*) each other. It, like the paintings in Genet's gallery, must be understood in terms of the (re-written) "Verily," the truth marked by remains that exceed reading: "this word [Verily] will henceforth come down to saying the truth (*versus*, *voirement*), but also the undecided suspense of what remains on the march or on the margin within the true, but nevertheless not being false in no longer being reduced to the true."

This definition will no doubt be repeated elsewhere in the text as the subject (of the truth) returns. Here, now, it will be allowed to stand (as a stipulation).

55. Gayatri Spivak glosses the gl- effect as the perpetual undoing of the intelligibility-corporeality hierarchy, as occurs in the debasement of the church here in CA, or in both CA and *Glas*' multiple re-stagings of the Last Supper scene as the place of morselization and the undoing of the body-spirit dichotomy, or, more precisely, in both texts many tollings for the (rising) of the dead (as they fall (to the tomb)):

"Why 'gl'? Because, at least in one reckoning, the unrestrained economy of *Glas* goes from the dictionary meaning -- 'knell,' the sepulchral tolling by which the corpse is declared to be not mere body and thus given significance -- to the sound of spit in the throat and the death rattle; in fact, to all the sticky agglutinative gurgling of the body as such. Reading with Derrida involves a perpetual undoing of the intelligibility-corporeality hierarchy that this range conceals. At one end of the oscillation, the Warburg lexicon and other authoritative dictionaries are invoked lengthily to give us a history of the many significations of *glas* and kindred words; *glas* is deciphered in many tongues, Indo-European and otherwise. At the other are many warnings like the following 'It is not a word -- gl hoists the tongue but does not hold it and always lets the tongue fall back, does not belong to it -- even less a name, and hardly a *proprénom*, a proper (before the first) name.'"(Spivak, 29)

Although Spivak's citation breaks off there, the next line in *Glas*' reading of the gl- (a reading between meaning and effect, between truth and the event, in the space of between, between pages 234-37b, as it is re-cited in terms of all the bits, wounds, schizs, breaks, sutures, borders, grafts and in terms of the debates that have always taken place around mimesis (and remains), from which gl- "tears the 'body,' sex,' voice,' and 'writing,' from the logic of consciousness and representation that guided those debates), the line that immediately follows Spivak's citation marks gl- as Gabriel's assigned place, the place from which Gabriel, as he is supposed to, delineates the intelligibility-corporeality hierarchy (in fiction and elsewhere):

"But may be the subject of the annunciation."(*Glas*, 236b)

56. More than a few critics have noted CA's re-marking of the difference between Fernanda del Carpio's customs and culture (as a highlander, a person from the mountainous center of the country, somewhere, perhaps, near Bogota) and the customs of the residents of Macondo (a Coastal region with a different set of traditions, religions, customs, etc.). One of the readings of this difference that places it (almost casually) in a footnote to a discussion of "García Márquez' humor" (a phrase that already announces a need to closely examine assumptions about "ownership," "property," and "propriety") can be found in *Gabriel García Márquez*, by George McMurray. The reading I would re-cite

begins with (the rhetoric of literary) categories:

"García Márquez' humor relies heavily on hyperbole and preposterous distortions, occasionally creating a tone of high comedy that marks him as a practitioner of absurd literature." (McMurray, 92)

A discussion of these categories and their "appropriateness" here will be deferred, as it would no doubt be too lengthy a digression that would require developing a complex and detailed reading and delimiting of terms such as "tone," "high comedy," "practitioner," and, perhaps most troublesome of all, "absurd" and an analysis of their ability to function in any singular way within the business of reading and writing in order for it even to begin. Rather, I would return to the "critical" reading (of these moments of "humor") as it arrives at the name of Fernanda del Carpio and a footnote is attached.

"Fernanda del Carpio, the beautiful, straitlaced aristocrat from the mountainous interior and wife of Aureliano Segundo, is the butt of many amusing episodes, some absurd and others bordering on black humor and the grotesque.\*"(McMurray, 93)

The text does not go on to offer any particulars concerning these distinctions (of "humors"), content merely to re-tell the (hi)story of Fernanda in the narrative and (apparently) to allow summarized events to stand on their own as examples of humor. But as the re-citing of Fernanda's exploits continues down the page, it bumps into a prosthesis, the "explanatory" note that awaits the eye's arrival below the margin and offers a casual cultural distinction:

"\*Fernanda's presence in Macondo highlights the very real difference in moral and social attitudes between the carefree inhabitants of the Colombian coastal region and the more conservative highlanders."(McMurray, 93)

Leaving aside, for the moment, the dialectics (of ideology) posed here between "carefree" and "conservative" and the universalism of the rhetoric, I would notice only how quickly this reading is willing to make a certain leap from the portrayal of a character to a conclusion about entire cultural and ideological constitutions. To what end? What is the function of this footnote that stands alone, isolated, a "serious utterance" relegated to the bottom of a page that seems to be bent on telling humorous stories? What allows a reader to make this specific move from the particular to the general, especially within a narrative moment that the reader himself announces as "humorous" and relying "heavily on hyperbole and preposterous distortions"? Can it be argued, with accompanying citations, that the Buendía's are, in any regular way, "carefree?" And, even if this character's "presence" "highlights" "very real differences," those differences would then need to be re-read with some attention being paid to the scene of reading and the effect it (as a network of informing criteria) might have on their delineation and the conclusions reached about them, whether concerning authorial intent or otherwise.

Stephen Minta's work on the same subject offers another example of this leap, in the name of "representation," a term that, as Derrida's reading of Heidegger in "Sending: On Representation" has shown me (or will come to show me, in the *Remains* -- I cannot predict the methods of my readers), often carries a set of specific metaphysical resonances that tie it to assumptions about ontology that themselves require careful examination. Minta argues that many of the novel's characters are trapped by their obsessing over the past into an inability to function in the present. "These familial traits, the corrosive inability to make anything of life in the present, and the distorted, repressed, or obsessional attitudes towards the past, are implicit in descriptions of the Buendías from the earliest pages of the novel."(Minta, 158) Putting aside here the problems that arise whenever the valuation of characters' destinies within a narrative becomes a critical activity (a problem that continues to haunt, for instance, Kafka studies as well), I again look for Fernanda, and she appears once more, as an illustration, even as, at the same time, a "representative" and a "reflection."

"This rigid dependence on a falsified and simplistic model of the past is reflected, too, in the character of Fernanda del Carpio, the woman who comes to Macondo from

Bogota, or somewhere close by, and who is clearly the representative of García Márquez's hated world of highland Colombia. By seeking to impose the standards of a reactionary colonial culture and the observances of the most repressive form of Catholicism, she succeeds in making the house in Macondo as mournful as the colonial mansion in which she was brought. She is one of the characters in the novel upon whom the most overt authorial criticism is directed."(Minta, 159)

This reading strategy, pivoting on assumptions concerning representation, reflection, and the direction of "authorial criticism," takes for granted the assumption that (hi)stories seem always to arrive at their intended destinations; it seems, that is, to rely on a model of (hi)story and ideology within fictive discourse that would announce its own arrival within an absolute rhetoric of unidirectional sending and receiving, that would signify (or even represent) without remains. But surely, for instance, the "house in Macondo" has already been made "mournful" (repeatedly) before Fernanda arrives. Surely, also, the transformation of the family and the house is not simply "imposed." There are a number of contextual considerations that make the changes possible and, perhaps, within the logic of the narrative, even inevitable (*apart* from the arrival of a highlander, whose (hi)story itself, it should be recalled, is told within the language of illusion and appearances that should call any referential reading of her character immediately into question). While a discussion of the cultural differences among Colombians is certainly possible and even necessary (both as a part of and independent of any novel-reading) today, and while such a discussion should no doubt concern itself with colonial and post-colonial ideologies and the impositions of customs and moralities; the gesture that finds a basis for such a discussion reflected or represented within a novel that so often de-parts (from) any geography of reflection and representation (or, at least, interrogates such a geography's relevance and possibility, today, within writing and "literature") must proceed more slowly and carefully than do these readings of this single character.

57. Irene Harvey hints at one of *Glas*' many weavings and reweavings between ICs (Immaculate Conceptions and Categorical Imperatives, Kant's "pure philosophical categories" that remain (as objects of critique) in Hegel and the immaculate conception announced in Genet's texts on his own birth and his own family, as, once again, *Glas* enacts a re-sexualization of philosophical reading and writing). Harvey sets up her discussion of the deconstruction offered in *Of Grammatology* with a reminder about Kant's warning against searching for the origins of such "special concepts" of Understanding.

"As [Kant] says concerning the pure concepts of the Understanding, 'although *what* they are and precisely *how many* there are can be exactly determined, *why* they are just these and not others and from whence they come cannot be known.' Thus he says we have 'special concepts *originally begotten* [another sexual metaphor!] in the Understanding which make possible the objective validity of the judgment of experience.' A certain *immaculate conception* therefore seems to have occurred at this point, as Derrida would say. The original 'conception' of the concepts themselves is thus announced by Kant [and so, Immanuel becomes Gabriel -- John] yet denied as a legitimate focus of investigation in our search for knowledge. One might well wonder at the origin of this taboo in the search for origins."(Harvey, 18)

[And here *Glas* would remind me that Freud, in *The Future of an Illusion*, analogizes this way, comparing his "taboo" to Kant's IC ("except for small differences"). In response, *Glas* allows Kant to speak, and argue that the differences are in fact not at all "small," and go to the very heart of the leap that Kant is suggesting must be made for their to be "pure morality, a leap whose possibility Freud's work would put into serious question. (See *Glas*, 215-16a, where Kant speaks on Freud during the debate between himself and Hegel on the potential for God to be jealous.) *Glas* has also reminded me, at



least once, that the place of the IC, of the announcement of the Immaculate Conception and the between of spirituality and ontology is the place of Gabriel, (the place, the gap, remarked I would say, by CA).]

Harvey later links Derrida's focusing of the "non-origin of origins" to his (non-)critique of meaning in terms of language's relationship to objects, his refusal to offer a meaning for meaning, and thereby his avoiding the retro-trap of metaphysical debate and a "univocalization of the world." Derrida's project in *Of Grammatology* seeks "to make enigmatic what one thinks one understands by the words 'proximity,' 'immediacy,' 'presence' (the proximate) the own and the pre- of presence...." (*Of Grammatology*, 70, also cited in Harvey, 34-5) She then goes on to remind me of the *glas*-ic element in making-enigmatic:

"To make enigmatic is to make resound, to make something oscillate or vibrate, or ring between two poles of opposition. What this means is that a certain irreducible duplicity must appear, indeed is already latent or immanent within classical metaphysics itself, but is as yet unheard within most of the tradition. In a certain sense, if one is not listening for it, it will not be heard. Thus a preparation for this resounding *Glas!* is essential; a certain readiness or a certain distrust of the infinity that metaphysics promises us. The clarity and distinctness, and the readiness-to-hand of immediate understanding in its full presence will become problematized for and by deconstruction." (Harvey, 35)

She does not go on to read *Glas*, to read its resoundings and enigmas for their philosophical consequences; but her call for an open and ready ear is one this work would echo. By the "end" of *Glas*, the siglum IC functions simultaneously for both the Kantian Categories and a number of immaculate conceptions (including Kant's). To read this double writing of a legend the reader should turn to *Glas*, pp. 223-25a.

58. *Glas* reminds me that laughter is also a gl- word. It cites the Wartburg dictionary's entry for *gladius*, part of which reads:

"Mdauph. *eyglaya* f. 'astonishment, hearty laughter', bdauph. *esglayado*. Mdauph. *eyglayayre* 'the one who surprises, who causes laughter'; *eyglayamen* 'astonishment, outburst of laughter'." (*Glas*, 50bi)

Like so many other gl- words, this one too marks an excess, a bursting out, and the moment of chance, of surprise. Its effect on Hegelianism has already been read by Bataille, and by Derrida as he reads Bataille on Hegel in *Writing and Difference*:

"Laughter alone exceeds dialectics and the dialectician." And later: "...it exceeds phenomenality in general, the absolute possibility of meaning. And the word 'laughter' itself must be read in a burst, as its nucleus of meaning bursts in the direction of the *system* of the sovereign operation ('drunkenness, erotic effusion, sacrificial effusion, poetic effusion, heroic behavior, anger, absurdity,' etc., cf. *Methode de meditation*). This burst of laughter makes the difference between lordship and sovereignty shine, without *showing* it however and, above all, without saying it." (*Writing and Difference*, 256)

Given this, it is all the more surprising that Bataille could not hear this laughter (as the exceeding of dialectics) in Genet; but I will return to *Glas*' remarks on this deafness and the ringing of Bataille's signature in a future cut. Here, now, it should also be mentioned that in the Wartburg *Glas* finds laughter sharing the same gl- root, the same entry, as "massacre." (*Glas*, 51bi) I will also return to this shared origin at the appropriate time (the time of an-other massacre). In *Glas*, Genet's laughter at Hegel's propriety echoes Aureliano Segundo's outburst (in surprise) at his wife's too proper(ly) marked garment.

59. The repetition of names in CA is not an actual repetition, it is always, in one way or another, marked by a difference (even in the way the names are written in the text). Regina Janes makes this point even as she moves towards the sort of generalizing conclusions

(such as, "García Márquez has not, or so it seems to me, opened up new possibilities for other writers; rather he seems to have closed off certain avenues, though he may of course have imitators." (Janes, 49)) that mark too much critical work on this text and that themselves serve only to close off a number of crucial issues. Even while she continually reads CA as a novel according to a rigid set of well-known and herein unexamined critical criteria (does it "delight and instruct," for instance) that tend to erase the play of its differences, she does, in one paragraph, arrive at a "pointing out" that marks a difference within the novel's "repetitions":

"García Márquez insists on the recognition of this patterning through the confusion [whose? --John] created at first by the repetition of masculine names and by the alternation of personal characteristics belonging to those named 'José Arcadio' and those named 'Aureliano.' But it should be pointed out that a masculine name is repeated in identical form only once. The patriarch is always called José Arcadio Buendía; his sons are José Arcadio and Aureliano, later Colonel Aureliano Buendía; José Arcadio's son is just Arcadio; the only son of Colonel Aureliano Buendía who figures in the early part of the novel is Aureliano José, while his seventeen sons are identified by their mothers' last names, Aureliano Triste, Centeno, Amador. The only identical names are comically appropriate, suggesting an identity where there should be an antithesis [another mock-Hegelianism -- John]: José Arcadio the macho son of José Arcadio Buendía and Úrsula Iguarán, and José Arcadio the homosexual, son of Aureliano Segundo and Fernanda del Carpio." (Janes, 53)

That "machismo" is or "should be" the antithesis of homosexuality is itself a troubling reading that elides over both repetitions and differences, but the point made here concerning the differences always written into the signing of proper names is important to remember as it is stretched and twisted within the re-citing of the signature and its dissemination in *Glas*. [Independent of this paragraph, a reading of this or Janes' more recent book on García Márquez in the context of *What Remains* would only be, in her words, "comically appropriate," and would demand more energy than the rewards would render worthwhile.]

60. See Note 49, above. Elsewhere, *Glas* also links the gift (as chain and as gold, as *or* as the link between) with the cross, in its description of a gift given to Hegel by his students.

"The medal given to Hegel by his students bears on its verso a heavenly spirit, standing, and flanked by a woman on its right. She holds a cross that the spirit is going to take hold of. On the other side, a philosopher seated before a column. Above the column the owl that takes wing [*vol*] at the end of history. The philosopher writes in a book opened on his knees." (*Glas*, 184ai)

One could, of course, write another book on this paragraph, on its incision into *Glas*, where Hegel finds himself flanked on his right (by a woman?) and where his texts (on spirit) are written in a cross between columns. Like the crosses that remain on the heads of the sons, this gift remains, marking the philosopher as one who writes "at the end of history" and marking the metaphoricity of the metaphor (of the coin) as it might be (elsewhere) tied to an economics of usury and numismatics. This book, which would also be a gift from a number of fathers and sons (including Nietzsche and Derrida) remains (to be written).

61. "Punishment" because the machine can also be read here in terms of Kafka's writing machine, the machine that undertakes the execution of the sentence with its teeth in "In the Penal Colony." "A machine with teeth so fine and so numerous..." (*Glas*, 207b) is set up as the colony's "remarkable piece of apparatus," (that is, a fragment of machinery that writes a sentence as its own scene of execution).

"The needles are set in like the teeth of a harrow and the whole thing works something like a harrow although its action is limited to one place and contrived with much more artistic skill."(Kafka, 194)

It should be recalled here that *Glas* has earlier sought to describe the operation it pursues here also in terms of a digging machine.(*Glas* 204-05b) In Kafka, however, the machine is first positioned at the center of a discourse around the dream of absolute closure, the perfect simulacrum, as it would (in the first instance) write the very "unity of occurrence" -- the performance of the banding (erect) of signification that *Glas* would read as the dream of *Sa*: "once contact is made the steel ribbon stiffens immediately into a rigid band. And then the performance begins."(Kafka, 200) -- as an absolute finality of purity and cleanliness, that *Glas* insists, should pose an insurmountable problem for the machine. But the problem also proves, eventually, to remain for *this* machine as the story turns away from the explanation of the officer and towards the mangled execution of the officer's sentence, in which the machine no longer writes, but simply and brutally "murders" with an uncontrollable excess (of blood ("the water jets had failed to function")). Earlier, during the scene of explanation, the site of the rationale (behind the machine), the text already hints that the rhetoric of explanation is (already) only following a supplemental route.

"Forgive me if my explanations seem rather incoherent. I do beg your pardon. You see, the Commandant always used to do the explaining; but the new Commandant shirks this duty."(Kafka, 196)

The Commandant, of course, remains only as a signature (on the set of "original" drawings the officer carries as his "most precious possessions"). But the machine's functioning is accompanied by the absolute justice of the colony ("Guilt is not to be doubted"), which returns with a vengeance against the officer and the legacy of the Commandant with the (non)-execution of the "final" sentence ("Be Just!", perhaps). The law, it seems, remains in a singular relationship to the *récit*, external to it, absolutely separated from it, as the man from the country remains "Before the Law." But the law of contamination that works on the law of law in both the parable and the novel from which it is drawn also works-out here. (For a detailed demonstration of how one might read this parable, and the relationship between the law and the *récit*, as well as the problem of title, property, and judgement of the law between literature and philosophy, between categories, see Derrida's "*Devant La Loi*", a text whose reading will no doubt return in these pages.) The story ends at the scene of monumentalization and prophecy, with the absolute rhetoric of the promise (destabilized as it announces a return from beyond death) ironically threatening to overrun the system of dialectical reversal that at first the narrative seems content to offer as justice. As the explorer leaves the colony, the future remains adrift (wandering between the promise of death as the final reversal (as justice) and the promise of the return). (This is also, of course, the route (of the between) along which Kafka's Hunter Gracchus is also known to drift, (with)in a text that begins by announcing itself as "A Fragment.")

62. The destabilizing effect of the telephone on any epistemology in which knowledge is bound (erect) to the routes of communication is analyzed most thoroughly and impressively in Ronell's *The Telephone Book*. Within a performance that both presents and enacts a theorization of the techno-logical challenge posed by the telephone for metaphysics, epistemology, and psychoanalysis (and for the development and impact of these within a reading of an emerging culture such as Macondo), this text delineates the re-writing of routes of communication and knowledge that is made possible by the arrival of the telephonic *envoi*. Ronell's work seems to read itself into CA (and its reading, here, now) when it reminds me that "The telephone connection houses the improper." The arrival of the telephone (and the machines that accompany it) put the lines of propriety into oscillation, challenging the "system" of proper behavior, the protocols already in place for

sending and receiving messages (according to which, previously, even a war had been fought). As the Other arrives, with different protocols of social behavior and other compelling interests, technologies accommodate. The telephone here is read as a response: "Thus we are inclined to place the telephone not so much at the origin of some reflection but as a response, as that which is answering a call." (Ronell, 3) Its effect is the effect of reading that has been at work here all along:

"When does the telephone become what it is? It presupposes the existence of another telephone, somewhere, though its atotality as apparatus, its singularity, is what we think of when we say 'telephone.' To be what it is, it has to be pluralized, multiplied, engaged by another line, high strung and heading for you." (Ronell, 3)

The text goes on, echoing Jean-Luc Nancy, to argue that to think the telephone philosophically it is necessary to first forget philosophy, or to look entirely elsewhere for it. For the telephone can be philosophized in totalitarian and absolute ways. The result of such a formulation, for instance, was the Nazi's plan to telephonize Germany as an absolute unity, since, as they read it: "The telephone connects where there has been little or no relation, it globalizes and unifies, suturing a country like a wound." (Ronell, 8) Ronell analyzes this technological call to unity of Being as it was heard by Heidegger, and opposes it to her own reading of the telephone as the problematizing machine of the subject and its place in a Family (hi)story:

"Why the telephone? In some ways it was the cleanest way to reach the regime of any number of metaphysical certitudes. It destabilizes the identity of self and other, subject and thing, it abolishes the originariness of the site; it undermines the authority of the Book and constantly menaces the existence of literature. It is itself unsure of its identity as object, thing, piece of equipment, perlocutionary intensity or artwork (the beginnings of telephony argue for its place as artwork); it offers itself as an instrument of the destinal alarm, and the disconnecting force of the telephone enables us to establish something like the maternal superego." (Ronell, 9)

The text continues to analyze, first, Heidegger's response to the call of National Socialism as it is written in and through his analysis of technology, and, second, the development of the telephone along a route-between (including the between of the living and the spirits of the dead and the between of the hearing and the deaf) within a Family (hi)story between Watson and Bell as their signatures write the (hi)story of the technology. But before it proceeds to write its own family chronicles and analyses, it reminds me that its own operations have been made possible by others:

"Of course, Derrida and others cleared the way. They built the switch. For Freud, the telephone, while exemplifying unconscious transmissions, set off the drama of an unprecedented long distance. There is always a child left behind, or the face of a distant friend translated sonically into a call. And there was always a Heidegger pulled into fascism by the strangulating umbilicus of a telephone cord whose radius he failed to measure." (Ronell, 9)

*What Remains* reads CA according to a number of problems posed by the routes of exchange and the sending and receiving of calls, including the one that arrives when it opens *Glas*; and in doing so, it would also seek to add Ronell's signature to these earlier listings in the directory. The telephone re-wires the community and thereby re-writes the future for Macondo and the Buendías by establishing a new and yet still problematic route of communication. It repeats the telepathic logic of family knowledge through technological machines and resituates the problem of sending and receiving along a new set of familial *films*.

63. In his essay "The Law of Genre," Derrida, reading Genette, suggests that the Romantic moment might also be written as the generic moment, the defining moment of genre (as "the teleological ordering of history"). Romance, then, would be the genre of

genre. The relationship between Romanticism and genre (as a law, the law and counter-law of genre) is a complex one and its analysis in this essay is crucial for my reading here and now of the incision of Remedios' *récit* into CA (a narrative that is already written along and around the edges of genres). Derrida's essay theorizes genre as the law of the limit and its supplement (with which it necessarily shares its theoretical space) as a counter-law of excess and remains, only to proceed then to de-lineate even these lines of demarcation within a performative and detailed reading of Blanchot's *The Madness of Day* (a text that announces its own problematization of genre before it even opens -- "*Un Récit?*" -- and that explicitly interrogates the relationship of the law to madness, of the law as madness within a supplemental yet unstable oscillation). This work is complex and includes important recitations that speak directly to the concerns in this reading of this cut in(to) CA. However, these passages will not be allowed to resonate here and now. Rather, the relationship of Romanticism to the debate concerning genre (and that debate's position always already within Romanticism), and the formulations of the play of limits and borders between texts and genres will resonate further on, will be woven into and through the *Remain(s)* that follow as they weave in and around the reading of another *récit*, another genre.

64. Again, the remains (of beauty, of memory, of the object of critique, of woman) are marked as a trace that erases itself from the experience of the Family even as it remains (as a reminder) for the Other. The importance of the trace-structure -- as the ever disappearing mark of difference, as the mark that is always vanishing (like the print or track washed from the sand by the repetition of the waves), even as it remains to mark a presence (in the past) -- for whatever we might name the Derridean corpus, cannot be overstated. The fullest explication and development of the relationship between the trace and Derrida's reading of difference within the operation of the text can be found, of course, in *Of Grammatology*, especially pp. 65-73 and in the essay "Differance." As the minimum origin of any concept (and its opposition), the trace is written into and through the operation of difference, and therefore through the business of reading and writing (in time).

The most complete and useful description of the trace (as that which, by its very nature, cannot be described) as an "infrastructure" within Derridean deconstruction, and the fullest analysis of its operation within Derrida's reading of Husserl, Hegel, and Heidegger, takes place between pp. 186-194 of Gasche's *The Tain of the Mirror*. Gasche describes the function of the arche-trace as that which makes philosophy (as opposition) possible, and within his analysis, writes the operation of the arche-trace directly into CA and into the (hi)story of the Family and Macondo: "The arche-trace is a minimal structure of referral to the extent that it constitutes difference between terms or entities. Indeed, what it describes is that all reference to self takes place by way of a *detour* through an Other and thus presupposes an originary self-effacement." (Gasche, 190-91)

This is the (hi)story of (this reading of) CA as it engages Others along its (f(am)ilial and civil) borders. It should also be recalled here, however, that the trace is also written within the problem of memory and time, even in its earliest formulations, in Derrida's reading of Husserl in *Speech and Phenomena*. As it reads the familiar phenomenological formulation (in Husserl) of Being as being marked by the "pure difference" of the gap between the fully-present moment (of experience, that which is always withdrawing, that which calls to be bracketed) and the moment of memory (of experience with and in language, and therefore within the movement of time), Derrida's essay posits the trace as the remains that exceeds even as it constitutes the appearance (in temporal terms) of Being as self-presence (Husserl's "Being-primordial"):

"But this pure difference, which constitutes the self-presence of the living present, introduces into self-presence from the beginning all the impurity putatively excluded from it. The living presence springs forth out of its non-identity with itself and from the possibility of a retentional trace. It is always already a trace. This trace cannot be thought

out on the basis of a simple present whose life would be within itself; the self of the living present is primordially a trace. The trace is not an attribute; we cannot say that the self of the living present 'primordially is' it. Being-primordial must be thought on the basis of the trace, and not the reverse. This proto-writing is at work at the origin of the sense. Sense, being temporal in nature, as Husserl recognized, is never simply present; it is always already engaged in the 'movement' of the trace, that is, in the order of 'signification.'"(*Speech and Phenomena*, 85)

So the remains of the trace (as the mark of remains) writes itself into and throughout Writing, the business of textual difference, the relationships with which and by which we read and write experience in time, grafting and cutting piece after piece and arranging them according to an admittedly aleatory logic. This operation, which cannot proceed without leaving the (memory of the) smell (as trace), might, as in the text I am reading, prove to be fatal, but it also demands my re-marking of its erasure; it also marks my inevitable return.

65. As it reads *The Thief's Journal* here, *Glas* plays on the chance of Hegel's signature and its variations being written into Genet's tale of crossing at the border. At the border (between Poland and Czechoslovakia) there is a field of rye (*seigles* in French) and a scene that re-calls, for Genet, the imagery of the Polish eagle in an heraldic blazon:

"I advanced slowly, surely, with the certainty of being the heraldic character for whom a natural blazon has been formed: azure, field of gold, sun, forests. This imagery, of which I was a part, was complicated by the Polish imagery."(*The Thief's Journal*, 48) And this scene inspires the call of the eagle, the call of the swooping, (though, it would seem at first, invisible) imperial signature of *Sa*:

"In this noonday sky the white eagle should soar invisible!"

To add to *Glas* readings of the cuttings in Genet's *récit* of the edge, of the border and the between of the woven unicorn (of tapestry) and the guards in the rye, *The Thief's Journal* then offers a note, a writing on the margins, that re-calls the memory of writing. *Glas* arrives at the note via the (signatory) rye:

"The flight of the eagle {*aigle*} had been pre-elaborated by a whole glean of rye {*seigles*} ('The ideal line traversed a field of ripe rye...', 'This rye field was bounded...', 'the rye was hiding...', 'Standing up I traversed the rye.', and so on). But it is not for the word *seigle* (rye) that the reference of this note appears:"(*Glas*, 194b)

And then, across from its judas cut with the story of Gabriel announcing the birth of John the Baptist, after which, the swooping of eagles and angels are described (incompletely) "[A]s the material signifying tomb(stone), as the signifying material falls"(*Glas*, 195bi), *Glas* re-cites the note that appears attached to the bottom of the page in the *Journal*:

"The first line of verse which to my amazement I found myself composing was the following: 'Harvester of stolen breath.' I am reminded of it by what I have written above."(*The Thief's Journal*, 49, cited in *Glas*, 194-95b)

After an interruption, in which *Glas* hears Derrida recall the few lines he can remember from what he has written, including another signatory speculation of the word "angle" (juxtaposed, remember, to the story of the angel (and here to a story by one)) and the re-citation of a gl- line of verse, the column returns to line of verse in the note by Genet and identifies (across signatures, here, now) the proper name at stake:

"Harvester of winded breaths. The other, 'sent by God,' 'his name was John,' had come to say 'In the Beginning was the Word.' The latter presents himself in order to sound the *glas* of breath...."(*Glas*, 196b)

66. This is, of course, the conclusion of Paul de Man's reading of these figures in Hegel's

*Encyclopedia* in his "Sign and Symbol in Hegel's *Aesthetics*." It also assumes (as a starting point) much of the work he had written earlier, including the theorization of "blindness" and the rhetorical positionality of reading in his essay on Derrida's reading of Rousseau in *Blindness and Insight* (pp. 102-42). Derrida reminds me of de Man's constant reading of memory (especially in Hegel) within his "own" *Memoires*, his own texts of mourning for de Man, in which he too offers a series of complex theorizations of memory (and its relationship to mourning) while reading Hegel, Heidegger, and de Man. The links forged between memory, narrative, acceleration, and the finitude of memory in these works resonates (often as the impossibility for a "true mourning") through the pages of *Glas*, thereby writing it into the disseminative figure of the flower and "the work of the tongue, of the teeth, and of saliva, of deglutition too, of assimilation and belching," in other words, the gl- work that exceeds ontology. (see *Glas*, 31bi)

Memory is bound (erect) to the operations of narrative in a problematic way as early as the first pages of *Memoires*, when Derrida opens the cut that would critique the relationship between memory, narrative, rhetoric, and mourning with a confession and a series of "rhetorical" questions.

"I have never known how to tell a story.

"And since I love nothing better than remembering and Memory itself -- Mnemosyne -- I have always felt this inability as a sad infirmity. Why am I denied narration? Why have I not received this gift? Why have I never received it from Mnemosyne, *tes ton Mouson metros*, the mother of all muses, as Socrates recalls in the *Theatetus*? The gift (*doron*) of Mnemosyne, Socrates insists, is like the wax in which all that we wish to guard in our memory is engraved in relief so that it may leave a mark, like that of rings, bands, or seals. We preserve our memory and our knowledge of them; we can then speak of them, and do them justice, as long as their image (*eidolon*) remains legible

"But what happens when the lover of Mnemosyne has not received the gift of narration? When he doesn't know how to tell a story? When it is precisely because he keeps the memory that he loses the narrative?" (*Memoires*, 3)

Derrida goes on to remind me that de Man had earlier linked memory to narrative within the undecidable space between fiction and autobiography opened up in "Autobiography as De-facement," wherein "infinite acceleration" is written into the unfolding of memories as narrative, confusing two irreducible figures -- irony and allegory (and linking the problems posed by autobiography as written memory to problems of genre, totalization and performance). (see *Memoires*, 23 and *Rhetoric of Romanticism*, 70-72) As de Man goes on to inscribe the figure of prosopopeia ("the signature of memoirs-from-beyond-the-grave") into that space between fiction and autobiography, and thereafter into writing as it delimits the finitude of memory, Derrida re-inscribes into this reading a reminder: that the figure marks a limit only insofar as it marks a trace of the other "in us, the other's irreducible precedence." (*Memoires*, 29)

"If there is a finitude of memory, it is because there is something of the other, and of memory as a memory of the other, which comes from the other and comes back to the other. It defies any totalization, and directs us to a scene of allegory, to a fiction of prosopopeia, that is, to tropologies of mourning: to the memory of mourning and to the mourning of memory." (*Memoires*, 29)

This analysis, between Derrida and de Man, around the intricacies of the Hegelian distinction between *Gedächtnis* and *Erinnerung*, and the space of undecidability that opens itself to fiction and allegory, is usefully supplemented by David Farrell Krell's excellent presentation of the difference between these two ways of thinking memory in Hegel, and the consequences of these theorizations for philosophy and psychoanalysis and, of course, for writing. I cite only the opening paragraph to Krell's detailed analysis:

"It may prove necessary to remember that the words for memory and remembrance in Hegel's philosophy -- *Gedächtnis* and *Erinnerung* -- recollect the whole of his thought,

so that they can scarcely be treated adequately as an isolated subject. *Gedächtnis* is reminiscent of *Gedanke*, *Denken*, of the thought and thinking as such. For Hegel, thought is the very form philosophy takes. *Erinnerung*, which he occasionally writes *Er-Innerung*, calls to mind not only a particular faculty or power of spirit but the *method*, the fundamental *way*, of all things on, above, and below the Earth -- the way of interiorization. Virtually every object that enters the philosopher's ken, whether of nature, society, culture, morality, or logic, serves to remind him or her of memory and remembrance. Each is metonymic-mnemonic of the whole; each is on the verge of *being* the whole. Yet if that is so, the movement of interiorization must come full circle, and thus must turn outward, without absolute beginning or end."(Krell, 205)

This entire cut in(to) *What Remains* is written with Krell's readings "in the back of my mind," in memory of them. In addition to reading Hegel's re-writing of thinking memory, Krell also reads the engrammatology of memory in (between) Aristotle, Merleau-Ponty, Freud, Heidegger and Derrida. But, even as "early" as Hegel's speculations concerning the role of the phenomenologist as philosopher of memory, the language of *Glas*, of memory as that which both constructs and makes untenable the construction of monuments, remains:

"The phenomenologist is the monster of memory who *shows* and *presents*. And the only thing that can prevent effortless ascent into absolute dogmatism is the readiness of the phenomenologist to *remember*. Relentlessly. Monumentally."(Krell, 233)

67. The problem of the subject as it approaches blindness, the difficulty posed by determining the origin and status of the lack (of perception), is once again a problem written along the edges of the distinction between thought (as reflection of things-in-the-world) and interiorization. It is, for instance the same problem posed by the gradual "blindness" that afflicts Kafka's "man from the country" in the parable "Before the Law," a tale both published separately, as a cutting unbound and re-bound (erect) into a separate volume, and as a graft with(in) a larger work (*The Trial*). In the parable (and this generic difficulty will not go away) the problem arises as the one who remains in a position before a law that remains inaccessible -- because it has already established itself as the Law (of singularity as meaning) -- is reaching the "end" of his tenure at his post. "At length, his eyesight begins to fail, and he does not know whether the world is really darker or whether his eyes are only deceiving him."(*The Penal Colony*, 149) Within the larger text, within the "host" text from which this graft is cut, the effect of this blindness on the position of the man before the law is debated between two interpretants, a debate that could also be re-cited here and now.

But also written around this brief *récit*, and between it and questions of philosophy and literature, before the Law of discipline and the discipline of Law, is an essay by Derrida which takes as its title the translated (or should it be untranslated?) title of the parable (reminding me in its *incipit* that "One title occasionally resonates like the citation of another. But as soon as it names something else as well, it no longer simply cites."): *Devant la Loi*. The question of the singularity of the title, the *récit*, the author, and the literary status of the text directs this address. It would ask what remains inaccessible to the law, and thereby writes itself into the series of questions that interest and constrain us here. What remains when the door, when the text, is closed? Must I remain always before the door (which stands, like a text, written between "me" and the Law)?

One possible response (though it, eventually, becomes an untenable one as well) that approaches these questions is offered in an exchange (in *The Trial*) between the priest who relates the parable to K. and his interlocutor. The exchange concludes a (partial) translation of Derrida's reading and the difficulties it poses remain here, now, to guide a further reading between *Glas* and CA:

"I therefore leave you with this other *récit*. There, the speaker who narrates in the



account is the priest, and what he says might form a quotation to head another lecture: 'You do not have enough respect for what is written, you change the account,' he says to K., and further on: 'do not misunderstand me, I am merely showing you the views on that there are on this point. You must not pay too much attention to commentaries. The script is immutable and the commentaries often merely express the despair that this causes.'" (*Devant la Loi*, 149)

68. I have already hinted at how thoroughly and irreducibly memory is bound to mourning throughout the work of Hegel, Heidegger, Freud, and Derrida. This seems to me to be in constant operation within a reading of CA's scenes of mourning (as introjection and (compulsive) repetition) as well. For more on these relationships, of course, one should examine Freud's "Mourning and Melancholy" and Abraham and Torok's *The Wolf Man's Magic Word*. But this binding is explicitly re-written in terms of remains and the memory of the departed when Derrida sketches the limits of reading as the finitude of memory re-marked by a trace (as a gap of difference):

"When we say 'in us' or 'between us' to recall ourselves faithfully 'to the memory of,' of which memory are we speaking, *Gedächtnis* or *Erinnerung*? The movement of interiorization keeps within us the life, thought, body, voice, look or soul of the other, but in the form of those hypomnemata, memoranda, signs or symbols, images or mnesic representations which are only lacunary fragments, detached and dispersed -- only 'parts' of the departed other. In turn they are parts of us, included 'in us' in a memory which suddenly seems greater and older than us, 'greater,' beyond any quantitative comparisons: sublimely greater *than* this other that the memory harbors and guards within it, but also greater *with* this other, greater than itself, inadequate to itself, pregnant with this other." (*Memoires*, 37)

For a detailed analysis of the demarcation between introjection and incorporation (between a speaking interiorization, wherein "'denomination' is its privileged medium," and the clandestine disguise and silence that would mark the incorporation (in the crypt) of the other for the Self) in the act of what Freud would define as "normal" mourning, and the problems these terms pose for the memory of the other and its memory (as interiorization), see Derrida's Foreword ("*Fors*: The English Words of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok") to *The Wolf Man's Magic Word*, especially pp. xvi-xxi.

A final binding, as a return, so to speak, to the "beginning": Within the Hegelian formulation of memory (in the *Phenomenology*) *Erinnerung* is occasionally written with a hyphen (as *Er-Innerung*) in order, Krell suggests, "to stress that all the icons in the gallery traversed by spirit are now recognized as being spirit's own productions." (Krell, 236) Even spirit (as absolute memory, as "true mourning") seems to require its own introjection, even as that in itself would render it impossible (because it could no longer be absolute, impregnated as it would be with the remains of the other (spirit)). This is evidenced in CA whenever mourning takes place in "the presence of" the other (as spirit) and introjection is revealed to be both interiorization and remembrance of the external (that remains, even as a ghost, within the narrative) simultaneously, thereby overrunning the limits of "normal" or "proper" mourning and the "finitude" of memory.

69. The dream of clarity (and its bound rhetoric of "purity") that so often accompanies the operations of principles of "reason" and "order" is in part the subject of Derrida's analysis of the institution of the university and its "founding" principles in "The Principle of Reason: The University in the Eyes of its Pupils." For purposes of reading the effects of Fernanda's founding order, I would call attention to this text and to Derrida's supposition about the university's "reason for being":

"As far as I know, nobody has ever founded a university *against* reason. So we

may reasonably suppose that the University's reason for being has always been reason itself, and some essential connection of reason to being. ("Principle," 7)

This connection proves also to tie reason (as a principle) to (the) representation (of being) (see, for instance, Heidegger's analysis of this in *The Principle of Reason*, or, for a different but related reading, Kant's definition of reason as "the faculty of principles" in *The Conflict of Faculties*). The call of the principle of reason (a call Heidegger describes in terms of the sending and the hearing of an address) is heard, suggests Derrida, at the founding moment of the university, and resonates throughout its structures and operations. But it also silences a return call, a putting into question the principle of the principle of reason. "Are we obeying the principle of reason when we ask what grounds this principle which is itself a principle of grounding? We are not -- which does not mean that we are disobeying it either." ("Principle," 9) The problem is posed here because of the relation at work between reason, ontology, and representation -- the very concerns which circulate when reason is the founding principle of an order imposed within Family walls.

"The modern dominance of the principle of reason had to go hand in hand with the interpretation of the essence of beings as objects, an object present as representation, an object placed and positioned *before* a subject. [...] This relation of representation -- which in its whole extension is not merely a relation of knowing -- has to be grounded, ensured, protected: that is what we are told by the principle of reason." ("Principle," 10)

Derrida goes on to remind me that this putting into question the founding of a founding principle challenges not only the operation and stability of the institution but the relationship between the institution and the State as well, especially in the case of the university and its interplay with a State sketched out not as a nation-state but as "multinational military industrial complexes or techno-economic networks, or rather international technomilitary networks that are apparently multi- or trans-national in form." ("Principle," 11) In addition, the effect of this interrogation is also to direct attention to and to delimit the borders and frames of the institutional structures and their operations -- departments, rooms, those places and subjects kept separate by walls. One of the forces engaged by the principle of reason is the business of establishing and maintaining borders ("theoretical," "physical," "institutional," etc.) including those of departments, disciplines, and genres and those of Family, civil society, and the State (in *Glas* and CA). For a detailed analysis of how these forces of separation operate in the name of reason and purity in both political and institutional terms (in both the nation-state and the university), see Derrida's exchange with Ann McLintock and Rob Nixon on the issue of apartheid: "Racism's Last Word," "No Names Apart," and "But Beyond....," especially pp. 168-170 of the last text, concerning "the homelands of academic culture or of 'political action.'" ("But Beyond....," 170)

70. Hegel is also a teacher of voice in *Glas*. The critical distinction within speculative dialectics between the functions of nature and spirit and the position of the Self within a process of interiorization is voiced in several of Hegel's texts in terms of the resonating of voice, (the rhetorical ringing of a *Klang* in Hegel's metaphor) and the sound of external noise.

"In the process of subjectivizing idealization that the oscillation and the vibration punctuate, the difference between nature and spirit corresponds to the difference between what does not resonate starting from (it)self, the bodies (*Die Körper klingen noch nicht aus sich selbst*), and what resonates with (it)self. The history of *Klang* is what reappropriates itself up to resounding *with Klang itself*." (*Glas*, 250a)

Dialectics, and the ontology that accompanies it, seems to be a question of the resonance of noise and voice, the passage from noise to voice (from the Jena *Philosophy of Nature* through the *Encyclopedia*). "Only in the voice is 'subjectivity or independence of form present.'" Between noise and voice, within the ringing of the Hegelian *Klang*,

(between, that is, the exterior and the interior of (the philosophy of) the subject) is the cutting place of *Glas*' operations on the dialectics of subjectivity. In Hegel, the passive, exterior noise and the active, interiorized "voice" (of the *Klang*) (and the relationship of both to "hearing") form a dialectical opposition that allows for their relief (for an *Aufhebung*), ultimately, as a universal subjectivity (formed by the coupling of voice and hearing). (See *Glas*, 250a, last paragraph) But within this coupling, there is a fermentation at work, a leaking of remains (as an escaping of heat) which Hegel seeks to account for in terms of (the example of) a bell, and I will let that bell ring here, as the *glas* (of the) note is sounded, immediately following a reminder that Ronell sends me (via a call) to point out that another Bell, the one who would sign, in such a complex way, the voice machine and a system for its instillation that carries his name over the wires, Alexander Graham, was also (always) a teacher of voice.

"Yet a bell will become hot by being struck for example, and this is a heat...not external to it. Not only the musician gets warm, but also the instrument." (*Glas*, citing *The Philosophy of Nature*, vol.2, 81-82, 251a)

71. If these are to be (the) "cuts," they can only be so as long as they remain unsutured, not purely detached, only incisions which allow the skin to remain (as a pocket) on both sides, though without allowing for the possibility of ever managing a closing (off) of the wound. They would offer themselves only as cuts into an already written strategy of binding and re-binding, of "detachment as stricture." They would, of course, seek to avoid "a logic or even dialectic of opposition" that often accompanies the figure of the cut as a simple detachment, as a cutting loose or unbinding, a setting free from stricture, an operation which is rendered impossible here, in part by what remains. The possibility of remains (after the cut) poses a problem discussed in some detail in Derrida's "debate" between Heidegger and Meyer Schapiro in "Restitutions." The difficulty begins with the resonance of another discourse (of the doctors) that is noticed within a dialogue "on the laces" in Van Gogh's paintings of peasant shoes (on which Heidegger and Schapiro had, of course, already written).

"--I'm bothered by this word 'cut.' First of all it sets things up too quickly, it arraigns and maintains in a problematic of castration truth[.]" (*Truth in Painting*, 340)

The debate continues, thereafter, to spell out precisely the sort of re-writing of the metaphor of the cut that would be required within the business of *glas*-writing and the logics of binding and the graft that are so crucial in this reading here and now. Within this citation (which will be bound below, grafted onto the end of the note for the purposes of introducing yet another rhetoric into the forest of available discourses) the "cut" is re-written (using the quasi-logic of the generalized fetish, the fold that is and is not...) along the lines of the stricture, along the formation of binding ligaments and detachment, a logic which, as explained, carries with it the problematics of the double bind (and "band"). The citation is closed with the binding of its own "proper" note that proves to name the most proper name for *What Remains*, *Glas*, wherein the figure of the double band/bind is "most extensively exploited by Derrida." The annunciation of the "proper" name continues a (hi)story of *Glas*-citations (a (hi)story of *Glas* as text) that has already been undertaken in "earlier" *Remain(s)*. The explanation remains:

"This problematic is a bit simplistic -- a case or an effect at the very most -- if you take into account the argument-of-the- girdle or of the two-shoes. And then these laces, precisely, these loosened bonds do not seem to me to play in a logic of the cut. Rather in the logic of the stricture, in the interlacing of *différance* of (or as) stricture. The loosening of the laces is not absolute, it does not absolve, unbind, cut. It keeps an organized stricture. Not a more or less of stricture but a determined (structured) form of stricture: of the outside and the inside, the underneath and the top. The logic of detachment as cut leads to opposition. I have shown elsewhere that it has the effect of sublating difference. And

thus of suturing. The logic of detachment as stricture is *entirely other*. Deferring: it never sutures. Here it permits us to take account of this fact: that these shoes are neither attached nor detached, neither full nor empty. A double bind is here as though suspended and imposed simultaneously, a double bind which I shall not here attempt to attach strictly to another discourse on the double bind. But this shifty, limping, more or less paired pair, like the in between band, ajar, is neither empty nor full. A certain haunting, which will return in a moment, cannot accommodate any of these couples of oppositions, of these oppositional cuts. If I say of the ghost in this leasing-out of shoes, that *le, la, les double(s) band --*"(*Truth in Painting*, 340)

72. The State's exaltation of the memory of the dead enemy is also one part of what *Glas* describes (in Genet's operations) as "writing." The value of the *glas* remains unbalanced and undecidable (as a strategy) and is used, therefore, to keep possible challengers "off guard." The citation in *Glas* begins to sound as if it were offering instructions, lessons in writing the double-bind(band) of the text along the lines of a ritual of mourning (even for an enemy).

"To write, for Genet

[But already there is a problem in reading, even this much. The opening clause allows itself to be read in a number of ways whose difference poses the question of subject-position within the business of writing. Is the text sent to Genet, written "for him"? Is writing an operation of mourning (by Genet) or is it an act of mourning for Genet and the "death" of his texts as they are read? What is it to write "for"? The function of the "for(s)" (remembering Abraham and the double bind of inside and out, interior and exterior, introjection and incorporation, that is also already the double bind of mourning (see "translator's note" at the beginning of "Fors")) is the function of opening mourning and writing to the undecidability of its "own" addressee(s).]

Again:

"To write, for Genet: to know how to carry, to include the neck (*cou*

(And here an insert that is carved into the column to cite Genet will be temporarily erased.)

*p*) cutting stroke. To draw with a song the course of a blade that, erecting the text, makes it fall on the other side and so precipitates two inseparable heads, one the exalted, the brandished, the aureolated, the other what resembles and reflects it, to a near margin that renders the balance undecidable and announces the cost of the operation very quickly: a *glas* that no longer dies away."(*Glas*, 62-64b)

This, it could be said, describes the operation I am pursuing here. It is also a step towards an account of the function of the remains (which remain caught in the double bind of the ruse). Consider, along these lines, the lines that *Glas* lifts and sews into its "theory" of the double column, lines from "What Remained of a Rembrandt..." that could just as easily have been written, here, now:

"The remain(s), all the remain(s) seemed to me the effect of an optical error provoked by my appearance itself necessarily faked."(*Glas*, 44b)

73. For a rereading of irony as a *glace*-trope, and, thereby a reading of it back into *Glas* and into *What Remains*, see Derrida's work on *Romeo and Juliet*: "Aphorism Countertime." Here Derrida offers irony as a trope that functions, within an icy scene, to mark a space between for the play to follow its "impossible" re-writings of names, masks, and bad timing. As such, irony re-writes the double-bind in explicit and "ironic" ways. Amidst all of this, among these aphorisms that themselves (generically, as it were) ironically resist the completion of their own *récit* and the *récit* they would (ironically) feign to read), the scenes of the ironic take place surrounded by the props of *Glas*, the writing of

*glace* into *glas* and into Hegel's and Genet's obsession with the maintenance of remains.

"33. The lunar face of this shadow play, a certain coldness of *Romeo and Juliet*. Not all is of ice or glass, but the ice on it does not only come from death, from the marble to which everything seems doomed (to tomb, the monument, the grave, the flowers on the lady's grave), in the sepulchrally statuesque fate which entwines and separates these two lovers, starting from the fact of their names. No, the coldness which, little by little, takes over the body of the play, and, as if in advance, cadaverizes it, is perhaps irony, the figure of the rhetoric of irony, the contretemps of ironic consciousness. It always places itself disproportionately between finitude and infinitude, it makes use of inadequation, of aphorism, it analyzes the law of misidentification, the implacable necessity, the machine of the proper name that obliges me to live through precisely that, in other words my name, of which I am dying." ("Aphorism Countertime," 431-432)

This is the fate of the *seing* as well, in *Glas* and CA. For more on the effect of "Speaking ironically" and the "events" of *Romeo and Juliet*, and the events being read here and now in CA, see also aphorism 36, following which Hegel puts in a brief appearance.

74. The double potential of friendship (its ability to be both liberatory and binding (since it involves a graft, a stricture) at the same time) is also taken up in *Glas* in terms of Genet as reader of the column written "for" him. Here, explicitly the problematic is laid out first in terms of one who would sign (here, now) John (198ai) and then in a more generalized logic. The binding quality of friendship (that serves to limit in the name of the (religious) object) has already been discussed in terms of the contract of the apostles upon eating of the bits of the body. On the other hand, friendship works against the continuation of a (hi)story within the business of sending and receiving writing (whether scriptures or missives). It is a case of inevitable judgment and the double-bind of the letter (and sentence):

"So, anyhow, I am judged and condemned, that is what he always sought to do: if I write for him, I write against his text. This friendship is irreconcilable." (*Glas*, 200b)

Genet's texts, of course are easily read as discourses on the problematics of friendship (consider, for instance Stillitano, or Harmacone, or *The Maids*). In CA part of what contributes to the liberatory quality of certain, usually incestuous friendships, is the maintenance of a secret (the province and difference, remember, that marks "woman" for Hegel). Friendship, then, is at least in partially entangled in its own silence, in the Other that will not speak. It is, therefore, already a political engagement. The final explicit "friend" to arrive and leave the *récit* will, of course, "later" sign it with the mark of a visiting angel.

For a more detailed reading of the philosophical formulations of friendship (explicitly in terms of Hegel and Nietzsche, the terms that "conclude" (in "opposition") one reading of *Glas*) see also Derrida's essay "The Politics of Friendship." Also, *Glas* reminds me, when it cites Genet's *The Thief's Journal*, that the state of being "friendless" is always bound to the act of memory (of the de-parted, Stillitano), and to the undecidable epistemology of solitude. (See *The Thief's Journal*, 82)

75. And here the "reading" (proper) begins to fall gradually into remains. It is here, now, then that the last note is signed (for the remains cite without explanation, only in bits, disappearing already). The seventy-fifth note. On the way to a hundred, to the end of the reading but not arriving, remaining outside the "end" of the *récit*, the remaining note offers a pair of final citations and the beginning of a new reading, a simultaneous grafting that the reader is encouraged to follow beyond the border of the page and back along an interminable wire (*fil*). First, a question and an answer (from Edmond Jabes) which appears at least in part to speak to the operation that has preceded:

"And if dialogue were only tearing an anonymous book into pieces which do not so much try to recombine as mark the cuts? We talk across a wound whose origins we still do not know."(*The Book of Dialogue*, 16)

Second, a brief set of remarks (between two voices) on the breath of the remains (as a trace of the cinder that marks a burning) that vanish before they can end:

"At present, here and now, there is something material -- visible but scarcely readable -- that referring only to itself, no longer makes a trace, unless it traces only by losing the trace it scarcely leaves

-- that it just barely remains

-- but that is just what he calls the trace, this effacement. I have the impression now that the best paradigm for the trace, for him, is not, as some have believed, and he as well, perhaps, the trail of the hunt, the fraying, the furrow in the sand, the wake in the sea, the love of the step for its imprint, but the cinder (what remains without remaining from the holocaust, from the all-burning, from the incineration the incense)

-- That is remains for very few people, and, however slightly one touches it, it falls, it does not fall into cinders, it gets lost down to the cinder of its cinders. In writing this way, he burns one more time, he burns what he still adores although he has already burned it, he is intent on it"(*Cinders*, 43)

Finally, a new text, another possible method of operation (of reading) that the reader may wish to pursue (to begin again) while searching for more of what remains:

Many year later, as he faced the firing squad,  
Colonel Aureliano Buendía was to remember  
that distant afternoon when his father took him  
to discover ice.

What remains?  
What remains of the be-  
tween and of the space  
that divides, the seam  
that touches both  
borders?

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